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dantaik merged 1 commit into from
Sep 30, 2026
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docs(protocol): add Proposal0026 artifact verification #22182

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166 changes: 164 additions & 2 deletions packages/protocol/script/layer1/proposals/Proposal0026.md
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -150,6 +150,95 @@ raiko2 commit; gaiko2-sgxgeth uses gaiko2 commit
`@sha256:8b8de3572a9e798226fb1b42623d59d1bf5ba80fbe79177be5c13b5d033ae77e`
- `gaiko2-sgxgeth@sha256:309afe801117934ad64906014c2cb049461f5c09ca2ff2a3d7d595ec64094886`

The [v0.9.0 release page](https://github.com/taikoxyz/raiko2/releases/tag/v0.9.0) publishes the
source-reproduction instructions and these machine-readable artifacts:

| Artifact | Release asset | SHA-256 |
| ------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| Release manifest | [`release-manifest-v0.9.0.json`](https://github.com/taikoxyz/raiko2/releases/download/v0.9.0/release-manifest-v0.9.0.json) | `e0fe8f2283fa4112206fe6d6686e81121e083251b2a7a3722b30818933dedd06` |
| ZK digest summary | [`guest-digests-summary.json`](https://github.com/taikoxyz/raiko2/releases/download/v0.9.0/guest-digests-summary.json) | `376225618b838bbe1e93be5ff1670eec1a4fb101bf69e52acbe2176761ed5ed2` |
| TEE attestation manifest | [`tee-attestation-manifest-v0.9.0.json`](https://github.com/taikoxyz/raiko2/releases/download/v0.9.0/tee-attestation-manifest-v0.9.0.json) | `de75ce83550809ca4a495abfec34e6a177e12ab73a2a75716e68a95c827b812c` |

Reproduce the ZK identifiers from a clean `taikoxyz/raiko2` checkout. Build the guests before
running `guest-digests`; otherwise the command only re-hashes the checked-in release artifacts.
Compare the sorted `.digests` projection because `created_at_unix` changes on every run:

```bash
export TAG=v0.9.0
export REPRO_DIR=target/releases/${TAG}/zk-digest-repro

git fetch --tags origin "${TAG}"
git checkout "${TAG}"
Comment on lines +170 to +171

@chatgpt-codex-connector chatgpt-codex-connector Bot Sep 30, 2026

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P2 Badge Bind the reproduction workflow to the documented artifacts

The workflow resolves TAG to whatever v0.9.0 currently points at, but never asserts HEAD is the documented dcbf... commit or checks either downloaded blob against the SHA-256 values in the new table. If the tag is force-moved and the corresponding release assets are replaced, both source-vs-release diffs can succeed against the altered release, so this procedure no longer verifies the artifacts that Proposal0026 documents. Check the checkout commit and run SHA-256 verification immediately after each download.

Useful? React with 👍 / 👎.

mkdir -p "${REPRO_DIR}"

just build-guest all --force

cargo run -r -p xtask-build-guest --bin guest-digests --features digests -- \
--output "${REPRO_DIR}/from-source.json"

gh release download "${TAG}" --repo taikoxyz/raiko2 \
--pattern guest-digests-summary.json \
--dir "${REPRO_DIR}" \
--clobber

jq -S '.digests | sort_by(.proof_system, .object_name, .stage, .digest_source)' \
"${REPRO_DIR}/guest-digests-summary.json" > "${REPRO_DIR}/release-digests.sorted.json"
jq -S '.digests | sort_by(.proof_system, .object_name, .stage, .digest_source)' \
"${REPRO_DIR}/from-source.json" > "${REPRO_DIR}/source-digests.sorted.json"
diff -u "${REPRO_DIR}/release-digests.sorted.json" \
"${REPRO_DIR}/source-digests.sorted.json"
```

Reproduce the TEE source pins and MRENCLAVEs from the same release checkout. A disposable local
key cannot reproduce the official Taiko MRSIGNER, which comes only from the protected
`sgx-release-signing` workflow, so remove `attestation.mr_signer` from both projections:

```bash
export TAG=v0.9.0
export REPRO_DIR=target/releases/${TAG}/tee-provider-repro

git fetch --tags origin "${TAG}"
git checkout "${TAG}"
mkdir -p "${REPRO_DIR}"

gh release download "${TAG}" --repo taikoxyz/raiko2 \
--pattern "tee-attestation-manifest-${TAG}.json" \
--dir "${REPRO_DIR}" \
--clobber

openssl genrsa -3 -out "${REPRO_DIR}/local-gramine-signing-key.pem" 3072
RAIKO2_SGX_ENCLAVE_KEY_HOST="${REPRO_DIR}/local-gramine-signing-key.pem" \
cargo run -r -p xtask --no-default-features --features tee-provider-release -- \
release-tee-providers --tag "${TAG}" --no-push

cp "target/releases/${TAG}/tee-attestation-manifest-${TAG}.json" \
"${REPRO_DIR}/from-source.json"

jq -S '[.providers[]
| {lane, provider, source, attestation: (.attestation | del(.mr_signer))}]
| sort_by(.provider, .lane)' \
"${REPRO_DIR}/tee-attestation-manifest-${TAG}.json" \
> "${REPRO_DIR}/release-tee.no-signer.sorted.json"
jq -S '[.providers[]
| {lane, provider, source, attestation: (.attestation | del(.mr_signer))}]
| sort_by(.provider, .lane)' \
"${REPRO_DIR}/from-source.json" \
> "${REPRO_DIR}/source-tee.no-signer.sorted.json"
diff -u "${REPRO_DIR}/release-tee.no-signer.sorted.json" \
"${REPRO_DIR}/source-tee.no-signer.sorted.json"
```

`release-tee-providers --no-push` verifies local metadata but does not authenticate the published
registry objects. Inspect all four tags separately and confirm their reported manifests match the
immutable digests above:

```bash
docker buildx imagetools inspect us-docker.pkg.dev/evmchain/images/raiko2:v0.9.0
docker buildx imagetools inspect us-docker.pkg.dev/evmchain/images/raiko2-sgx:v0.9.0
docker buildx imagetools inspect us-docker.pkg.dev/evmchain/images/raiko2-sgx:v0.9.0-edmm
docker buildx imagetools inspect us-docker.pkg.dev/evmchain/images/gaiko2-sgxgeth:v0.9.0
```

Both SGX verifiers have `nextInstanceId() == 3` at the pinned pre-execution state. IDs `0` and `1`
are empty and ID `2` is the active v0.8.0-rc1 registration. Actions 19 and 20 delete ID `2`.
After the proposal executes, each v0.9.0 provider must register separately; the next successful
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -323,7 +412,7 @@ transaction (it happened during the Proposal0022 deployment), so the receipts we
summary:

```bash
export L1_RPC=<l1 rpc>
export L1_RPC='<l1 rpc>'
cast codesize 0xA18431d42C8dF9778905fBEa912aCF1881b49D2e --rpc-url $L1_RPC # 23058
cast codesize 0x526957d1a25E9D3F5ab5a4926d07eEE5d612ED42 --rpc-url $L1_RPC # 2407, LibInboxSetup
cast codesize 0x511e1E5D9b9E23958076ccF1dD0033237a8cE4f8 --rpc-url $L1_RPC # 1936, LibForcedInclusion
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -355,6 +444,79 @@ Deployed on 2026-09-12 by `0x56706f118e42ae069f20c5636141b844d1324ae1`, all in L

Every commented value is the expected result.

### Live verifier preconditions

Immediately before submission, check the live mainnet state rather than assuming the historical
fork preconditions still hold. The old values must all return `true`, the final v0.9.0 values must
all return `false`, both SGX verifiers must still report `nextInstanceId() == 3`, and instance ID
`2` must still contain a non-zero provider address:

```bash
(
set -euo pipefail

export L1_RPC='<l1 rpc>'
RISC0_VERIFIER=0x059dAF31F571da48Ab4e74Ae12F64f907681Cd8b
SP1_VERIFIER=0x73A0Db393ef87ce781ac7957bE10D6628432100F
SGXGETH_ATTESTER=0x0ffa4A625ED9DB32B70F99180FD00759fc3e9261
SGXRETH_ATTESTER=0x8d7C954960a36a7596d7eA4945dDf891967ca8A3
SGXGETH_VERIFIER=0x41e79EB4F03aBB5DF8716B759528dc5d8f6a84Ee
SGXRETH_VERIFIER=0x9D3C595BFf6Ff7D2b2CbdEcF94aD917eB2fCFFd8
ZERO_ADDRESS=0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000

check_trust() {
local target=$1 signature=$2 expected=$3 value actual
shift 3
for value in "$@"; do
actual=$(cast call "$target" "$signature" "$value" --rpc-url "$L1_RPC")
test "$actual" = "$expected" || {
echo "unexpected trust state: target=$target value=$value expected=$expected actual=$actual" >&2
return 1
}
done
}

# Live v0.8.0-rc1 values: all true.
check_trust "$RISC0_VERIFIER" 'isImageTrusted(bytes32)(bool)' true \
0xd6ab71c22201c23ef512b706f2e2d720f6da1b559fb76834aa9d4e35276f6e10 \
0xdd9b8abff96c409ae2418edfb51d893ea2bd10f4873a0226f17a6998c1afc1b7
check_trust "$SP1_VERIFIER" 'isProgramTrusted(bytes32)(bool)' true \
0x0025425c22e827507428a3d9c7b0f89635be5462f34bb6780563e3d6086be7c7 \
0x12a12e113a09d41d05147b387b0f89632df2a3174d2ed9e00ac7c7ac086be7c7 \
0x0051ac1d9e8cfd4196e37f9cfefd08e9b0f7ce653bad4634cd1ee84b71ca3be6 \
0x28d60ecf233f50655c6ff39f6fd08e9b07be73296eb518d31a3dd09671ca3be6
check_trust "$SGXGETH_ATTESTER" 'trustedUserMrEnclave(bytes32)(bool)' true \
0x5f7da556f3b75dcc71465030e1b7274e82df9e9120c0b3eaf5bb76246a514005
check_trust "$SGXRETH_ATTESTER" 'trustedUserMrEnclave(bytes32)(bool)' true \
0x3564b6a30089fcb3e2f69c19b22d23f84ce148387cd7a15f5c1df165b2ae5847 \
0xae2c7b92b2a71238226cb624ecd1171b66bf943cc372314affca0e6748ccecdf

# Final v0.9.0 values: all false before execution.
check_trust "$RISC0_VERIFIER" 'isImageTrusted(bytes32)(bool)' false \
0x88712dad7dc78126ee7bb592282d3102569c706f1b9db80580a582e5ffd1dfb0 \
0x04480b22e244d60165f3d0898bc61ea084d9c76221464a8a3c3343c74889040a
check_trust "$SP1_VERIFIER" 'isProgramTrusted(bytes32)(bool)' false \
0x0012b97234e59f2319d44202c7b093fed9c9a51b2068e38d26625c139d668c97 \
0x095cb91a3967c8c63a8840587b093fed4e4d28d901a38e344cc4b8271d668c97 \
0x0017912dfd72308e2e2cd4211b05ed73a97eb7f576816adec2606a37507de51e \
0x0bc896fe5c8c238b459a8423305ed73a4bf5bfab5a05ab7b04c0d46e507de51e
check_trust "$SGXGETH_ATTESTER" 'trustedUserMrEnclave(bytes32)(bool)' false \
0x8c23c79045b9b6bb827eab208e0fe58d7446a57a55f3dfc825c90e904953105b
check_trust "$SGXRETH_ATTESTER" 'trustedUserMrEnclave(bytes32)(bool)' false \
0xfeabd725eb5bb621b5c6a5071d1702bcbe06a643b42a0db8f381d5bc07dd81bf \
0x6f3c8c55ec62fe48b83e57463e8717aa9f8594418203c9520f0f80e6f4fc4d87

for verifier in "$SGXGETH_VERIFIER" "$SGXRETH_VERIFIER"; do
test "$(cast call "$verifier" 'nextInstanceId()(uint256)' --rpc-url "$L1_RPC")" = 3
provider=$(cast call "$verifier" 'instances(uint256)(address,uint64)' 2 \
--rpc-url "$L1_RPC" | sed -n '1p')
test "$provider" != "$ZERO_ADDRESS"
done
)
```

### Inbox implementation and proposal rehearsal

The fork rehearsal defaults to L1 block **26,075,649**, after the implementation deployment and
Proposal0021 execution but before Proposal0026. At that block all v0.8.0-rc1 identifiers are
trusted, all v0.9.0 identifiers are untrusted, `nextInstanceId()` is `3` on both SGX verifiers,
Expand All @@ -364,7 +526,7 @@ another block only if it has the same preconditions; `--fork-block-number` does
created inside the test.

```bash
export L1_RPC=<l1 rpc>
export L1_RPC='<l1 rpc>'
export INBOX=0x6f21C543a4aF5189eBdb0723827577e1EF57ef1f
export NEW_IMPL=0xA18431d42C8dF9778905fBEa912aCF1881b49D2e
CONFIG='getConfig()((address,address,address,address,address,uint64,uint64,uint48,uint48,uint48,uint48,uint48,uint8,uint16,uint64,uint64,uint8))'
Expand Down
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