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Fix CI on current black and mypy #245

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choosen23 wants to merge 1 commit into from
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Fix CI on current black and mypy #245

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4 changes: 1 addition & 3 deletions src/nashpy/algorithms/support_enumeration.py
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -254,7 +254,5 @@ def support_enumeration(
An even number of ({}) equilibria was returned. This
indicates that the game is degenerate. Consider using another algorithm
to investigate.
""".format(
count
)
""".format(count)
warnings.warn(warning, RuntimeWarning)
4 changes: 1 addition & 3 deletions src/nashpy/game.py
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Expand Up @@ -61,9 +61,7 @@ def __repr__(self) -> str:
{}

Column player:
{}""".format(
tpe, *self.payoff_matrices
)
{}""".format(tpe, *self.payoff_matrices)

def __getitem__(self, key: Any) -> npt.NDArray:
row_strategy, column_strategy = key
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2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion src/nashpy/learning/imitation_dynamics.py
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Expand Up @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ def imitation_dynamics(
iterations=1000,
random_seed=None,
threshold=0.5,
) -> Generator[Tuple[float, float], Any, None]:
) -> Generator[Tuple[npt.NDArray, npt.NDArray], Any, None]:
"""
Simulate the imitation dynamics for a given game represented by payoff matrices A and B.

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