Security is the primary design constraint for this crate.
Only the latest published stable SDK release receives security fixes. Older SDK releases may remain wire-compatible but are not security-supported. An older OpenBao server profile can remain wire-compatible without making that server release eligible for security maintenance. Upgrade the SDK independently of the selected OpenBao compatibility profile.
Do not open a public issue for suspected vulnerabilities.
Report privately through GitHub Security Advisories or contact the maintainers through the private channel listed in the repository profile.
Include the affected version or commit, enabled features, operating system, Rust version, OpenBao state, reproduction steps, and proof of impact. Do not include real tokens, private keys, unseal material, or production secrets.
unsafe_code = "forbid"applies to this crate's own Rust sources. TLS and cryptographic dependencies can contain unsafe Rust, FFI, assembly, or native code and remain part of the trusted computing base. This includes the sanitization and sanitization-secrecy storage implementations and their platform-specific unsafe code. Advisory-clean dependencies are not proof of independent unsafe-code review; deployments requiring such assurance must audit the exact resolved dependency graph and retain their lockfile.- HTTPS, TLS verification, TLS 1.3, and disabled redirects are the defaults.
- Credential-bearing external service configuration fails closed on plaintext transport. Typed OIDC/JWKS, Kubernetes, RabbitMQ, LDAP/Kerberos LDAP, and reviewed built-in database connections enforce their documented TLS policy.
- TLS 1.2, native TLS, raw transports, operator operations, software Transit import wrapping, and other high-risk capabilities require explicit feature acknowledgements.
- Tokens, accessors, credentials, and secret response fields use secret-aware types and redacted diagnostics.
- Paths, headers, durations, collection sizes, request bodies, and response bodies are validated or bounded before use.
- Environment CA certificates must be regular, non-link files no larger than 1 MiB and are opened with platform-specific link protections.
- OpenBao compatibility is selected through immutable, fail-closed profiles; unknown newer servers are rejected unless explicitly acknowledged.
- Third-party GitHub Actions are pinned to immutable commit SHAs, dependencies
are checked with
cargo denyand RustSec, and every release requires a reviewed pentest report.
Dependency checks establish source integrity and enforce the configured policy;
they do not prove a dependency is trustworthy or detect every malicious release.
This project does not provide an independently reviewed cargo-vet audit chain,
committed vendor sources, or a signed internal registry. Deployments requiring
those assurances must establish them separately before approving this SDK.
SDK-owned JSON, form, and byte request-body allocations are sanitized after the final HTTP-body owner drops. Uniquely owned receive chunks are sanitized after copying into secret storage. Dependency-owned HTTP, TLS, allocator, kernel, and device buffers can retain copies this crate cannot sanitize. Memory locking covers only the authenticated client's retained token when its acknowledged feature is enabled; it does not automatically lock every request or response secret.
PKI authority key export and ordinary certificate issuance reject pem_bundle:
the server duplicates private keys into otherwise public certificate/CSR fields.
Use pem or der so conforming responses keep private keys in secret-aware
fields. Public-only bundles remain supported. This is not a guarantee that an
untrusted server cannot place secret content in arbitrary public text fields.
ML-DSA message and import Base64 syntax validation is bounded but variable-time: the strict validator avoids a message-sized decoded allocation and the expensive 64-symbol-per-byte constant-time scan. It does not protect against co-resident cache observers; dependency-owned stack scratch/state is not guaranteed wiped. Only fixed-size external mu uses constant-time sanitizing decoding. Applications must enforce ingress, concurrency and aggregate batch budgets independently of the SDK's per-value and HTTP-body limits.
The complete threat model, hardened deployment guidance, feature-specific controls, compatibility evidence rules, residual-memory analysis, and accepted limitations are maintained in the signed repository source:
Review those documents before enabling any feature whose name ends in
-acknowledged or deploying the SDK in a high-assurance environment.