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Bedrock

Tectonic's common cryptography library.

Bedrock provides post-quantum cryptographic primitives, including digital signatures and key-encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs). The library supports NIST-standardized algorithms (ML-DSA and ML-KEM) as well as other post-quantum schemes (Falcon/FN-DSA and Classic McEliece).

Features

  • ML-DSA (FIPS 204): Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm
  • Falcon/FN-DSA: Fast Fourier lattice-based compact signatures
  • MAYO: Multivariate oil-and-vinegar signatures with compact public keys
  • ML-KEM (FIPS 203): Module-lattice-based key-encapsulation mechanism
  • Classic McEliece: Code-based key-encapsulation mechanism
  • ETHFALCON: Ethereum-compatible Falcon variant with Keccak-256 XOF
  • X-Wing: Hybrid KEM combining X25519 with ML-KEM or Classic McEliece
  • HQC: Code-based key-encapsulation mechanism over quasi-cyclic codes, selected by NIST for standardization
  • Streamlined NTRU Prime: Lattice-based KEM avoiding ring structure, all six sizes
  • FrodoKEM: Conservative plain-LWE key-encapsulation mechanism
  • XMSS (RFC 8391 / SP 800-208): Stateful hash-based signatures
  • Bird-of-Prey-2: Hybrid signatures combining Ed25519 with ML-DSA or FN-DSA

Supported Algorithms

ML-DSA (Digital Signatures)

Three security levels following NIST standards:

  • ML-DSA-44 (NIST Level 2) - Deprecated; use ML-DSA-65 or higher
  • ML-DSA-65 (NIST Level 3) - Default
  • ML-DSA-87 (NIST Level 5)

Falcon/FN-DSA (Digital Signatures)

Two security levels plus Ethereum variant:

  • FN-DSA-512 (NIST Level 1) - Default
  • FN-DSA-1024 (NIST Level 5)
  • ETHFALCON (Ethereum-compatible Falcon-512 with Keccak-256)

MAYO (Digital Signatures)

MAYO provides multivariate oil-and-vinegar signatures with compact public keys through the mayo feature. It offers four parameter sets at three NIST security levels:

  • MAYO-1 (NIST Level 1) - Default
  • MAYO-2 (NIST Level 1) - Smallest signatures
  • MAYO-3 (NIST Level 3)
  • MAYO-5 (NIST Level 5)

HHD key derivation is supported for MAYO-1, MAYO-2, and MAYO-3. The 32-byte SLIP-0010 child key is truncated to the parameter set's key-generation seed size (24 bytes for MAYO-1 and MAYO-2; 32 bytes for MAYO-3). MAYO-5 is not offered in HHD because its 40-byte seed would require expanding, rather than truncating, the child key.

ML-KEM (Key Encapsulation)

Two security levels following NIST standards:

  • ML-KEM-768 (NIST Level 3) - Default when the ml-kem feature is enabled
  • ML-KEM-1024 (NIST Level 5)

Classic McEliece (Key Encapsulation)

  • ClassicMcEliece-348864 (legacy NIST Level 1; not part of ISO)
  • ClassicMcEliece-460896 (NIST Level 3) - Default when only mceliece is enabled
  • ClassicMcEliece-6688128 (NIST Level 5)
  • ClassicMcEliece-6960119 (NIST Level 5)
  • ClassicMcEliece-8192128 (NIST Level 5)

The four larger sizes are ISO standardized; 348864 remains available for legacy interoperability. Every size supports deterministic key generation from a 32-byte seed.

X-Wing (Hybrid Key Encapsulation)

Hybrid KEM combining X25519 with post-quantum KEMs:

  • X25519-ML-KEM-768 (X25519 + ML-KEM-768) - Default
  • X25519-ML-KEM-1024 (X25519 + ML-KEM-1024)
  • X25519-ClassicMcEliece348864 (X25519 + Classic McEliece)

HQC (Key Encapsulation)

Code-based KEM selected by NIST for standardization, using quasi-cyclic codes with a concatenated Reed-Solomon/Reed-Muller construction under a Fujisaki-Okamoto transform. Its final FIPS publication is forthcoming. HQC complements ML-KEM with larger ciphertexts and a security assumption that does not rest on structured lattices. Enable it with the hqc feature.

  • HQC-128 (NIST Level 1)
  • HQC-192 (NIST Level 3) - Default when hqc is the only KEM enabled
  • HQC-256 (NIST Level 5)

Seed-derived key generation is supported with a 32-byte seed. Decapsulation is pinned to the official HQC submission's known-answer test vectors in tests/kat_kem.rs.

All three parameter sets also support HHD key derivation when the hhd and hqc features are enabled. HQC-128/192/256 use distinct BIP-85 child indices 10'/11'/12' and SLIP-0010 domain separators. The complete 32-byte SLIP-0010 child key is passed to HQC deterministic key generation without truncation or expansion.

Streamlined NTRU Prime (Key Encapsulation)

Streamlined NTRU Prime is a lattice-based KEM designed to avoid the ring structure used by ring-LWE schemes. Enable it through the sntrup feature. All six parameter sets are offered:

  • sntrup653 (NIST Level 1) - lowest margin in the family
  • sntrup761 (NIST Level 2) - the set OpenSSH deploys in sntrup761x25519-sha512
  • sntrup857 (NIST Level 3)
  • sntrup953 (NIST Level 4)
  • sntrup1013 (NIST Level 5)
  • sntrup1277 (NIST Level 5)

Every set generates keys deterministically from a 32-byte seed, so all six support seed-derived generation.

FrodoKEM (Key Encapsulation)

FrodoKEM is a conservative KEM built on plain LWE with no ring or module structure. Enable it through the frodo feature. Six parameter sets are available:

  • FrodoKEM-640-AES / FrodoKEM-640-SHAKE (NIST Level 1)
  • FrodoKEM-976-AES / FrodoKEM-976-SHAKE (NIST Level 3)
  • FrodoKEM-1344-AES / FrodoKEM-1344-SHAKE (NIST Level 5)

The AES and SHAKE variants of a given n differ only in how the matrix A is derived and have identical key, ciphertext, and shared-secret lengths. They are therefore distinguished exclusively by the scheme stored alongside the key material — never by encoding length.

FrodoKEM does not support seed-derived key generation. Its key seed is 48, 72, or 96 bytes depending on parameter set, above the 32-byte ceiling a single SLIP-0010 child key can supply without expansion. keypair_from_seed returns Error::DeterministicKeygenUnsupported for any input, including an empty seed. Use KemScheme::supports_seeded_keygen() to test for this rather than inspecting seed_size, which is zero for these schemes and would otherwise be ambiguous.

XMSS (Stateful Hash-Based Signatures)

XMSS provides hash-based signatures under RFC 8391 and SP 800-208 through the xmss feature. It supports all 21 standardized single-tree parameter sets across seven hash/output families, each at tree heights 10, 16, and 20.

The optional xmss-extra-depths feature adds all 147 non-standard single-tree parameter sets from pq-xmss: seven hash/output families at heights 1–9, 11–15, 17–19, and 21–24. For example, construct a height-4 SHA-256 scheme with:

let scheme = XmssScheme::extra_depth(
    XmssExtraDepthFamily::Sha2_256,
    XmssExtraDepth::H4,
);

These keys use pq-xmss's private-use OIDs and therefore interoperate only with implementations that use the same extra-depth encoding. Tree generation and compact-key decoding grow exponentially with the height; choose the smallest tree that supplies the required capacity.

XMSS is stateful. Every signature consumes one one-time-signature leaf, and releasing two signatures under the same leaf index reveals the secret key. Because Bedrock performs no I/O, state persistence is the caller's responsibility: implement the XmssStateStore trait. The signer commits advanced state through the store before releasing a signature, so a failed commit yields no signature. Exhausting the tree returns Error::XmssKeyExhausted rather than wrapping around.

Bird-of-Prey-2 (Hybrid Signatures)

Bird-of-Prey-2 provides strong-unforgeability-preserving hybrid signatures that combine Ed25519—treated as a Fiat-Shamir identification scheme with unique responses—with a post-quantum signature. It follows ePrint 2025/1844 and Section 4 of draft-prabel-cfrg-suf-hybrid-sigs. Enable it through the bird-of-prey feature.

  • Ed25519-ML-DSA-65
  • Ed25519-FN-DSA-512

The Ed25519 commitment R is recovered during verification rather than transmitted, so the classical half of the signature is a single 32-byte scalar instead of a full 64-byte EdDSA signature. The classical component is serialized first in both keys and signatures.

Because the combiner hashes the post-quantum signature into its Fiat-Shamir challenge, that signature must be a deterministic function of key and message — otherwise a repeated message would pair a fixed classical nonce with two different challenges and leak the classical secret key. The FN-DSA branch is therefore driven by an RFC 6979 HMAC-SHA-512 DRBG (det_rng); the ML-DSA branch uses Bedrock's already-deterministic signer directly.

No cross-implementation test vectors exist for BoP-2 yet, so byte-level interoperability with other implementations is not claimed.

Excluded Schemes

The weakest ML-KEM parameter set is intentionally not offered. ML-DSA-44 remains available for compatibility, but is deprecated and should not be used for new deployments:

Scheme NIST Level Status Notes
ML-KEM-512 Level 1 Removed Use ML-KEM-768 (the new KemScheme default) or higher.
ML-DSA-44 Level 2 Deprecated Available for compatibility; use ML-DSA-65 (the MlDsaScheme default) or higher.
X25519-ML-KEM-512 — Removed Hybrid built on ML-KEM-512; use X25519-ML-KEM-768 or higher.

Removing the KEMs dropped the KemScheme::MlKem512 and XwingScheme::X25519MlKem512 variants. See the CHANGELOG for the full breaking-change entry. ML-DSA-44's APIs remain available with deprecation warnings.

The serde discriminants and BIP-85 child indices of the surviving schemes are unchanged, so existing serialized keys and derivation paths for the stronger schemes remain valid.

Deprecation path for existing data. The wire discriminants (1) and name strings ("ML-KEM-512", "X25519-ML-KEM-512") of the removed schemes stay reserved: deserializing or parsing data produced by an older version of the library returns a specific Error::DeprecatedScheme { scheme, replacement } — naming the removed scheme and its recommended replacement — rather than a generic InvalidScheme. This gives anything that may already have used these schemes a clear, actionable migration error instead of a silent or confusing failure. The discriminants are never reassigned to other schemes.

Note: ClassicMcEliece-348864 remains available for legacy interoperability; new applications should select one of the ISO-standardized sizes.

API Reference

ML-DSA Methods

MlDsaScheme

Key Generation:

  • keypair() -> Result<(MlDsaVerificationKey, MlDsaSigningKey)> Generates a new ML-DSA signing and verification keypair (requires the kgen feature).

Signing:

  • sign(message: &[u8], signing_key: &MlDsaSigningKey) -> Result<MlDsaSignature> Signs a message with the specified signing key (requires the sign feature).

Verification:

  • verify(message: &[u8], signature: &MlDsaSignature, verification_key: &MlDsaVerificationKey) -> Result<()> Verifies a signature (requires the vrfy feature).

MlDsaSigningKey, MlDsaVerificationKey, MlDsaSignature

Common methods for all types:

  • scheme() -> MlDsaScheme - Returns the scheme used by this key or signature.
  • to_raw_bytes() -> Vec<u8> - Converts the value to its raw byte representation.
  • from_raw_bytes(scheme: MlDsaScheme, bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self> - Constructs a value from raw bytes.
  • as_ref() -> &[u8] - Returns a byte-slice reference.

Falcon/FN-DSA Methods

FalconScheme

Key Generation:

  • keypair() -> Result<(FalconVerificationKey, FalconSigningKey)> Generates a new Falcon signing and verification keypair (requires the kgen feature).
  • keypair_from_seed(seed: &[u8]) -> Result<(FalconVerificationKey, FalconSigningKey)> Generates a keypair from a 32- to 64-byte seed (requires the kgen feature).

Signing:

  • sign(message: &[u8], signing_key: &FalconSigningKey) -> Result<FalconSignature> Signs a message with the specified signing key (requires the sign feature).

Verification:

  • verify(message: &[u8], signature: &FalconSignature, verification_key: &FalconVerificationKey) -> Result<()> Verifies a signature (requires the vrfy feature).

FalconSigningKey, FalconVerificationKey, FalconSignature

Common methods for all types:

  • scheme() -> FalconScheme - Returns the scheme used by this key or signature.
  • to_raw_bytes() -> Vec<u8> - Converts the value to its raw byte representation.
  • from_raw_bytes(scheme: FalconScheme, bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self> - Constructs a value from raw bytes.
  • as_ref() -> &[u8] - Returns a byte-slice reference.

FalconSigningKey (ETHFALCON-specific)

When eth_falcon feature is enabled:

  • into_ethereum(self) -> Result<Self> - Converts an FN-DSA-512 signing key to the ETHFALCON scheme.
  • into_dsa512(self) -> Result<Self> - Converts an ETHFALCON signing key to the FN-DSA-512 scheme.

ETHFALCON Conversions

When eth_falcon feature is enabled:

  • EthFalconVerifyingKey::try_from(FalconVerificationKey) -> Result<EthFalconVerifyingKey> Converts a Falcon public key to the ETHFALCON Solidity format (abi.encodePacked, NTT form, 1,024 bytes).
  • EthFalconSignature::try_from(FalconSignature) -> Result<EthFalconSignature> Converts a Falcon signature to the ETHFALCON Solidity format (abi.encodePacked, 1,024 bytes).

KEM Methods

KemScheme

Key Generation:

  • keypair() -> Result<(KemEncapsulationKey, KemDecapsulationKey)> Generates a new encapsulation and decapsulation keypair (requires the kgen feature).
  • keypair_from_seed(seed: &[u8]) -> Result<(KemEncapsulationKey, KemDecapsulationKey)> Generates a keypair from a seed (requires the kgen feature).

Encapsulation:

  • encapsulate(encapsulation_key: &KemEncapsulationKey) -> Result<(KemCiphertext, KemSharedSecret)> Encapsulates to the provided public key (requires the encp feature).

Decapsulation:

  • decapsulate(ciphertext: &KemCiphertext, decapsulation_key: &KemDecapsulationKey) -> Result<KemSharedSecret> Decapsulates the provided ciphertext (requires the decp feature).

KemEncapsulationKey, KemDecapsulationKey, KemCiphertext, KemSharedSecret

Common methods for all types:

  • scheme() -> KemScheme - Returns the scheme used by this key, ciphertext, or secret.
  • to_raw_bytes() -> Vec<u8> - Converts the value to its raw byte representation.
  • from_raw_bytes(scheme: KemScheme, bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self> - Constructs a value from raw bytes.
  • as_ref() -> &[u8] - Returns a byte-slice reference.

X-Wing Methods

XwingScheme

Key Generation:

  • keypair() -> Result<(EncapsulationKey, DecapsulationKey)> Generates a new X-Wing encapsulation and decapsulation keypair (requires the xwing feature).
  • keypair_from_seed(seed: &[u8]) -> Result<(EncapsulationKey, DecapsulationKey)> Generates a keypair from a seed (requires the xwing feature).

EncapsulationKey

  • encapsulate() -> Result<(Ciphertext, SharedSecret)> Creates a ciphertext and shared secret for the encapsulation key holder.
  • to_raw_bytes() -> Vec<u8> - Converts the value to its raw byte representation.
  • from_raw_bytes(scheme: XwingScheme, bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self> - Constructs a value from raw bytes.

DecapsulationKey

  • decapsulate(ciphertext: &Ciphertext) -> Result<SharedSecret> Decapsulates the ciphertext to recover the shared secret.
  • to_seed() -> Vec<u8> - Returns the seed bytes.
  • from_seed(scheme: XwingScheme, bytes: &[u8]) -> Self - Constructs a key from seed bytes.
  • expand() -> Result<ExpandedDecapsulationKey> - Expands the seed into full key material.

ExpandedDecapsulationKey

  • decapsulate(ciphertext: &Ciphertext) -> Result<SharedSecret> - Decapsulates using the expanded key.
  • encapsulation_key() -> EncapsulationKey - Returns the associated encapsulation key.

Ciphertext

  • to_raw_bytes() -> Vec<u8> - Converts the value to its raw byte representation.
  • from_raw_bytes(scheme: XwingScheme, bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self> - Constructs a value from raw bytes.

Serialization

All key types, signatures, ciphertexts, and shared secrets implement serde::Serialize and serde::Deserialize:

  • Human-readable formats (JSON, for example): Serialized as hex strings.
  • Binary formats (postcard and CBOR, for example): Serialized as compact byte arrays.

Schemes implement the Display and FromStr traits for string parsing:

  • to_string() - Converts a scheme to its string representation (for example, "ML-DSA-65").
  • from_str(s: &str) -> Result<Self> or parse() - Parses a scheme from a string.
  • Conversion to and from u8 provides compact storage.

Examples

ML-DSA Digital Signatures

use tectonic_bedrock::ml_dsa::MlDsaScheme;

// Generate a keypair
let scheme = MlDsaScheme::Dsa65;
let (verification_key, signing_key) = scheme.keypair()?;

// Sign a message
let message = b"Hello, world!";
let signature = scheme.sign(message, &signing_key)?;

// Verify the signature
scheme.verify(message, &signature, &verification_key)?;

// Serialize keys
let vk_json = serde_json::to_string(&verification_key)?;
let vk_binary = postcard::to_stdvec(&verification_key)?;

Falcon/FN-DSA Digital Signatures

use tectonic_bedrock::falcon::FalconScheme;

// Generate a keypair with deterministic seed
let scheme = FalconScheme::Dsa512;
let seed = [1u8; 48];
let (verification_key, signing_key) = scheme.keypair_from_seed(&seed)?;

// Sign and verify
let message = b"Sign this message";
let signature = scheme.sign(message, &signing_key)?;
scheme.verify(message, &signature, &verification_key)?;

ETHFALCON (Ethereum-compatible)

use tectonic_bedrock::falcon::{EthFalconSignature, EthFalconVerifyingKey, FalconScheme};

// Generate ETHFALCON keypair
let scheme = FalconScheme::Ethereum;
let (verification_key, signing_key) = scheme.keypair()?;

// Sign with ETHFALCON
let message = b"Transaction data";
let signature = scheme.sign(message, &signing_key)?;

// Verify
scheme.verify(message, &signature, &verification_key)?;

// Convert to Solidity-compatible formats
let eth_vk: EthFalconVerifyingKey = verification_key.try_into()?;
let eth_sig: EthFalconSignature = signature.try_into()?;

// Convert between schemes
let signing_key_512 = signing_key.into_dsa512()?;

ML-KEM Key Encapsulation

use tectonic_bedrock::kem::KemScheme;

// Generate a keypair
let scheme = KemScheme::MlKem768;
let (encapsulation_key, decapsulation_key) = scheme.keypair()?;

// Encapsulate to create shared secret
let (ciphertext, shared_secret_sender) = scheme.encapsulate(&encapsulation_key)?;

// Decapsulate to recover shared secret
let shared_secret_receiver = scheme.decapsulate(&ciphertext, &decapsulation_key)?;

assert_eq!(shared_secret_sender.as_ref(), shared_secret_receiver.as_ref());

Classic McEliece

use tectonic_bedrock::kem::KemScheme;

// Use Classic McEliece for code-based KEM
let scheme = KemScheme::ClassicMcEliece6960119;
let (ek, dk) = scheme.keypair()?;
let (ct, ss) = scheme.encapsulate(&ek)?;
let ss2 = scheme.decapsulate(&ct, &dk)?;
assert_eq!(ss.as_ref(), ss2.as_ref());

HQC HHD Key Derivation

use tectonic_bedrock::{
    hhd::{HHDWallet, Mnemonic},
    kem::KemScheme,
};

let mnemonic = Mnemonic::from_phrase(
    "abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon about"
)?;
let wallet = HHDWallet::new_from_mnemonic_with_kem_schemes(
    mnemonic,
    Vec::new(),
    vec![KemScheme::Hqc128, KemScheme::Hqc192, KemScheme::Hqc256],
    None,
)?;

let (encapsulation_key, decapsulation_key) = wallet.derive_hqc192_keypair(0)?;
let (ciphertext, sender_secret) = KemScheme::Hqc192.encapsulate(&encapsulation_key)?;
let receiver_secret = KemScheme::Hqc192.decapsulate(&ciphertext, &decapsulation_key)?;
assert_eq!(sender_secret.as_ref(), receiver_secret.as_ref());

X-Wing Hybrid KEM

use tectonic_bedrock::xwing::XwingScheme;

// Generate X-Wing keypair (combines X25519 with ML-KEM-768)
let scheme = XwingScheme::X25519MlKem768;
let (encapsulation_key, decapsulation_key) = scheme.keypair()?;

// Encapsulate to create shared secret
let (ciphertext, shared_secret_sender) = encapsulation_key.encapsulate()?;

// Decapsulate to recover shared secret
let shared_secret_receiver = decapsulation_key.decapsulate(&ciphertext)?;

assert_eq!(shared_secret_sender, shared_secret_receiver);

Feature Flags

Control which algorithms and operations are enabled:

Algorithm Features

  • ml-dsa - Enable ML-DSA signature schemes (default)
  • slh-dsa - Enable SLH-DSA signature schemes (default)
  • mayo - Enable MAYO signature schemes (default)
  • falcon - Enable Falcon/FN-DSA signature schemes (default)
  • eth_falcon - Enable ETHFALCON Ethereum-compatible variant (default, requires falcon)
  • ml-kem - Enable ML-KEM key encapsulation
  • mceliece - Enable Classic McEliece key encapsulation
  • frodo - Enable FrodoKEM key encapsulation
  • hqc - Enable HQC key encapsulation and, with hhd, HQC HD derivation
  • classical-signatures - Enable transport-neutral RSA, P-256 ECDSA, P-384 ECDSA, and Ed25519 signing, verification, and private-key loading
  • key-agreement - Enable ephemeral X25519, P-256, and P-384 key agreement (also enables random)
  • sntrup - Enable Streamlined NTRU Prime key encapsulation
  • xmss - Enable XMSS stateful signatures
  • xmss-extra-depths - Enable all 147 non-standard pq-xmss tree-depth parameter sets
  • bird-of-prey - Enable Bird-of-Prey-2 hybrid signatures
  • xwing - Enable X-Wing hybrid KEM (requires ml-kem or mceliece)
  • symmetric - Enable transport-neutral AES-GCM, ChaCha20-Poly1305, SHA-2, HMAC/HKDF, AES block, and ChaCha20 stream primitives
  • random - Enable operating-system cryptographic randomness
  • hhd - Enable hierarchical deterministic wallet support (default)

Operation Features

  • kgen - Enable key generation (default)
  • sign - Enable signing operations (default)
  • vrfy - Enable verification operations (default)
  • encp - Enable encapsulation operations (default)
  • decp - Enable decapsulation operations (default)

Default Features

Bedrock is designed to allow selective features to minimize the dependency list. The default feature set is:

default = ["eth_falcon", "falcon", "ml-dsa", "slh-dsa", "mayo", "decp", "encp", "kgen", "sign", "vrfy", "hhd"]

Minimal Configuration Examples

Verification only (no key generation or signing):

tectonic-bedrock = { version = "0.4", default-features = false, features = ["ml-dsa", "vrfy"] }

ML-KEM only:

tectonic-bedrock = { version = "0.4", default-features = false, features = ["ml-kem", "kgen", "encp", "decp"] }

X-Wing hybrid KEM only:

tectonic-bedrock = { version = "0.4", default-features = false, features = ["ml-kem", "xwing", "kgen", "encp", "decp"] }

Transport APIs introduced in v0.5.2, with symmetric primitives only:

tectonic-bedrock = { version = "0.5.2", default-features = false, features = ["symmetric"] }

Ephemeral key agreement only:

tectonic-bedrock = { version = "0.5.2", default-features = false, features = ["key-agreement"] }

Conventional signature operations and private-key loading only:

tectonic-bedrock = { version = "0.5.2", default-features = false, features = ["classical-signatures"] }

Error Handling

Scheme APIs return Result<T, tectonic_bedrock::error::Error>. The transport-neutral modules expose focused ClassicalSignatureError, SymmetricError, KeyAgreementError, and RandomError types. The scheme-level Error enum includes, among others:

  • McElieceError(String) - Errors from the Classic McEliece KEM.
  • InvalidScheme(u8) / InvalidSchemeStr(String) - Invalid scheme identifiers.
  • InvalidSeedLength(usize) - A seed length that does not match the selected scheme.
  • InvalidLength(usize) - Invalid data length.
  • FnDsaError(String) - ETHFALCON-specific errors.

Security Considerations

  • All post-quantum algorithms are designed to resist attacks by classical and quantum computers.
  • ML-DSA and ML-KEM are standardized by NIST in FIPS 204 and FIPS 203, respectively.
  • Falcon provides smaller signatures than ML-DSA at comparable security levels.
  • ETHFALCON enables post-quantum signatures in Ethereum smart contracts.
  • Classic McEliece offers conservative code-based security.
  • Use deterministic key generation (keypair_from_seed) only when necessary.
  • Protect private keys and seeds with appropriate key-management practices.

License

Licensed under either of:

Contribution

Unless you explicitly state otherwise, any contribution intentionally submitted for inclusion in the work by you, as defined in the Apache-2.0 license, shall be dual-licensed as above without any additional terms or conditions.

References

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