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fix(deps): update module github.com/traefik/traefik/v2 to v2.11.41 [security] - #552
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This PR contains the following updates:
v2.11.40→v2.11.41GitHub Vulnerability Alerts
CVE-2026-32305
Summary
There is a potential vulnerability in Traefik's TLS SNI pre-sniffing logic related to fragmented ClientHello packets.
When a TLS ClientHello is fragmented across multiple records, Traefik's SNI extraction may fail with an EOF and return an empty SNI. The TCP router then falls back to the default TLS configuration, which does not require client certificates by default. This allows an attacker to bypass route-level mTLS enforcement and access services that should require mutual TLS authentication.
Patches
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please open an issue.
Original Description
Summary
I found a behavior in Traefik's latest version where fragmented ClientHello packets can cause pre-sniff SNI extraction to not find the sni (EOF during sniff), which makes the TCP router fall back to default routing TLS config.
If the default TLS config does not require client certificates (which is NoClientCert by default), the handshake succeeds without client auth, and the request is later routed to the HTTP Host which should be the protected with client certificate authentication (RequireAndVerifyClientCert tls config).
Details
The vulnerability is caused by a mismatch between where Traefik decides the TLS policy per host and where Go TLS can finally parse the full ClientHello.
It runs a temporary TLS parse on those bytes to extract the SNI.
If ClientHello is fragmented, pre-sniff may return empty SNI (With fragmentation, first record can be incomplete for full ClientHello parsing).
Conditions required for impact:
A workaround for this is to set the default tls config to RequireAndVerifyClientCert (but then you need to explicitly define for each permissive host the NoClientCert TLS config).
A suggestion to fix is to parse the complete ClientHello before tls config decision (handle multi-record fragmentation).
PoC
Impact
An attacker can bypass route-level mTLS enforcement by fragmenting ClientHello so Traefik pre-sniff fails (EOF) and falls back to default permissive TLS config.
--
CVE-2026-32595
Summary
There is a potential vulnerability in Traefik's BasicAuth middleware that allows username enumeration via a timing attack.
When a submitted username exists, the middleware performs a bcrypt password comparison taking ~166ms. When the username does not exist, the response returns immediately in ~0.6ms. This ~298x timing difference is observable over the network and allows an unauthenticated attacker to reliably distinguish valid from invalid usernames.
Patches
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please open an issue.
Original Description
Summary
A timing attack vulnerability exists in Traefik's BasicAuth middleware that allows unauthenticated attackers to enumerate valid usernames. When a username exists, bcrypt password verification takes ~166ms; when it doesn't exist, the response returns immediately in ~0.6ms. This ~298x timing difference enables reliable username enumeration.
Details
The vulnerability exists in the BasicAuth middleware implementation. When validating credentials:
This timing difference is observable over the network and allows attackers to distinguish between valid and invalid usernames.
Root Cause: The code returns early when the user is not found, without performing a dummy bcrypt comparison to maintain constant-time execution.
Expected behavior: The system should perform a bcrypt comparison regardless of whether the user exists, to maintain consistent response times.
PoC
Environment:
Configuration:
PoC Script:
Execution Results:
Impact
Release Notes
traefik/traefik (github.com/traefik/traefik/v2)
v2.11.41Compare Source
Important: Please read the migration guide.
CVE fixed:
Bug fixes:
Documentation:
Configuration
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