If you discover a security vulnerability in go-ethernetip, please report
it responsibly. Do not open a public GitHub issue for security
vulnerabilities. Email security@otfabric.io, or open a private
advisory on GitHub (the Security
tab → Advisories → Report a vulnerability), with a description, the
steps to reproduce (ideally a minimal program or test), the affected
versions and the impact you see.
We acknowledge reports within 48 hours and aim to provide a fix or mitigation within 7 days for critical issues.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| Latest release | Yes |
| Older releases | No |
Plain EtherNet/IP has no authentication and no encryption. Anyone who can reach a target on TCP 44818 can read and write its attributes and open I/O connections that drive outputs; anyone who can send UDP datagrams to port 2222 from the originator's address with a fresher sequence number can replace output data; anyone on the path can read and alter the traffic.
- Keep EtherNet/IP on isolated, trusted networks (cell/area zones); never expose 44818 or 2222 to the Internet.
- Use EtherNet/IP over TLS for explicit messaging across untrusted
networks (
client.WithTLS,server.WithTLS, port 2221), or a VPN. I/O (UDP) has no protection in this library: DTLS is not implemented. - The server checks the source address of O->T datagrams (not the port: originators send from any port). That stops other hosts, not spoofing on the same network.
WithTLS takes a standard *tls.Config, used as given. Set MinVersion
to TLS 1.2 or later; for mutual authentication set ClientAuth: tls.RequireAndVerifyClientCert with ClientCAs on the server and
Certificates on the client. This is the TLS transport of CIP Security;
the CIP Security objects (0x5D, 0x5E, 0x5F) and their configuration are not
implemented, and the library makes no CIP Security conformance claim.
The library sends what it is asked to; it has no notion of a safe write.
Applications and tools should confirm writes, resets and I/O connections
that drive outputs (ethernetipctl requires --yes). An exclusive owner
connection replaces the outputs of the device: open one only where you own
the process.
The server bounds what a peer can make it hold:
- packets above
WithMaxPacket(4096 octets by default) close the session; sessions are limited byWithMaxSessions(64), connections byWithMaxConnections(128), and per originator address byWithMaxConnectionsPerOriginator(off by default); a connection whose TLS handshake fails frees its place at once; Class 3 replies are bounded by the connection's T->O size and unconnected replies by the encapsulation packet, and Multiple Service Packet, Get_Attribute_List and Get_Attributes_All stop with 0x11 as soon as the reply being built exceeds that bound; idle TCP connections close after the encapsulation inactivity timeout (120 s); - every count in a message (items, services, segments, attributes, tag list entries) is checked against the octets that carry it before memory is allocated, and bounded; allocation-budget tests state what the largest inputs cost (TESTING.md), and the fuzz targets found two defects fixed before the first release (a crash on a malformed Multiple Service Packet, unbounded recursion in a self-referencing Logix template);
- the scanner refuses a Forward_Open reply whose T->O actual packet
interval is 0, whose O->T actual packet interval is below a quarter of
the O->T RPI or below 100 µs (the RPI itself when that is shorter), or
whose O->T connection ID is 0, and closes that connection at the
target; the two floors are
IOConfig.OTAPIDivisorandIOConfig.MinOTAPI, which lower, raise or disable them, and an O->T interval of 0 is refused in any case; O->T data goes to the target's address, whatever address the reply's Sockaddr Info O->T item names; eds.Parsereads at most 16 MiB, 16384 sections, 262144 entries, 4096 fields per entry and 1048576 fields in all;- replies are written with a deadline, so a peer that stops reading loses its session instead of blocking the server;
- I/O datagrams from other addresses, of the wrong size, with old sequence numbers or unknown connection IDs are dropped (and counted).
go-ethernetip has no dependencies outside the Go standard library.
make vuln runs govulncheck; CI runs it on every pull request.