| Component | Algorithm / Specification | Security Role |
|---|---|---|
| Key Derivation (KDF) |
Argon2id (v0x13) — 64 MiB RAM, |
Protects user passwords against GPU/ASIC brute-force attacks |
| Key Wrapping & Deniability |
SVKEY04 Dual-Slot Envelope (2 XChaCha20-Poly1305) |
Instant password rotation & Plausible Deniability (index.meta vs index.shadow) |
| Symmetric Chunk AEAD |
XChaCha20-Poly1305 (256-bit DEK, 192-bit Nonce, 128-bit Tag) |
Authenticated encryption per 4 MiB chunk |
| Stream Integrity | Rogaway STREAM construction (64-bit Counter + EOF Flag in Nonce & AAD) |
Prevents chunk reordering, truncation, and splice attacks |
| Content-Addressed Dedup |
BLAKE3 Keyed Hash (BLAKE3_Keyed(DEK, PlainChunk)) |
Prevents cross-vault hash leakage while deduplicating identical 4 MiB blocks |
| Anti Bit-Rot ECC | Systematic Reed-Solomon GF(2^8) (SHA-256) |
Self-heals up to 33.3% damaged NAND flash sectors prior to Poly1305 auth |
| RAM & Unplug Hygiene |
ZeroizeOnDrop + libc::mlock + 2s USB Hot-Plug Watchdog |
Locks keys in physical RAM and zeroes DEK immediately if USB is unplugged |
- All filenames, directory structures, file sizes, and chunk tables are encrypted inside
index.meta/index.shadow. - Only obfuscated '<128-bit-hex>.bin' and '<256-bit-blake3-keyed>.chk' blobs exist on the
exFATpartition. - Because
BLAKE3deduplication uses the vault's secret 256-bit DEK as its key (keyed_hash), an attacker cannot perform known-file confirmation attacks by comparing chunk hashes against public datasets.
- Every initialized vault always creates a 199-byte
vault.keywith two 96-byte slots and bothindex.metaandindex.shadow(plus their '.ecc' sidecars). - Even if the user has never configured a Shadow Vault, Slot 1 is filled with 96 bytes of CSPRNG noise and
index.shadowis encrypted with a discarded ephemeral 256-bit key. - Under coercion, the user can disclose the Primary Password (unlocking Slot 0 and revealing innocuous decoy files), while there is no cryptographic distinguisher proving that Slot 1 holds a valid second key rather than random initialization bytes.
- Operational Note: Plausible deniability holds against an adversary who inspects the USB drive at a single point in time. If an adversary captures forensic images of the USB drive before and after you modify files in the Shadow Vault, they could observe new '.bin'/'.chk' files or changes to
index.shadow.
- Authenticate-Before-Decompress: No byte is ever passed to the
Zstddecompressor untilPoly1305has verified the integrity of the encrypted chunk. - Bit-Rot vs. Tampering: If NAND flash degradation corrupts up to 4 out of 12 shards in
index.meta,index.shadow, orvault.key, theReed-Solomon GF(2^8)healer reconstructs the original ciphertext and verifies it withPoly1305.
Please do not open a public GitHub issue for suspected security vulnerabilities. Use GitHub's Private Vulnerability Reporting tab so we can release a coordinated fix.