Six fictional suppliers scored on five factors. Three rate Critical — and two of them for opposite reasons.
| Folder | 08-Project-08/ |
| PDCA stage | Do |
| ISO/IEC 27001:2022 | Clause 8.1 — externally provided processes; Annex A A.5.19–A.5.22 |
| Status | Delivered — prepared 04-Sep-2026; no review completed, no evidence obtained, no decision approved |
| Consumes | 02 EXT-07, INT-10 · 03 RSK-009 · 04 A.5.19 · 05 policy requirements · 07 EM-8.1-04 |
| Feeds into | The supplier assurance programme, management acceptance of residual risk, and the integrated ISMS view |
A supplier risk review answers three questions about each third party — what can it reach, how much do we depend on it, and what would failure cost? — and then sets the depth of assurance to match. It is not the practice of sending every supplier the same questionnaire.
The distinction is a resourcing one. Assurance capacity is finite, and an organization that assesses its cleaning contractor with the same rigour as its cloud provider will run out of effort before it reaches the supplier that could actually harm its customers. This project is built around that trade-off, in both directions: three suppliers are escalated to the deepest review level, and one is deliberately held at the shallowest with the reasoning recorded as a conforming finding.
| Deliverable | File | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Supplier Risk Review and Third-Party Security Assessment — 15 parts: introduction, scope, register, data-touch map, scoring method, risk register, due diligence, review depth, decisions, ownership, monitoring, findings, write-ups, summary, conclusion | documents/supplier-risk-review.docx · Markdown |
Word (19 pages, mixed portrait and landscape) + Markdown |
| Supplier Risk Register Workbook — register, rating rationale, data-touch map, scoring model, due diligence, decisions, monitoring, ownership, findings, write-ups, summary, document control | spreadsheets/supplier-risk-register.xlsx |
Excel, 12 sheets |
| Supplier Risk Scoring Model — the five factors, the score bands, and the six suppliers scored against them | diagrams/supplier-risk-scoring-model.svg |
SVG |
| Inherent to Residual Movement — a dumbbell chart across the 5–20 scale, with the three deliberate positions explained | diagrams/supplier-residual-risk-movement.svg |
SVG |
| Supplier Security Requirements Schedule — a ten-clause contract annex template graded by review level, with a variation record | evidence/supplier-security-requirements-schedule.md |
Markdown |
| Evidence Index — the review's own evidence, held apart from the evidence the review calls for | evidence/evidence-index.md |
Markdown |
The data-touch map (10 columns), the risk register, the due-diligence checklist, the review decisions (9 columns), and the findings table (9 columns) are set on landscape pages. The remaining parts are portrait.
Page 1 of 19 — the document control block, the fictional-supplier caveat, and Part 1.
Five factors, each scored 1 to 4. Supplier Risk Score = A + B + C + D + E, giving a range of 5 to 20.
| Factor | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A. Data sensitivity | Public or non-sensitive | Internal | Confidential | Highly confidential / restricted |
| B. System access | No system access | Physical or limited access | Standard user or read-only | Administrative, production, or privileged |
| C. Business criticality | Non-critical service | Disruption is inconvenient | Affects important operations | Could seriously affect customers or core services |
| D. Dependency | Easy alternative available | Some replacement effort | Significant replacement effort | Highly dependent or hard to replace |
| E. External exposure | No meaningful exposure | Limited exposure | Internet-facing or externally hosted | Broad exposure or critical integration |
| Score | Risk level | Review depth | Reassessment |
|---|---|---|---|
| 17–20 | Critical | Level 4 — senior management approval, exit planning, audit rights | Every 6 months |
| 13–16 | High | Level 3 — assurance evidence, contractual safeguards, access review | Annually |
| 9–12 | Medium | Level 2 — questionnaire, contract clauses | Annually |
| 5–8 | Low | Level 1 — identification, confidentiality where appropriate | Every 2 years |
This is a proposed academic scoring model, not SecureBridge's approved methodology. If the organization adopts its own supplier-risk methodology, these scores must be recalculated rather than carried across.
| ID | Supplier | Category | A | B | C | D | E | Inherent | Residual | Review |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
SUP-001 |
CloudHarbor Infrastructure Services | Cloud hosting | 4 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 19 Critical | 16 High | Level 4 |
SUP-002 |
SentinelDesk Managed Support | IT support | 3 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 14 High | 12 Medium | Level 3 |
SUP-003 |
ReportVault Secure Storage | Document storage | 4 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 18 Critical | 15 High | Level 4 |
SUP-004 |
SignalWatch Monitoring Solutions | Security tooling | 4 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 18 Critical | 17 Critical | Level 4 |
SUP-005 |
TalentBridge Staffing Services | External personnel | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 9 Medium | 9 Medium | Level 2 |
SUP-006 |
OfficeLink Facilities Management | Facilities | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 7 Low | 7 Low | Level 1 |
All six are invented. No real vendor has been assessed, and no certification, breach history, security rating, or contractual term described anywhere in this project is real.
Sheet 1 of the workbook — the full 15-field register.
Most supplier assessments show every risk falling neatly after treatment. This one does not, in three specific places, and each is a design decision rather than an oversight.
SUP-001 CloudHarbor scores 19 on dependency and criticality, not data access. Every service line
runs on the platform and replacement would mean migrating production — but provider-side reach into guest
content is constrained by the shared-responsibility model, so System access scores 3, not 4.
SUP-003 ReportVault scores 18 on the reverse profile. It is easier to replace, but its whole purpose
is to hold delivered VAPT reports in readable form, and its administrators can technically reach them.
Treating both as "cloud vendors requiring the same review" would produce the wrong safeguards for each: an exit plan for the one that needs encryption, and encryption for the one that needs an exit plan.
SUP-004 SignalWatch moves from 18 to 17 — still Critical. The recommended treatment tightens
support access and reduces exposure, but the supplier uses an undisclosed subcontractor for out-of-hours
triage. Until SecureBridge knows who holds that access, the criticality and dependency factors cannot
honestly be reduced. The residual score is recorded as it stands and finding SF-04 addresses the
disclosure gap. Lowering the score first would be assurance theatre.
SUP-005 TalentBridge stays at 9 because the material weakness is not in the supplier's
environment — it is that SecureBridge does not reliably learn when a contractor's assignment ends. The
fix improves SecureBridge's control, not the agency's risk profile. Recording a reduction would credit the
supplier for a control SecureBridge operates.
SUP-006 OfficeLink stays at 7 because escorted access and a confidentiality clause reduce the
likelihood of misuse without changing access, dependency, or exposure — the structural factors the
model measures. The risk remains Low and within appetite, and the correct decision is to accept it.
Page 6 of the document — sections 6.4 and 6.5, where each rating and each residual position is justified.
High risk is not a reason to reject a supplier. In a cloud-native business, rejecting every Critical supplier would mean not operating. What is not acceptable is carrying the risk without a decision.
| Supplier | Decision | Approval authority | Review frequency |
|---|---|---|---|
| CloudHarbor | Accept with formally approved residual risk | Managing Director | Every 6 months, and on material change |
| SentinelDesk | Approve subject to enhanced review | ISMS Manager | Annually, and on change to the support model |
| ReportVault | Temporarily defer expansion of use pending enhanced review | Managing Director | Every 6 months until client-side encryption is in place |
| SignalWatch | Approve subject to enhanced review, with subcontractor disclosure as a condition | Managing Director | Every 6 months, and immediately on subcontractor change |
| TalentBridge | Approve with standard safeguards | Human Resources Manager | Annually, and at framework renewal |
| OfficeLink | Approve with basic safeguards | Finance & Procurement Lead | Every 2 years, or on change of provider |
Not one supplier is rejected. Two decisions turn on a management judgement rather than a technical action: CloudHarbor's dependency cannot be removed, so its residual risk requires formal acceptance; and ReportVault's use is deferred, not refused, because the service is sound and the assurance is missing.
Sheet 6 of the workbook — the eight-column decision table with its reasoning.
The checklist contains 39 questions across ten areas: company and service information, information access, security governance, access management, data protection, vulnerability and incident management, business continuity, subcontractors and fourth parties, contractual protections, and assurance evidence.
Every question carries the review level from which it becomes required, which is what stops the checklist becoming disproportionate. A Level 1 supplier is not asked who holds the encryption keys; a Level 4 supplier is not left unasked about exit arrangements.
Sheet 5 of the workbook — all 39 questions, with owner and required-from level.
No question has been answered and no evidence has been obtained — 0 of 39. Where the checklist requests a certificate or assurance report, it is requesting it, not recording that one exists. Two points of practice follow: a certificate is worth reading for its scope statement rather than its existence, and assurance evidence outside its validity period is not assurance.
| Ref | Supplier | Finding | Classification |
|---|---|---|---|
SF-01 |
ReportVault | Critical-rated supplier onboarded on a basic questionnaire, with no data-processing schedule | Potential minor nonconformity, Clause 8.1 |
SF-02 |
TalentBridge | Account revocation at assignment end cannot be evidenced | Minor or observation — depends on the extent-of-condition check |
SF-03 |
CloudHarbor | Supplier recovery arrangements never compared against SecureBridge's own customer commitments | Observation |
SF-04 |
SignalWatch | Undisclosed subcontractor with access to customer security telemetry | Minor nonconformity, Clause 8.1 |
SF-05 |
OfficeLink | Low-risk supplier appropriately limited; review depth proportionate to access | Conforming arrangement |
SF-06 |
Portfolio-wide | Half the assessed population rates Critical, and the concentration has not been reported to management | Observation with a resourcing implication |
Not every weakness is a major nonconformity. SF-01 is graded minor rather than major because a
process exists and was applied — inadequately — rather than being absent. SF-02 is deliberately left
ungraded pending an extent-of-condition check, because whether one contractor or every contractor is
affected is the difference between the two grades.
SF-05 records a conforming arrangement. A review that only reports problems gives management no way
to distinguish proportionate assurance from neglected assurance, and would make it rational to over-assess
SUP-006 next time.
Three findings — SF-01, SF-02, and SF-04 — are written up in full, holding apart immediate
correction from corrective action and from verification. A finding closed without verification
has been recorded, not resolved.
Every finding above concerns something that changed, or was never checked, after the supplier was engaged: an undisclosed subcontractor, an unreviewed recovery arrangement, an unevidenced revocation, an unreported concentration. Onboarding assurance is the easy part.
The monitoring plan sets seven activities — access review, security incident review, service availability review, contract and clause review, subcontractor change review, supplier reassessment, and assurance evidence currency — each with the evidence it produces, an owner, a frequency, and an escalation trigger. Ten reassessment triggers are listed, of which the most commonly missed is the supplier gains access to more sensitive information than the original assessment considered, because access expansion is usually incremental and rarely re-approved.
Sheet 11 of the workbook — the management summary and the position of the assessed population.
| Measure | Position |
|---|---|
| Suppliers assessed | 6 of an estimated population of approximately 26 |
| Supplier population enumerated | No — the estimate is an estimate; enumeration is open action EV-016 |
| Inherent distribution | 3 Critical · 1 High · 1 Medium · 1 Low |
| Residual distribution (forecast) | 1 Critical · 2 High · 2 Medium · 1 Low |
| Requiring Level 4 review | 3 — SUP-001, SUP-003, SUP-004 |
| Reviews completed | 0 of 6 |
| Due-diligence questions answered | 0 of 39 |
| Security requirements schedules executed | 0 |
| Residual risk formally accepted by management | 0 |
A method exists, it is documented, it is proportionate, and it has been applied to six suppliers on paper. Nothing has been executed. For Clause 8.1 that is a potential minor nonconformity rather than a major one — a designed but unoperated process is materially different from an absent one — and recording it as conforming because the documents look complete would be the error the evidence index exists to prevent.
02 EXT-07 supplier reliance → 03 RSK-009 scored 12 High, treated Share / Transfer
→ 04 A.5.19 applicable, status Planned
→ 08 the review that gives that treatment effect
→ 07 EM-8.1-04, rated Red until the reviews are done
| Project | How it connects |
|---|---|
| 02 — Context | EXT-07 reliance on third parties is the issue that makes supplier risk an ISMS concern; INT-10 no dedicated compliance role is the basis of SF-06 |
| 03 — Risk Assessment | RSK-009 third-party supplier security failure, scored 12 High, treated Share / Transfer — this project is that treatment |
| 04 — Statement of Applicability | A.5.19 assessed as applicable with status Planned; the register produced here is its intended evidence |
| 05 — Policy Pack | The policies state that third-party requirements are applied through contract; the schedule template at EV-062 is how |
| 07 — Evidence Map | EM-8.1-04, rated Red, owner Finance & Procurement Lead. This project is step one; completing the reviews is what changes the rating |
| Feeds into | What it carries forward |
|---|---|
| The supplier assurance programme | Six scored suppliers, 39 calibrated questions, and a contract annex ready to negotiate |
| Management review | The Critical concentration (SF-06) is a Clause 9.3 resourcing input, not a technical finding |
| Residual risk acceptance | SUP-001 requires a recorded Managing Director decision; Clause 6.1.3 e) has no substitute for it |
- Rating by access and dependency rather than vendor category — two Critical suppliers with opposite drivers, and a cloud provider scored 3 on system access because the shared-responsibility model constrains it
- Refusing to flatter the residual position — one supplier stays Critical, two show no movement, and each is explained rather than adjusted
- Separating supplier risk from the organization's own control failure —
SUP-005is Medium because the weakness is SecureBridge's offboarding, not the agency's security - Proportionality as a deliberate control decision —
SUP-006held at Level 1 and recorded as conforming, with the reasoning stated so it survives the next reviewer - Grading discipline — minor rather than major where a process exists but was applied inadequately, and one finding left ungraded pending an extent-of-condition check
- Contractual instrument design — a ten-clause schedule graded by review level, with a variation record, because a refused clause changes the residual position
- Not confusing documents with assurance — 0 of 39 questions answered, 0 reviews completed, and the evidence index saying so in those terms
| # | Assumption | Type |
|---|---|---|
| A-01 | All six suppliers are fictional. No real vendor has been assessed, contacted, or scored | Illustrative |
| A-02 | No certification, independent audit report, breach history, security rating, or contractual term described is real. Each is a stated fictional assumption | Illustrative |
| A-03 | SecureBridge has completed none of these reviews. The register records what the reviews would examine and what they would be expected to find | Not Yet Implemented |
| A-04 | The five-factor model is a proposed academic scoring model, not an approved methodology. Scores must be recalculated if a different methodology is adopted | Assumed |
| A-05 | All residual scores are a forecast, assuming treatment is designed, agreed, implemented, and evidenced. None of that has happened | Planned |
| A-06 | The supplier population of approximately 26 is an estimate. Enumeration is open action EV-016 from Project 02 |
To Be Verified |
| A-07 | The six findings are illustrative examples, not findings against SecureBridge. The evidence described was not observed | Illustrative |
| A-08 | Next-review dates follow a proposed rule expressed as fixed dates. They should be adjusted under the approved methodology and shortened where a finding is unresolved | Sample |
| A-09 | The security requirements schedule is a draft template. It has not been legally reviewed, approved, issued, or executed with any supplier | Planned |
| A-10 | Owners throughout are role titles. No individual is named, and the Supplier Relationship Manager role is dual-hatted per INT-10 |
Assumed |
| A-11 | SecureBridge is not certified to ISO/IEC 27001 and no external assessment of its supplier arrangements has taken place | Not Yet Implemented |
| Ref | Gap | Owner | Target |
|---|---|---|---|
EV-067 |
The supplier population is estimated, not enumerated, so this review covers a sample and cannot support a statement about the whole population | Finance & Procurement Lead | 31-Oct-2026 |
EV-068 |
No due-diligence question has been answered and no assurance evidence obtained — 0 of 39 | ISMS Manager | 31-Dec-2026 |
EV-069 |
No security requirements schedule has been negotiated or executed; the template has had no legal review | Legal & Compliance Advisor | 30-Nov-2026 |
EV-070 |
No supplier access review has been performed, so SUP-002's standing administrative rights are unverified as well as unreduced |
IT & Infrastructure Manager | 31-Oct-2026 |
EV-071 |
SUP-001's residual risk is expected to remain High and has not been accepted by management |
Managing Director | At first management review |
SF-06 |
Three Level 4 reviews, each with six-monthly reassessment and exit planning, exceeds what one dual-hatted ISMS Manager can absorb. Sequencing is a management decision | ISMS Manager | 31-Jan-2027 |
Part of the SecureBridge ISO 27001 GRC Portfolio · SecureBridge Technologies Pvt. Ltd. is a fictional organization created for portfolio purposes. All six suppliers are invented. This is an academic supplier-risk simulation: no review has been completed, no real vendor has been assessed, and no certification, breach history, security rating, or contractual term described is real. No supplier decision in this project has been taken or approved.





