Ten risks specific to a cybersecurity services company: identified from assets, scored with recorded reasoning, treated with one option each, and honest about what remains.
| Folder | 03-Project-03/ |
| PDCA stage | Plan |
| ISO/IEC 27001:2022 | Clause 6.1.2 — Information security risk assessment; Clause 6.1.3 — Information security risk treatment |
| Status | Delivered — assessed 14-Apr-2026, approved 22-Apr-2026 |
| Consumes | Project 01 — the scope boundary; Project 02 — the internal and external issues |
| Feeds into | Control selection and the Statement of Applicability, the treatment programme, internal audit, and management review |
Clause 6.1.2 requires an organization to define risk criteria, identify risks to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information within its scope, analyse them, and evaluate them against those criteria. Clause 6.1.3 requires it to select a treatment for each risk and to determine what remains afterwards.
This project does that for the first time at SecureBridge. It is deliberately a starting register — ten risks, not a complete population — built to establish the method and to give the treatment programme something defensible to work from.
The organization presents a specific difficulty for a risk assessor. It is genuinely excellent at managing risk for other people: it tests customer environments, monitors customer estates, and advises on customer cloud posture. Almost every risk in this register exists because that capability has never been pointed inward. Recording that honestly, rather than crediting the organization with controls it sells but does not apply to itself, is the substance of the assessment.
| Deliverable | File | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Risk Assessment Mini-Project — methodology, register, treatment plan, residual analysis, acceptance, conclusions | documents/risk-assessment-mini-project.docx · Markdown |
Word (14 pages) + Markdown |
| Information Security Risk Register — all 17 register fields in one filterable sheet, plus five supporting sheets | spreadsheets/information-security-risk-register.xlsx |
Excel |
| Risk Heat Map — inherent and residual positions side by side | diagrams/risk-heat-map.svg |
SVG |
Risk Assessment Process Flow — the method, with RSK-001 worked through it |
diagrams/risk-assessment-process-flow.svg |
SVG |
| Risk Assessment Session Record — attendance, method, seven recorded points of discussion | evidence/risk-assessment-workshop-record.md |
Markdown |
| Evidence Index — 10 evidence items with readiness and gaps | evidence/evidence-index.md |
Markdown |
Every score, level, and total in the document, the workbook, and both diagrams is computed from likelihood and impact in a single content source, never typed by hand. The arithmetic cannot disagree between formats.
Risks were identified by working forward from assets, not from a published threat catalogue. A threat catalogue produces risks an organization recognizes but does not own; starting from in-scope assets produced risks with a specific consequence and an identifiable owner.
Risk score = Likelihood × Impact, on a 5 × 5 matrix.
| Score | Likelihood | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Rare | Insignificant |
| 2 | Unlikely | Minor |
| 3 | Possible | Moderate |
| 4 | Likely | Major |
| 5 | Almost certain | Severe |
| Risk level | Score band | Position against appetite |
|---|---|---|
| Critical | 17–25 | Outside appetite |
| High | 10–16 | Outside appetite |
| Medium | 5–9 | Within appetite, actively managed |
| Low | 1–4 | Within appetite |
A twelve-month horizon is used for every likelihood judgement, so scores are comparable between risks.
SBT-REG-03 v1.0 — all seventeen register fields, rendered from the actual Excel deliverable.
| Ref | Risk | L | I | Score | Level | Treatment | Residual | Level |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
RSK-001 |
Unauthorized access to customer security reports | 4 | 5 | 20 | Critical | Reduce | 10 | High |
RSK-002 |
Ransomware affecting company systems | 3 | 5 | 15 | High | Reduce | 8 | Medium |
RSK-003 |
Cloud storage misconfiguration | 3 | 4 | 12 | High | Reduce | 8 | Medium |
RSK-004 |
Leakage of customer credentials during VAPT | 3 | 5 | 15 | High | Reduce | 8 | Medium |
RSK-005 |
Unavailability of the security monitoring platform | 2 | 4 | 8 | Medium | Reduce | 6 | Medium |
RSK-006 |
Phishing attack against employees | 4 | 3 | 12 | High | Reduce | 9 | Medium |
RSK-007 |
Inadequate vulnerability management of own estate | 3 | 4 | 12 | High | Reduce | 8 | Medium |
RSK-008 |
Loss of a key cybersecurity employee | 4 | 3 | 12 | High | Reduce | 8 | Medium |
RSK-009 |
Third-party supplier security failure | 3 | 4 | 12 | High | Share / Transfer | 9 | Medium |
RSK-010 |
Loss of availability of customer reports | 2 | 2 | 4 | Low | Retain / Accept | 4 | Low |
(Illustrative. Scores are judgements based on reasonable assumptions, not measurements.)
| Risk level | Inherent | Residual (forecast) | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | 1 | 0 | −1 |
| High | 7 | 1 | −6 |
| Medium | 1 | 8 | +7 |
| Low | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Outside appetite | 8 | 1 | −7 |
Sheet 4 of SBT-REG-03, with the reasoning for every residual score.
1. Not every risk is reduced to Low. RSK-001 remains High after treatment. Access controls
reduce how likely unauthorized access is, but they cannot reduce how damaging it would be — the
sensitivity of aggregated customer vulnerability findings is a property of the information, not of the
control protecting it. That residual would require an explicit acceptance decision by the Managing
Director.
2. Not every treatment is "Reduce". RSK-009 is treated by Share / Transfer, because the
organization cannot implement controls inside a supplier's environment; assurance and consequence are
allocated contractually and through insurance. RSK-010 is Retained, because it is already Low, sits
within appetite, and its underlying weakness is treated more effectively under RSK-002 — treating it
twice would duplicate effort. Avoid was considered and not selected as a primary option, since
avoiding these risks would mean ceasing to trade.
3. Three risks show no reduction in likelihood at all. RSK-005, RSK-008, and RSK-009 reduce
impact only. A documented runbook does not make a practitioner less likely to resign; a contract does not
make a supplier less likely to be breached; nothing SecureBridge does changes the probability of a cloud
region outage. Lowering those likelihood scores would have flattered the treatment and misrepresented
what it achieves.
Section 6 of SBT-RSK-01, rendered from the actual Word deliverable.
| Priority | Risk | Owner | Timeframe |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | RSK-001 Unauthorized access to customer reports |
IT & Infrastructure Manager | Within 30 days |
| 2 | RSK-004 Leakage of customer credentials |
Head of Delivery | Within 30 days |
| 3 | RSK-002 Ransomware |
IT & Infrastructure Manager | Within 60 days |
| 4–6 | RSK-003, RSK-007, RSK-006 |
Cloud Practice Lead · IT & Infrastructure Manager · ISMS Manager | Within 60 days |
| 7–9 | RSK-009, RSK-008, RSK-005 |
Finance & Procurement Lead · Human Resources Manager · Head of Delivery | Within 90 days |
| 10 | RSK-010 |
IT & Infrastructure Manager | No action — reviewed next cycle |
Owners are role titles; no individual is named. Most of these treatments cost discipline rather than
money — recertifying access, verifying patch compliance, testing restoration, and pointing the
organization's own posture-monitoring capability at its own tenancies. That matters for a company with the
resource constraints recorded at INT-10, and it is what makes the plan realistic rather than aspirational.
| Consumes | How |
|---|---|
| Project 01 — ISMS scope | No risk is raised against an out-of-scope asset. The twelve in-scope system groups in SBT-REG-01 framed the assets considered. |
| Project 02 — Context | Every risk traces to at least one determined issue. INT-06 produced RSK-001 and RSK-004; INT-05 produced RSK-002 and RSK-007; EXT-07 produced RSK-009. |
| Feeds into | What it carries forward |
|---|---|
| Control selection and the Statement of Applicability | Controls are selected because a scored risk justifies them. This register is that justification. |
| The treatment programme | Ten treatment actions with named owners, priorities, and target dates |
| Internal audit | Audit tests whether treatments were implemented and whether forecast residual scores were achieved |
| Management review | The single residual High risk is the decision Clause 9.3 must address |
| Project 11 — integrated view | RSK- identifiers feed the master risk and control view |
Relationship to the portfolio dashboard. This is the initial register of ten risks as at April 2026. The portfolio dashboard shows 42 risks as at September 2026 — the register grows as the asset register, supplier enumeration, and legal determination complete, each of which is recorded here as an open action.
- Traceable risk identification — working forward from assets, so each risk has an owner and a specific consequence rather than a generic label
- Defensible scoring — every likelihood and impact value carries recorded reasoning that can be challenged at review
- Honest control crediting — configured-but-untested controls (backup restoration) are recorded as assumptions, not credited as effective
- Correct use of all four treatment options — including a genuine transfer and a genuine retention, each justified
- Understanding what treatment actually changes — separating risks where likelihood can be reduced from risks where only consequence can
- Residual honesty — one risk stays outside appetite, one shows no change at all, and neither is disguised
- Governance framing — approval authority by risk level, acceptance criteria tied to appetite, and a review trigger list
| # | Assumption | Type |
|---|---|---|
| A-01 | All likelihood and impact scores are judgements based on reasonable assumptions about a fictional organization. They are not measurements and not derived from incident data | Illustrative |
| A-02 | No incident history exists, so likelihood is judged from the threat environment, the observed weaknesses, and how often the activity occurs | Assumed |
| A-03 | The ten risks were selected to cover the principal assets and service lines. The register is not complete and does not claim to be | Sample |
| A-04 | Backup restoration has never been tested, so recovery capability is recorded as an assumption rather than credited as a control | Assumed |
| A-05 | The supplier population of approximately 26 is an estimate; RSK-009 will be re-scored once enumeration completes |
To Be Verified |
| A-06 | Risks arising from legal and regulatory obligations are not covered, because those obligations have not yet been determined | Not Yet Implemented |
| A-07 | Every residual score is a forecast. No treatment in the plan has been implemented | Planned |
| A-08 | No risk has been accepted. No management decision, actual or represented, has been taken on any risk here | Illustrative |
| A-09 | The organization is not certified to ISO/IEC 27001 and no external audit has been performed | Not Yet Implemented |
| Ref | Gap | Owner | Target |
|---|---|---|---|
EV-026 |
Risk identification worked from ten assets chosen at the session, not from a completed asset register, so coverage cannot be shown to be complete | ISMS Manager | 31-May-2026 |
EV-023 |
Treatment actions are assigned but not formally acknowledged by their owners — accountability is asserted rather than evidenced | ISMS Manager | 31-May-2026 |
EV-025 |
Residual scores are forecasts with no evidence yet that the forecast position is achievable | ISMS Manager | 31-Aug-2026 |
Part of the SecureBridge ISO 27001 GRC Portfolio · SecureBridge Technologies Pvt. Ltd. is a fictional organization created for portfolio purposes. All scores are illustrative. No certification has been achieved, no external audit has been performed, and no risk has been accepted.


