Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History

03-Project-03

Folders and files

NameName
Last commit message
Last commit date

parent directory

..
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

README.md

03 — Risk Assessment

Ten risks specific to a cybersecurity services company: identified from assets, scored with recorded reasoning, treated with one option each, and honest about what remains.

Clause Stage Status Risks Data

Folder 03-Project-03/
PDCA stage Plan
ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Clause 6.1.2 — Information security risk assessment; Clause 6.1.3 — Information security risk treatment
Status Delivered — assessed 14-Apr-2026, approved 22-Apr-2026
Consumes Project 01 — the scope boundary; Project 02 — the internal and external issues
Feeds into Control selection and the Statement of Applicability, the treatment programme, internal audit, and management review

Purpose

Clause 6.1.2 requires an organization to define risk criteria, identify risks to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information within its scope, analyse them, and evaluate them against those criteria. Clause 6.1.3 requires it to select a treatment for each risk and to determine what remains afterwards.

This project does that for the first time at SecureBridge. It is deliberately a starting register — ten risks, not a complete population — built to establish the method and to give the treatment programme something defensible to work from.

The organization presents a specific difficulty for a risk assessor. It is genuinely excellent at managing risk for other people: it tests customer environments, monitors customer estates, and advises on customer cloud posture. Almost every risk in this register exists because that capability has never been pointed inward. Recording that honestly, rather than crediting the organization with controls it sells but does not apply to itself, is the substance of the assessment.


Deliverables

Deliverable File Format
Risk Assessment Mini-Project — methodology, register, treatment plan, residual analysis, acceptance, conclusions documents/risk-assessment-mini-project.docx · Markdown Word (14 pages) + Markdown
Information Security Risk Register — all 17 register fields in one filterable sheet, plus five supporting sheets spreadsheets/information-security-risk-register.xlsx Excel
Risk Heat Map — inherent and residual positions side by side diagrams/risk-heat-map.svg SVG
Risk Assessment Process Flow — the method, with RSK-001 worked through it diagrams/risk-assessment-process-flow.svg SVG
Risk Assessment Session Record — attendance, method, seven recorded points of discussion evidence/risk-assessment-workshop-record.md Markdown
Evidence Index — 10 evidence items with readiness and gaps evidence/evidence-index.md Markdown

Every score, level, and total in the document, the workbook, and both diagrams is computed from likelihood and impact in a single content source, never typed by hand. The arithmetic cannot disagree between formats.


Method

Risk assessment process flow

Risks were identified by working forward from assets, not from a published threat catalogue. A threat catalogue produces risks an organization recognizes but does not own; starting from in-scope assets produced risks with a specific consequence and an identifiable owner.

Scoring scales

Risk score = Likelihood × Impact, on a 5 × 5 matrix.

Score Likelihood Impact
1 Rare Insignificant
2 Unlikely Minor
3 Possible Moderate
4 Likely Major
5 Almost certain Severe
Risk level Score band Position against appetite
Critical 17–25 Outside appetite
High 10–16 Outside appetite
Medium 5–9 Within appetite, actively managed
Low 1–4 Within appetite

A twelve-month horizon is used for every likelihood judgement, so scores are comparable between risks.


The Register

Risk register

SBT-REG-03 v1.0 — all seventeen register fields, rendered from the actual Excel deliverable.

Ref Risk L I Score Level Treatment Residual Level
RSK-001 Unauthorized access to customer security reports 4 5 20 Critical Reduce 10 High
RSK-002 Ransomware affecting company systems 3 5 15 High Reduce 8 Medium
RSK-003 Cloud storage misconfiguration 3 4 12 High Reduce 8 Medium
RSK-004 Leakage of customer credentials during VAPT 3 5 15 High Reduce 8 Medium
RSK-005 Unavailability of the security monitoring platform 2 4 8 Medium Reduce 6 Medium
RSK-006 Phishing attack against employees 4 3 12 High Reduce 9 Medium
RSK-007 Inadequate vulnerability management of own estate 3 4 12 High Reduce 8 Medium
RSK-008 Loss of a key cybersecurity employee 4 3 12 High Reduce 8 Medium
RSK-009 Third-party supplier security failure 3 4 12 High Share / Transfer 9 Medium
RSK-010 Loss of availability of customer reports 2 2 4 Low Retain / Accept 4 Low

(Illustrative. Scores are judgements based on reasonable assumptions, not measurements.)


Inherent and Residual Positions

Risk heat map

Risk level Inherent Residual (forecast) Change
Critical 1 0 −1
High 7 1 −6
Medium 1 8 +7
Low 1 1 0
Outside appetite 8 1 −7

Three Things This Register Does Deliberately

Residual comparison

Sheet 4 of SBT-REG-03, with the reasoning for every residual score.

1. Not every risk is reduced to Low. RSK-001 remains High after treatment. Access controls reduce how likely unauthorized access is, but they cannot reduce how damaging it would be — the sensitivity of aggregated customer vulnerability findings is a property of the information, not of the control protecting it. That residual would require an explicit acceptance decision by the Managing Director.

2. Not every treatment is "Reduce". RSK-009 is treated by Share / Transfer, because the organization cannot implement controls inside a supplier's environment; assurance and consequence are allocated contractually and through insurance. RSK-010 is Retained, because it is already Low, sits within appetite, and its underlying weakness is treated more effectively under RSK-002 — treating it twice would duplicate effort. Avoid was considered and not selected as a primary option, since avoiding these risks would mean ceasing to trade.

3. Three risks show no reduction in likelihood at all. RSK-005, RSK-008, and RSK-009 reduce impact only. A documented runbook does not make a practitioner less likely to resign; a contract does not make a supplier less likely to be breached; nothing SecureBridge does changes the probability of a cloud region outage. Lowering those likelihood scores would have flattered the treatment and misrepresented what it achieves.


Treatment Plan

Treatment plan

Section 6 of SBT-RSK-01, rendered from the actual Word deliverable.

Priority Risk Owner Timeframe
1 RSK-001 Unauthorized access to customer reports IT & Infrastructure Manager Within 30 days
2 RSK-004 Leakage of customer credentials Head of Delivery Within 30 days
3 RSK-002 Ransomware IT & Infrastructure Manager Within 60 days
4–6 RSK-003, RSK-007, RSK-006 Cloud Practice Lead · IT & Infrastructure Manager · ISMS Manager Within 60 days
7–9 RSK-009, RSK-008, RSK-005 Finance & Procurement Lead · Human Resources Manager · Head of Delivery Within 90 days
10 RSK-010 IT & Infrastructure Manager No action — reviewed next cycle

Owners are role titles; no individual is named. Most of these treatments cost discipline rather than money — recertifying access, verifying patch compliance, testing restoration, and pointing the organization's own posture-monitoring capability at its own tenancies. That matters for a company with the resource constraints recorded at INT-10, and it is what makes the plan realistic rather than aspirational.


Role in the Portfolio

Consumes How
Project 01 — ISMS scope No risk is raised against an out-of-scope asset. The twelve in-scope system groups in SBT-REG-01 framed the assets considered.
Project 02 — Context Every risk traces to at least one determined issue. INT-06 produced RSK-001 and RSK-004; INT-05 produced RSK-002 and RSK-007; EXT-07 produced RSK-009.
Feeds into What it carries forward
Control selection and the Statement of Applicability Controls are selected because a scored risk justifies them. This register is that justification.
The treatment programme Ten treatment actions with named owners, priorities, and target dates
Internal audit Audit tests whether treatments were implemented and whether forecast residual scores were achieved
Management review The single residual High risk is the decision Clause 9.3 must address
Project 11 — integrated view RSK- identifiers feed the master risk and control view

Relationship to the portfolio dashboard. This is the initial register of ten risks as at April 2026. The portfolio dashboard shows 42 risks as at September 2026 — the register grows as the asset register, supplier enumeration, and legal determination complete, each of which is recorded here as an open action.


Skills Demonstrated

  • Traceable risk identification — working forward from assets, so each risk has an owner and a specific consequence rather than a generic label
  • Defensible scoring — every likelihood and impact value carries recorded reasoning that can be challenged at review
  • Honest control crediting — configured-but-untested controls (backup restoration) are recorded as assumptions, not credited as effective
  • Correct use of all four treatment options — including a genuine transfer and a genuine retention, each justified
  • Understanding what treatment actually changes — separating risks where likelihood can be reduced from risks where only consequence can
  • Residual honesty — one risk stays outside appetite, one shows no change at all, and neither is disguised
  • Governance framing — approval authority by risk level, acceptance criteria tied to appetite, and a review trigger list

Assumptions and Illustrative Data

# Assumption Type
A-01 All likelihood and impact scores are judgements based on reasonable assumptions about a fictional organization. They are not measurements and not derived from incident data Illustrative
A-02 No incident history exists, so likelihood is judged from the threat environment, the observed weaknesses, and how often the activity occurs Assumed
A-03 The ten risks were selected to cover the principal assets and service lines. The register is not complete and does not claim to be Sample
A-04 Backup restoration has never been tested, so recovery capability is recorded as an assumption rather than credited as a control Assumed
A-05 The supplier population of approximately 26 is an estimate; RSK-009 will be re-scored once enumeration completes To Be Verified
A-06 Risks arising from legal and regulatory obligations are not covered, because those obligations have not yet been determined Not Yet Implemented
A-07 Every residual score is a forecast. No treatment in the plan has been implemented Planned
A-08 No risk has been accepted. No management decision, actual or represented, has been taken on any risk here Illustrative
A-09 The organization is not certified to ISO/IEC 27001 and no external audit has been performed Not Yet Implemented

Known Gaps Carried Forward

Ref Gap Owner Target
EV-026 Risk identification worked from ten assets chosen at the session, not from a completed asset register, so coverage cannot be shown to be complete ISMS Manager 31-May-2026
EV-023 Treatment actions are assigned but not formally acknowledged by their owners — accountability is asserted rather than evidenced ISMS Manager 31-May-2026
EV-025 Residual scores are forecasts with no evidence yet that the forecast position is achievable ISMS Manager 31-Aug-2026

Part of the SecureBridge ISO 27001 GRC Portfolio · SecureBridge Technologies Pvt. Ltd. is a fictional organization created for portfolio purposes. All scores are illustrative. No certification has been achieved, no external audit has been performed, and no risk has been accepted.