Found something in this repository that could leak secrets, escalate write access, or undermine the integrity of translations Cider ships? Please report it privately rather than opening a public issue.
Preferred path: use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting on this repo. It routes the report straight to maintainers and supports a private back-and-forth before public disclosure.
If you don't have a GitHub account, the Cider team is reachable via the project Discord; ask there for the current security contact.
Please include:
- A clear description of the issue
- Steps to reproduce, or a proof-of-concept
- The impact you believe it has (token leak, write-access escalation, etc.)
- Whether you've notified anyone else
We aim to acknowledge within a week and coordinate the fix and disclosure window with you.
- The translation issue bot (
scripts/lint-translation-issue.mjs) - The AI fill script (
scripts/i18n-translate.mjs) - GitHub Actions workflows (
.github/workflows/*.yml) - The issue template (
.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/translation.yml) - The locale file format and any path that processes user-submitted translation data
- The Cider desktop client itself. This repo only hosts translation data; the client lives in a separate, closed-source repo.
- Third-party services (Anthropic Claude, GitHub Actions infrastructure).
- Social-engineering attacks against maintainers.
- Denial of service via flooding (GitHub rate limits and maintainer triage are the mitigation).
- Anything that could leak a repository secret (
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, the GitHub App'sCIDER_I18N_BOT_PRIVATE_KEY, orGITHUB_TOKEN). - Token-leak paths via workflow logs, error messages, or bot-posted comments.
- Bypasses of the
author_associationgate on theapplyjob (e.g. a way for a non-maintainer to get the bot to commit on their behalf). - Code execution in any workflow triggered by
pull_requestfrom a fork. - Path-traversal or prototype-pollution paths the existing regex gates don't cover.
Thanks for keeping the project safe.