Skip to content

Security: ciderapp/translations

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Reporting a vulnerability

Found something in this repository that could leak secrets, escalate write access, or undermine the integrity of translations Cider ships? Please report it privately rather than opening a public issue.

Preferred path: use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting on this repo. It routes the report straight to maintainers and supports a private back-and-forth before public disclosure.

If you don't have a GitHub account, the Cider team is reachable via the project Discord; ask there for the current security contact.

Please include:

  • A clear description of the issue
  • Steps to reproduce, or a proof-of-concept
  • The impact you believe it has (token leak, write-access escalation, etc.)
  • Whether you've notified anyone else

We aim to acknowledge within a week and coordinate the fix and disclosure window with you.

Scope

In scope

  • The translation issue bot (scripts/lint-translation-issue.mjs)
  • The AI fill script (scripts/i18n-translate.mjs)
  • GitHub Actions workflows (.github/workflows/*.yml)
  • The issue template (.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/translation.yml)
  • The locale file format and any path that processes user-submitted translation data

Out of scope

  • The Cider desktop client itself. This repo only hosts translation data; the client lives in a separate, closed-source repo.
  • Third-party services (Anthropic Claude, GitHub Actions infrastructure).
  • Social-engineering attacks against maintainers.
  • Denial of service via flooding (GitHub rate limits and maintainer triage are the mitigation).

What we'd particularly like to know

  • Anything that could leak a repository secret (ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, the GitHub App's CIDER_I18N_BOT_PRIVATE_KEY, or GITHUB_TOKEN).
  • Token-leak paths via workflow logs, error messages, or bot-posted comments.
  • Bypasses of the author_association gate on the apply job (e.g. a way for a non-maintainer to get the bot to commit on their behalf).
  • Code execution in any workflow triggered by pull_request from a fork.
  • Path-traversal or prototype-pollution paths the existing regex gates don't cover.

Thanks for keeping the project safe.

There aren't any published security advisories