fix(deploy): strip internal trust headers at proxy layer; run containers as non-root - #4985
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fix(deploy): strip internal trust headers at proxy layer; run containers as non-root#4985simpleqt wants to merge 1 commit into
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…ers as non-root Proxy headers: the Gateway treats X-DeerFlow-Internal-Token and X-DeerFlow-Owner-User-Id as internal credentials that bypass session auth and impersonate arbitrary users. Browser clients can set arbitrary custom headers, so the public hops (Next.js /api/memory proxy and every nginx proxying location) now strip both headers before forwarding. nginx does not inherit proxy_set_header into locations that define their own, hence the explicit clearing in all 16 locations. Containers: the frontend, backend and provisioner images all ran as root. The agent runtime can execute tool/shell commands, so a container compromise (or a prompt-injected run in host-bash mode) meant instant root. The frontend now runs as the image's uid-1000 node user, the backend and provisioner create a dedicated uid-1000 deerflow user, and HOME is set so ~/.deer-flow runtime state stays writable. The DooD overlay opts the gateway back into root explicitly because the host Docker socket requires it; this matches the Helm chart, which already sets runAsNonRoot/runAsUser 1000.
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August 24, 2026 03:55
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Proxy headers: the Gateway treats X-DeerFlow-Internal-Token and
X-DeerFlow-Owner-User-Id as internal credentials that bypass session
auth and impersonate arbitrary users. Browser clients can set arbitrary
custom headers, so the public hops (Next.js /api/memory proxy and every
nginx proxying location) now strip both headers before forwarding.
nginx does not inherit proxy_set_header into locations that define their
own, hence the explicit clearing in all 16 locations.
Containers: the frontend, backend and provisioner images all ran as
root. The agent runtime can execute tool/shell commands, so a container
compromise (or a prompt-injected run in host-bash mode) meant instant
root. The frontend now runs as the image's uid-1000 node user, the
backend and provisioner create a dedicated uid-1000 deerflow user, and
HOME is set so ~/.deer-flow runtime state stays writable. The DooD
overlay opts the gateway back into root explicitly because the host
Docker socket requires it; this matches the Helm chart, which already
sets runAsNonRoot/runAsUser 1000.