Prompt OIDC users to migrate trust policies - #382
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Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-01a031f1-2916-7144-a77d-ad88fa077cda Co-authored-by: Chris Campbell <chris.c@buildkite.com>
Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-01a031f1-2916-7144-a77d-ad88fa077cda Co-authored-by: Chris Campbell <chris.c@buildkite.com>
Amp-Thread-ID: https://ampcode.com/threads/T-01a031f1-2916-7144-a77d-ad88fa077cda Co-authored-by: Chris Campbell <chris.c@buildkite.com>
dannymidnight
marked this pull request as ready for review
August 24, 2026 23:55
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No inline findings. This changes behavior in the OIDC token issuance path, so it needs human review.
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Why
An action can successfully mint a Buildkite OIDC token while the target service still trusts GitHub's issuer and claims. Today the job produces no migration guidance at mint time, so a green build can hide the requirement to update that trust policy.
Closes PB-3066
This covers the OIDC slice of PB-2951. PB-2717 concerns GitHub issuer parity; this PR documents Buildkite-native issuer behavior and does not claim to resolve it.
What
After the first authorized token request successfully mints and protects a token, publish one trusted job warning:
Additional token requests do not duplicate the warning. Unauthorized or failed mint attempts do not claim that a token was issued; existing HTTP status handling and token secrecy are unchanged. The compatibility guide distinguishes Agent mint denial from a later downstream trust-policy rejection.
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