fix(security): reserve integration secrets to admins, and remove the shell from the backup chain

[HowmationFr]

Description

Two independent authorization and injection issues, both in code paths that handle integration credentials. They are grouped here because they share a threat model — an account with no administrative rights, or none at all, reaching secrets and commands it should never touch — but each is reviewable on its own commit.

---

1. Service and global variables were readable and writable by any authenticated user

GET|POST /api/v1/service/:service_name/variable/:variable_key and GET|POST /api/v1/variable/:variable_key were only marked authenticated. Service variables hold the credentials of the integrations — the Telegram bot token, the MQTT broker password, the Netatmo OAuth tokens, the eWeLink and CalDAV passwords — and global variables hold the instance-wide Gladys Plus keys. Any user, a guest included, could read all of them, and overwrite them: pointing MQTT_URL at another broker exfiltrates the whole sensor traffic, and corrupting GLADYS_GATEWAY_USERS_KEYS breaks Gladys Plus.

Authorization now follows the scope of the variable rather than the route:

• GET|POST /api/v1/variable/:variable_key become admin: true. Per-user settings already go through /api/v1/user/variable/:variable_key, which can only ever touch the caller's own row and stays open to everyone.
• The two service-variable routes cannot be flagged at the route level: the same routes serve the per-user account pages (CalDAV, Nextcloud Talk, CallMeBot) through userRelated. The check moved into the controller and is derived from the resolved userId, so the authorization and the row being addressed can never diverge — a service-wide variable requires an admin, a user-scoped one does not. variable.getValue matches exactly on (service_id, user_id) with no fallback, so a user-scoped read cannot reach a service-wide row.

Both the local HTTP API and the Gladys Plus gateway go through these checks: setupGateway already honours the admin flag, and the controller check covers the gateway path too.

Some services expose the very same secrets through a route of their own, handing their configuration object straight to res.json(). Left open they would make the fix above pointless, so they are reserved to admins as well: mqtt config (broker password), netatmo configuration (client secret), zwavejs-ui configuration (broker password), nuki config (API key), and the tuya configuration write. Their front pages are device integrations, already hidden from non-admin users, so no screen loses a working call. node-red configuration is left as is: its controller already whitelists the two version fields and never returns the stored password.

Front side: the Telegram page is visible to every user — an admin configures the bot there, a habitant gets their own linking link. Reading the API key first would now abort the whole page load for a non-admin, so it is only fetched for admins, which is also the only role the form is rendered for.

---

2. The name of a restored backup reached a shell

POST /api/v1/gateway/backup/restore builds every path it works on from the basename of the caller-supplied file_url, and that name was interpolated into a /bin/sh command:

exec(`gzip -dc ${compressedBackupFilePath} > ${sqliteBackupFilePath}`)

path.basename stops a path traversal but keeps $( ), backticks, quotes and semicolons, so the file name was executed by the shell. That route and POST /api/v1/gateway/backup-key are both authenticatedOrNotConfigured, which means that while no user exists in database the whole chain is reachable without authenticating — the signup restore flow. On a configured instance an admin reaches it too, which turns an admin UI into a shell in the Gladys process.

The same caller-controlled string reached two more interpreters further down:

• gateway.restoreBackup.js built sqlite3 STORAGE ".restore 'PATH'" for a shell, PATH being the name of a file inside the restored archive. The existing archive check only rejected absolute paths, .. and symlinks, not metacharacters.
• IMPORT DATABASE 'FOLDER' is a DuckDB statement, and DuckDB reads and writes files from SQL. FOLDER comes from the same archive.

Tracing the chain surfaced a fourth sink, on the backup side this time: gateway.backup.js ran openssl enc -pass pass:KEY through a shell, KEY being the backup passphrase, which saveBackupKey stores without any validation. A key containing a command substitution runs on every backup, including the scheduled ones.

Removing the shell is the fix, applied to the whole backup/restore chain rather than to the one reachable call:

• gzip -dc IN > OUT becomes spawnToFile('gzip', [...], out), a new helper whose redirection is a write stream. execFile is not usable here: it buffers stdout, and a database is not bounded by the exec buffer, so large restores would break.
• sqlite3 .backup / .restore, and tar (through a new cwd option on execFile, replacing a cd ... &&), become argument-array calls.
• openssl enc becomes an argument-array call. Side effect: a passphrase containing a space no longer breaks the backup, since no shell splits it any more.
• Both DuckDB IMPORT/EXPORT DATABASE paths are escaped for the SQL string literal they sit in.

Defense in depth, in the new utils/backupSafety.js: a backup name and every archive entry must match [A-Za-z0-9._-], checked per path segment so the Parquet folder keeps its nested files. . and .. are rejected explicitly, since the alphabet allows the dot. The name is validated before the download, so a malformed URL is never fetched at all, and a rejected archive is never retried with the old restore strategy.

post /api/v1/gateway/backup/restore also gets rateLimit: true: it is reachable before authentication and makes the server download and unpack a remote file.

The backup key is deliberately left unconstrained. It is the passphrase existing backups were encrypted with, so refusing some characters — or refusing to overwrite an existing key — would lock users out of restoring their own data. With no shell left in the chain, the key does not need a charset.

---

Tests

Regression tests reproduce both issues rather than only asserting the new behaviour: non-admin reads and writes rejected on service-wide and global variables (over HTTP and through the Gladys Plus gateway), with the stored value checked to be untouched after a rejected write; the userRelated flow verified to still work for a non-admin; a real backup renamed evil$(touch MARKER).enc, asserting both the rejection and that the marker was never created; and an encrypted archive fixture whose single entry is named x$(touch ...).db.

Not addressed here

file_url is passed as-is to an axios GET, so the server will fetch any URL including internal ones — a blind SSRF, unauthenticated on a fresh instance. Fixing it needs to know which hosts Gladys Plus signs its backup URLs on.

Roughly a hundred other service routes (discover, scan, permit_join, connect…) are reachable by any authenticated user. That is action authorization rather than secret disclosure, and it deserves its own change.

Checklist

• Tests pass: full server suite green, with the failure set compared against the pre-change baseline to confirm no regression. Coverage is 100% on every changed line; the lines left uncovered in gateway.downloadBackup.js and childProcess.js are pre-existing code this PR does not touch. Cypress green.
• Linter and prettier pass on both front and server
• No undocumented breaking change. Behaviour change to be aware of: a non-admin user now gets a 403 on the instance-wide settings that were previously writable by anyone (timezone, data retention, battery threshold, mDNS hostname) and on the integration setup screens.

Summary by CodeRabbit

• Security Improvements

  • Restricted service configurations, credentials, shared variables, and administrative settings to administrators.
  • Restricted access to integrations with shared credentials or household-wide access.
  • Added rate limiting for unauthenticated backup restoration on unconfigured instances.
  • Hardened backup downloads, restores, and archives against unsafe names, paths, and command injection.
  • Improved Telegram integration loading so users can continue accessing their personal link when API-key retrieval fails.

• Tests

  • Added coverage for authorization controls, backup safety, and error handling.

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---

📝 Walkthrough

Walkthrough

The changes restrict non-admin access to service secrets and service-wide variables. They also harden Gateway backup handling by validating paths, escaping SQL literals, and replacing shell command execution with argument-based child processes.

Changes

Access control

Layer / File(s)	Summary
Variable and integration access authorization server/api/controllers/variable.controller.js, server/api/routes.js, front/src/routes/integration/..., front/src/routes/settings/SettingsLayout.jsx, server/test/controllers/variable/variable.test.js	Service-wide and global variable access now requires administrators. User-scoped variables retain ownership checks. Telegram API key retrieval continues for all users. Selected integrations and settings entries are hidden from non-admin users.
Secret-bearing service routes server/services/{mqtt,netatmo,nuki,tuya}/api/*, server/services/zwavejs-ui/api/*, server/services/zigbee2mqtt/api/*, server/test/controllers/serviceSecretRoutes.test.js	Service configuration routes now require administrator authorization. Tests verify authentication and admin flags.
Gateway restore route protection server/api/routes.js	The unconfigured-instance restore route remains available before authentication and now uses rate limiting.

Backup command and path hardening

Layer / File(s)	Summary
Backup safety contracts server/utils/backupSafety.js, server/test/utils/backupSafety.test.js	New helpers validate backup names and archive entries and escape single quotes in DuckDB SQL literals.
Shell-free child process support server/utils/childProcess.js, server/test/utils/childProcess.test.js	execFile accepts a working directory. spawnToFile redirects stdout and handles process, stream, and output errors.
Backup creation and restore execution server/lib/gateway/gateway.backup.js, server/lib/gateway/gateway.restoreBackup.js	SQLite, tar, and OpenSSL commands now use explicit argument arrays. DuckDB paths are escaped before SQL interpolation.
Backup download validation server/lib/gateway/gateway.downloadBackup.js, server/test/lib/gateway/gateway.downloadBackup.test.js	Backup names and archive entries reject unsafe values. SQLite fallback decompression uses spawnToFile. Tests verify unsafe names and metacharacters are rejected.

Estimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~45 minutes

Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to adf4e

Backup decompression can still terminate the Gladys process when a child stream errors instead of failing the restore cleanly. This is a bounded but concrete availability risk that should be fixed or explicitly accepted before merge.

Suggested reviewers: pierre-gilles

Poem

A rabbit checks each backup name,
No shell-born spark can leap its frame.
Admin paws guard secrets tight,
Safe paths guide the files tonight.
The carrot stamp says: access right!

🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 5

✅ Passed checks (5 passed)

Check name	Status	Explanation
Description Check	✅ Passed	Check skipped - CodeRabbit’s high-level summary is enabled.
Title check	✅ Passed	The title accurately summarizes the two primary changes: restricting integration secrets to administrators and removing shell interpolation from backup operations.
Docstring Coverage	✅ Passed	Docstring coverage is 100.00% which is sufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 14 functions across 21 files.
Linked Issues check	✅ Passed	Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.
Out of Scope Changes check	✅ Passed	Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.

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Codecov Report

✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests.
✅ Project coverage is 99.55%. Comparing base (f2b49a7) to head (adf4e2a).

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@@           Coverage Diff            @@
##           master    #3005    +/-   ##
========================================
  Coverage   99.55%   99.55%            
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  Files        1268     1269     +1     
  Lines       92772    93004   +232     
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+ Hits        92359    92591   +232     
  Misses        413      413            

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[cursor]

Stale comment

Review

The two bugs are real, and the shape of the fix is right: authorize by the scope of the row rather than the route, and take /bin/sh out of the backup/restore chain instead of trying to sanitize filenames for the shell. The regression tests actually replay the old attacks (habitant read/write of service-wide secrets over HTTP and the gateway; evil$(touch …).enc; archive entry with metacharacters). CI is green, including codecov patch.

I am requesting changes for one leftover of the same secret-disclosure class this PR set out to close.

Requested change

GET|POST /api/v1/service/zigbee2mqtt/setup are still authenticated only. getSetup() returns SETUP_VARIABLES, which includes GLADYS_MQTT_PASSWORD. That is the same “hand the configuration object to res.json()” pattern this PR locked on mqtt, netatmo, nuki, zwavejs-ui and tuya. Left open, a habitant can still read the Z2M broker password after the mqtt config door is closed. Please mark those two routes admin: true and add them to SECRET_BEARING_ROUTES.

The ~100 other discover / scan / connect routes called out in the description are action authorization and are fine as a follow-up. node-red staying open is also fine (the handler already whitelists the version fields).

Residuals (not blocking)

• sqlite3 .restore / .backup still interpolate the path into sqlite3’s meta-command language. Combined with the [A-Za-z0-9._-] per-segment check this is no longer filename RCE; the Node sqlite3 backup API would remove that interpreter entirely.
• execFile now spreads caller options onto child_process.execFile, which can reintroduce shell: true. Allowlisting cwd would match the goal of this PR.
• openssl -pass pass:KEY still puts the passphrase on argv (ps, /proc/<pid>/cmdline). -pass env:… would be cleaner. Agreed the key itself must stay unconstrained so existing backups remain restorable.
• Blind SSRF on file_url is correctly called out as needing Gladys Plus URL hosts; not this PR.
• Unauthenticated restore uses the global 100 req / 5 min limiter. Tightening that is optional follow-up.

Product / risk

No new DEVICE_FEATURE_CATEGORIES / DEVICE_FEATURE_TYPES.

This touches backup/restore (a failed restore can brick an instance) and the authorization of every integration secret, so I am adding risk:high. The breaking 403 on instance-wide settings (timezone, retention, battery threshold, mDNS hostname) and the remaining unauthenticated-restore + SSRF threat model should get a maintainer look: needs:human-review, requesting Pierre-Gilles.

  

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⚠️ Outside diff range comments (1)

server/utils/childProcess.js (1)

99-126: 🩺 Stability & Availability | 🟠 Major | ⚡ Quick win

Handle errors from both child stdio streams.

spawnToFile does not handle errors from child.stdout or child.stderr. Readable.pipe() does not forward source errors, so an unhandled error event can terminate the Node.js process. Add listeners for both streams or use stream.pipeline. Add regression tests for both paths and include them in npm run coverage.

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In `@server/utils/childProcess.js` around lines 99 - 126, Update spawnToFile to
handle error events from both child.stdout and child.stderr, routing them
through the existing fail handler so stream failures reject cleanly instead of
becoming unhandled errors. Add regression tests covering stdout and stderr
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Outside diff comments:
In `@server/utils/childProcess.js`:
- Around line 99-126: Update spawnToFile to handle error events from both
child.stdout and child.stderr, routing them through the existing fail handler so
stream failures reject cleanly instead of becoming unhandled errors. Add
regression tests covering stdout and stderr stream errors, and ensure those
tests run through npm run coverage.

---

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Stale comment

Review (follow-up)

The previous blockers are fixed at efb91e1:

• GET|POST /api/v1/service/zigbee2mqtt/setup are now admin: true and sit in SECRET_BEARING_ROUTES. That was the last dedicated config route that handed GLADYS_MQTT_PASSWORD (and MQTT_URL) to res.json().
• execFile now forwards cwd only, so a later caller cannot pass shell: true and put /bin/sh back in the backup chain.

I re-checked the remaining service controllers that res.json() a configuration object. node-red still whitelists the two version fields. nuki/mqtt/ewelink/tuya status handlers only return booleans. Bluetooth and LAN-manager config are scan settings, not credentials. The ~100 discover / scan / connect routes remain action authorization and are fine as a follow-up.

CI is green on this SHA (front test/build, server lint/test, Cypress, Docker, codecov patch and project).

No new DEVICE_FEATURE_CATEGORIES / DEVICE_FEATURE_TYPES.

Residuals (not blocking)

• sqlite3 .restore / .backup still interpolate the path into sqlite3’s meta-command language. The [A-Za-z0-9._-] per-segment check means this is no longer filename RCE; the Node sqlite3 backup API would drop that interpreter entirely.
• spawnToFile does not listen for error on child.stdout / child.stderr. See the inline note: a disk-full restore could crash the process instead of rejecting. stream.pipeline would close that.
• openssl -pass pass:KEY still puts the passphrase on argv (ps, /proc/<pid>/cmdline). -pass env:… would be cleaner. Agreed the key itself must stay unconstrained so existing backups remain restorable.
• Blind SSRF on file_url is correctly called out as needing Gladys Plus URL hosts; not this PR.
• Unauthenticated restore uses the global 100 req / 5 min limiter.
• Front: System settings (timezone, mDNS, battery threshold, history retention) still render for habitants and will now 403. Documented breaking change; the screens themselves are not gated.

Product / risk

This still touches backup/restore (a failed restore can brick an instance) and the authorization of every integration secret, so risk:high stays. The breaking 403 on instance-wide settings and the remaining unauthenticated-restore + SSRF threat model should get a maintainer look: needs:human-review, requesting Pierre-Gilles.

  

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[cursor]

Not blocking. pipe() does not forward source errors, so an error on child.stdout (or child.stderr, which only has a data listener) can become an unhandled exception and take the Gladys process down. Disk-full during restore is the realistic trigger: writeStream errors, fail() destroys the stream and kills gzip, then stdout can emit EPIPE.

Routing both streams through fail, or switching this to stream.pipeline, would make a failed decompression a rejected promise instead of a crash. Worth a follow-up on this path, not a reason to hold the secret/RCE fix.

[Pierre-Gilles]

Strong PR overall — the server side is ready as far as I can tell, and I'm requesting changes only for the front-end fallout (see inline comments).

What I verified and confirmed sound:

• The controller-level authorization check is well designed: derived from the resolved userId rather than the route, so the check and the row being addressed can never diverge. variable.getValue matches exactly on (service_id, user_id) with no fallback, so a user-scoped read can't reach a service-wide row.
• The Gladys Plus gateway path is covered: setupGateway honours the admin flag, and the controller check applies to gateway calls too (and is tested).
• The claims in the description check out: node-red's configuration really does whitelist the two version fields; CalDAV, Nextcloud Talk and CallMeBot all pass userRelated: true; MQTT's saveConfiguration is mounted on /connect, which was already admin-only; the device/weather integrations and homekit are hidden from non-admins in the catalog. I also swept the remaining non-admin config routes (bluetooth, caldav, lan-manager) — no secrets in their payloads.
• The backup/restore chain: spawnToFile is correctly implemented (waits for both process exit and stream flush, all error paths handled), backupSafety validates per path segment and explicitly rejects ./.., absolute paths and tar's trailing slash are handled, and the DuckDB literal escaping is standard. The name is validated before the download, and a rejected archive never falls back to the old restore strategy.
• The tests are genuinely adversarial (a real backup renamed with $(touch …), a booby-trapped archive fixture, gateway 403, stored value asserted untouched after a rejected write).

Changes requested (inline):

1. front/src/routes/integration/all/telegram/actions.js — on a hard page load the store's user isn't populated yet when getTelegramApiKey runs, so an admin refreshing the page never loads the API key.
2. The Free Mobile page stays visible to non-admins and now errors out (its variables are service-wide, fetched without userRelated).
3. The OpenAI weekly digest card and the Settings → System / Backup / Gateway tabs are still reachable by non-admins and now hit 403s — decide whether to hide them or gate the fetches (a follow-up is fine for the settings tabs, but the OpenAI card is worth handling here).

Nit: the description's list of service routes moved to admin doesn't mention zigbee2mqtt setup, which the diff (rightly) includes.

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Generated by Claude Code

[Pierre-Gilles]

Restricting these routes is correct, but two front surfaces still reachable by non-admins consume them and weren't adjusted:

• the OpenAI page (communication type, so visible to habitants): WeeklyDigestSettings.jsx reads and writes /api/v1/variable/AI_WEEKLY_DIGEST_* on mount;
• the Settings → System / Backup / Gateway tabs: SettingsLayout.jsx has no role gating, and those pages read/write the timezone, device history, mDNS hostname, backup key… through these routes.

The PR body documents the 403 behaviour change, so this may be intended — but as it stands habitants get error states on screens they can still navigate to. Either hide these tabs/pages for non-admins (here or in a follow-up), or gate the fetches like the Telegram page. At minimum the OpenAI weekly digest card is worth handling in this PR, since the integrations catalog still shows that page to them.

---

Generated by Claude Code

[cursor]

Review (follow-up)

Head is now adf4e2ad (previous Cursor approval was on efb91e1, then Pierre requested front-end changes). The two follow-up commits close those front-end holes; the merge with master only had to combine SettingsLayout.jsx (#3000 ChipsScroll + this branch’s adminOnly filter). Both are present in the resolved file.

Pierre’s request-changes items

1. Telegram hard load — fixed. The API key is fetched unconditionally and a failure on that call is swallowed, so the linking link still loads. That is the right call: getDefaultState() still has no user.role when componentWillMount runs, and the JWT is already on the client, so the server is the authority.
2. Free Mobile — fixed. It is now in HIDDEN_INTEGRATIONS_FOR_NON_ADMIN_USERS next to HomeKit. Nothing on that page is per-user.
3. Settings → System / Backup / Gateway — done in this PR (Pierre had allowed a follow-up). Those tabs, plus Jobs (already an admin API), are adminOnly. The layout is connect'd so the sixteen callers do not need to pass user down. Deep links still reach the page; the server stays the authority, as the comment says.
4. OpenAI weekly digest — not changed, and I am not blocking on it. WeeklyDigestSettings only mounts when GET /api/v1/gateway/status succeeds. That route is authenticatedOrNotConfigured, and on a configured instance that middleware already applies adminMiddleware. A habitant therefore never mounts the card: they see the Gladys Plus upsell, which was already the case before this PR. The new admin: true on /api/v1/variable/:key does not add a 403 on a screen they can actually open. Gating the card on user.role would still be nicer defense in depth, but it is not a regression.

Server side is unchanged from the previous approval (Z2M setup locked, execFile cwd allowlisted, shell gone from backup/restore).

No new DEVICE_FEATURE_CATEGORIES / DEVICE_FEATURE_TYPES.

CI is green on this SHA (front test/build, server lint/test, Cypress, Docker, codecov patch and project).

Residuals (not blocking)

• spawnToFile still does not listen for error on child.stdout / child.stderr. Disk-full during restore can crash the process instead of rejecting (pipe() does not forward source errors). stream.pipeline would close that. Previous thread left open.
• sqlite3 .restore / .backup still interpolate the path into sqlite3’s meta-command language. The [A-Za-z0-9._-] per-segment check means this is no longer filename RCE.
• Telegram’s inner catch treats every failure (including a 500) as “no key”. A 403 or 404 is the intended case; a transient error could show an admin an empty field. Not worth holding the PR.
• openssl -pass pass:KEY still puts the passphrase on argv. The key itself must stay unconstrained.
• Blind SSRF on file_url is still out of scope (needs Gladys Plus URL hosts).

Product / risk

This still touches backup/restore (a failed restore can brick an instance) and the authorization of every integration secret, so risk:high stays. Pierre asked for the front-end pass; that landed, and he should re-check before merge: needs:human-review, requesting Pierre-Gilles.

  

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