Security fixes target the current main branch and the latest published Docker
image, battermanz/hatchdoor:latest.
Hatchdoor serves a private Markdown vault. Treat every network-exposed instance as sensitive:
- Set
HATCHDOOR_WEB_BEARER_TOKENbefore binding to a non-loopback interface. - Docker Compose binds Hatchdoor to
0.0.0.0inside the container, so a web bearer token is required there. - Enable MCP only for trusted clients and always set
HATCHDOOR_MCP_BEARER_TOKEN. - Keep the SQLite cache outside the Markdown vault. The cache is disposable, but the vault is the source of truth.
- For a Git-backed Vault, use an HTTPS token scoped to that one repository.
Watch for sync failures in the Vault's Git console under Settings, or in the
gitandgit_errorfields of each Vault from MCPlist_vaultsorGET /api/v1/vaults. Hatchdoor sends the token only to the scheme, host and port of the Vault's repository URL, once per attempt; a redirect to another host gets no token, and a rejected token is not retried until someone acts.
Anyone who can create or edit Vaults, through the Web UI, the HTTP API or an
MCP client with write access, can make the server open an HTTPS connection to
any host they name as a repository URL. That includes private and LAN
addresses (127.0.0.1, 10.0.0.0/8, 192.168.0.0/16, the container
network) and hosts that redirect elsewhere. Hatchdoor deliberately keeps no
address allow-list or block-list, because self-hosted Git servers on the LAN
are a normal setup. Only give Vault-management access to people you would let
reach those addresses from the server, or restrict the container's outbound
network if that is a concern.
Open a private security advisory or contact the maintainer before publishing details. Include affected version, deployment mode, reproduction steps, and whether the issue can expose or mutate vault content.