- Every capability uses the normative evidence states in
Evidence And Roadmap Governance.
Planning prose, generated documentation, a type name, or a passing docs check
proves
Specifiedonly. Implementedrequires an executable owner and its exact required tests;Supportedadditionally requires the selected profile's release, security, compatibility, operational and exact-commit pentest evidence.- README, API discovery, UI navigation, release notes, support matrices, installers and operator output must expose conditional and unsupported scope without silent fallback. Missing or stale evidence moves readiness toward refusal.
0.398.0blocks a Hosted production claim unless mandatory dependency-free transport/crypto, storage, identity/session, hostile-input, packaging, operations, and recovery profiles are all Supported with exact evidence.- One canonical roadmap manifest accounts for all 425 exact stops and their owners, evidence, authority review and pentest markers. Count or claim drift is a release-blocking integrity failure.
- PackageExact capability dependencies retain an independently generated declared minimum. Silent edge removal and same/future-version prerequisites fail; an actual removal requires a separately approved, digest-bound security supersession with affected controls and negative/integration tests.
- An executable-test claim resolves to a registered Rust source symbol and a project-owned runner that lists and executes the exact stable ID. Implemented status additionally binds passing evidence to source, runner, Rust toolchain, candidate commit and evidence-artifact digests.
- Plan-review inputs are treated as untrusted snapshots. Reopened
0.1.0records the actual commit and workspace inventory, classifies revision mismatch, and requires every stale finding to reproduce before it can change roadmap, dependency, evidence, or support authority. WorkPackageClosureV1generation 2 bidirectionally binds every package to exact normalized generation, code-owner, transition/evidence-path, test and verification sets plus its bounded authority. Missing, extra, substituted or duplicate scope and orphan packages/rows fail.0.2.0cannot enter implementation without complete ID/time/error ownership, while excluding its own proof paths, or after silently admitting unrelated work.- The roadmap is a planning superset.
1.0.0consumes only the complete transitive closure of the selected mandatory core and explicitly selected optional profiles; every unselected stop remains visibly non-shipping and grants no claim. 0.119.0–0.121.0are a PostgreSQL-backed transport/domain test slice with static identity facts only. The first production-authenticated Hosted architecture proof occurs after the real identity/policy owners through0.225.0, as defined by the Implementation Convergence Plan. No fake profile is retroactively promoted. Every Supported deployment publishes numeric workload, recovery, and refusal limits beginning with the production-authenticated proof.
- Rust
1.97.1, edition 2024, resolver 3, warnings denied. - Unsafe Rust forbidden workspace-wide.
- Panics, unwraps, expects, unreachable paths, TODOs, and debug macros denied by Clippy in production code.
- No third-party Cargo sources and no crate publication.
- Every Rust library currently
no_std; every Rust source file at most 500 lines. - Locked builds, full action SHA pins, read-only CI permissions, and no persisted checkout credentials.
- Format, check, unit, documentation, Clippy, source-policy, link, license, advisory, and SBOM gates.
Every change needs:
- a release-plan assignment and bounded scope;
- threat-model and attack-surface delta;
- positive, negative, boundary, and regression tests;
- property tests for state or algebraic invariants;
- fuzzing for untrusted syntax and decoders;
- authorization and tenant-isolation cases for affected reads/actions;
- failure-injection for persistence and distributed behavior;
- documentation, changelog, and release-note updates;
- exact-commit pentest and clean retest before tagging.
Tests must prove both acceptance and rejection. A rejected operation must not partially mutate state, consume authority, expose hidden fields, or omit an audit decision.
From 0.95.0, every domain owns one checked identity/application/event
manifest with exact aggregate/stream, command, event, compatibility/upcaster,
read, and applicable consumer references; later typed extensions reference,
never copy, authoritative policy, tenant-surface, workflow, search, workspace,
API, and transfer registry entries. 0.96.0 enforces namespace, dependency,
generation, compatibility, rollback, mixed-node, atomic metadata admission,
scope separation, contribution-kind registry/lifecycle/test/certification
obligations, and no-authority-from-declaration rules. Metadata admission cannot
enable a feature, plugin, consumer, license, entitlement, or authorization.
0.97.0 makes absent-surface-only deferrals exact, expiring, retested, and
product-state visible; existing schema, storage, routing, derived data, effects,
or messages cannot defer their structural controls.
0.98.0 backfills current event ownership/evolution. 0.99.0 consumes the
complete 0.30.0–0.32.0 family and gates effects/messages/consumers/timers/
activities/poison/replay/quarantine/results. 0.100.0 requires permanent-ID,
fenced, drained, history-preserving retirement with orthogonal evidence and
distinct verified/loss/blocking terminals. 0.101.0 governs exact tenant-child
proposal authority and recovery; 0.156.0 owns authenticated deployment
membership cuts, topology reconciliation, and safe fence release; 0.157.0
owns separated approval, exact-cut plan consumption, atomic campaign admission,
and constrained child-authority derivation; 0.158.0 owns successor-plan CAS,
allowed deltas, cumulative budgets, predecessor fencing, and resume authority;
0.159.0 owns narrow domain guarding, authoritative post-cut absence/child
handoffs, and broad-fence transfer; 0.160.0 owns the joint successor/
protection-root CAS and ancestor-receipt validity; 0.161.0 owns bounded fair
isolated-child dispatch and truthful terminal aggregation; 0.162.0 owns
tenant-local residual-obligation handoff, authenticated receipt reconciliation,
and retained tenant fences; 0.163.0 separates immutable residual membership
from authenticated predecessor-linked mutable state; 0.164.0 owns exact
restore-safe partition delivery cuts so a folded parent head cannot hide local
state and defines absorbing consumption/canonical empty state; 0.165.0 owns
closed mutation classification, emergency restrictive invalidation, safety
epochs and mode-bound source status; 0.166.0–0.169.0 authorize/complete
target-slot takeover, atomically transfer funded capacity for retained
candidate controls, and reconcile every barrier release/retention receipt;
0.170.0 archives before deletion under truthful uncertainty; 0.171.0
independently authorizes exact retained-namespace safety; 0.172.0–0.210.0
evaluate reinstall under partition fences, enforce explicit lifecycle
adjacency, serialize activation against abort,
require source-local activation-permit redemption and successor-restriction
bridges, fund each bridge under one durable owner, define canonical clean-empty
ownership/disposition roots, reconcile/abort/supersede partial admission
without treating unknown as absence, default permanent unknown to terminal
unavailable unless an independent two-CAS quarantine profile is selected and
fully fences it, make quarantined unknown restrictions maximal authoritative
members over a generated complete operation universe actively enforced by
evaluation, admission and funded bridges, consume replacement eligibility once
into a finite predecessor-linked evaluation lineage with cumulative budgets
and permanently terminal exhaustion, create exactly one proof-bound successor
lifecycle, keep lowering evaluation/permits distinct from reinstall authority,
use one closed top-or-pre-operational-lowered genesis tag through lifecycle
creation, per-partition adoption and final activation so neither the restriction
branch nor eligibility can be consumed incorrectly; require closed Top/Lowered
partition-receipt and admission-root variants with no optional authority
members; preserve bridge identity and capacity while carrying the lowered
branch through the same expected-generation lifecycle CAS and tagged
admission/ownership roots; atomically consume both candidates only after
complete admission and bridge-ownership transfer; commit-revalidate evidence,
coverage, safety, restriction, revocation/expiry and prepared-root/bridge-owner
state plus distinct current guard-slot, non-operational candidate and expected
successor generations; route every final freshness failure through typed
ActivationPrepared → AdmissionRevalidationRequired, with Blocked diagnostics
derived only and permanent denial continuing through abort/disposition;
reconcile both reinstall release families; permit
already-operational lowering only through the same fresh guard-slot CAS; and
release the old top only through per-enforcement-point Released or
RetainedAccepted receipts committed by expected-version member CAS with
absorbing terminals, with unknown remaining pending; canonical parent vectors
select one maximum authenticated version independently per member and allow
heterogeneous cross-member versions; identical pending observations coalesce
under a separate bounded attempt budget; pending version saturation reserves
terminal capacity; and completion requires zero pending under authenticated
conservation.
0.192.0 derives every finite budget from governed per-class bounds and cost
units and funds the checked worst authorized work without borrowing.
0.193.0 constructs immutable manifest members, transition and retry-ledger
geneses in authority-inert bounded batches, seals their exact root, and leaves
the guard-slot transaction only a bounded root recheck/binding; inactive roots
are safely disposed under retained funding. Pending advances only below its
ceiling, enters saturation exactly at the ceiling and jumps from valid
Pending/saturation directly to the reserved terminal version.
0.194.0 forbids cross-store transactions: source release and destination
retention each commit a local effect receipt, while a durable parent inbox
folds only the selected intent through one parent-local member/head CAS.
0.196.0 source-fences the complete distributed predecessor inventory through
activation; 0.197.0–0.198.0 commit one parent intent and require its closed,
activation-bound one-shot authority to be recorded before dispatch in one
intent-scoped issuance aggregate: a shared expected-version scope head plus
immutable unique entries. Issuance atomically advances the shared
head/count/root, consumes exact intent-lifetime reservation legs and commits
outbox work under one lock order; incapable adapters refuse the profile.
Exact retry joins, changed material/reservation conflicts, and restore cannot
infer authority from an outbox or projection.
0.199.0 keeps contradictory physical effects nonterminal until every losing
effect is removed/transferred or durably funded and exact conservation holds.
0.200.0 gives every restrictive-safety mutation an immediate protected lane
through any prepared inventory fence and atomically invalidates both the cut
and prepared construction. 0.201.0 cuts authorization issuance, reconciles
the sealed issued-entry universe only, terminally consumes unused reservation
legs without refund and requires the terminal CAS to consume its closure root
with current budget and conflict heads. Unissued attempts are inert command
results, not fabricated closure members. 0.202.0 treats a truly
unauthorized post-closure effect as a separately funded current-generation
incident/residual without reopening terminal history; stable local
observation identities and create-or-join heads prevent duplicate/reordered
polls from multiplying incidents, charges or owners. Its closed physical-
status port requires an ABA-resistant authority sequence and continuity
ratchet; snapshot-only profiles refuse and remain restrictively unresolved.
Manual evidence may add custody/annotations or funded residual ownership but
cannot invent identity/absence, authorize safe removal or lower that fence.
0.203.0 permits a dead
intent to be abandoned or replanned only from a complete no-effect closure;
uncertainty or any observed effect enters conflict, and successor identities
and cumulative budgets are never reused or reset. Its immutable
multidimensional lifetime ledger creates stable route reservation legs before
successor authority, 0.198.0 consumes issuance legs, 0.201.0 closes unused legs,
and explicit exhaustion can be widened only by a separate policy-authorized
predecessor-linked amendment—never ordinary retry.
0.204.0 replaces a supported status authority only through independently
approved predecessor-final/successor-genesis receipts, one continuity head and
a dual-source fence; prepared or uncertain handoff grants no authority.
0.205.0 prepays one immutable per-authorization send allowance, charges a
non-wrapping attempt head and creates the canonical VIT-LAW-006 start claim
before each I/O permit; failover, response loss,
route movement and restore cannot refund or reset it. 0.206.0 admits an
intent/replan only when its worst-case closure bundle fits the active backend;
staged dispositions are authority-inert and one bounded final CAS alone
publishes complete issuance/budget/dispatch/conflict closure.
0.207.0 installs the predecessor fence, dormant successor admission and
successor activation through separately authenticated local atomic receipts.
0.208.0 keeps the predecessor and failed successor tombstoned while one fresh
bounded post-fence replacement either activates or becomes permanently
refused. 0.209.0 makes every live or unknown/reconciling transmission claim
block closure until authenticated reconciliation settles its possible effect.
0.210.0 limits stale seal preparation through one cumulative lineage and
pins codec, schema, size algorithm and backend profile through final publish;
cleanup requires checkpoint/archive coverage.
Saturated recovery remains
a retry-only lane with no terminal or cleanup authority; 0.195.0 charges its
non-resetting lifetime limit through a separate versioned ledger before outbox
work and binds that head into restore and terminal evidence. Dispatch remains
closed until continuity from sealed construction genesis is admitted; a
signature, larger version or reconstructed history alone grants nothing.
No wildcard tenant or cross-tenant retirement transaction exists, and loss
never counts as clean or grants deletion/hold release. 0.155.0 immediately
certifies tenant surfaces; 0.369.0 iterates
contribution-kind obligations; and default 0.414.0 certifies fail-closed
retirement refusal and retained-history compatibility. Destructive retirement
requires a future selected successor after its complete implementation closure.
Missing obligations block the owner and release.
- Secure configuration defaults and startup validation.
- Law-manifest trust independent from mutable storage: exact admitted
(LawId, Generation, Digest)tuples, compiled or dedicated-platform-law signed activation-floor catalogs, planning-superset separation, one global lineage, one rollout-root process manager, one independent dynamic-topology generation owner, and exact attested/fenced local placement owners with catalog/distrust/trusted-time fences; compiled static bootstrap and immutable successor topology/placement manifests; one active rollout generation with irreversible authorization receipt/outbox pinning and permanent pre-authorization loser supersession; staged exact-singleton topology handoff only after generation-2 admission and with exclusive authority; one independent topology-authorization issuer with issuance-time authority/ quorum checks, short immutable grants, idempotent unknown-response recovery, revocation/supersession of future issuance, independent break-glass recovery, and restore high-watermarks; authenticated mutation class/issued-at/deadline/ maximum-uncertainty/trusted-time-profile/issuer-continuity fields with concrete five-minute initialization, two-minute commit-or-successor, and sixty-second break-glass ceilings; fail-closed issuance and rollback- resistant consumer lower-bound/profile/continuity/expiry ratchets proving pre-expiry CAS despite clock steps, suspend, restore, failover, or skew; canonicalTopologyMutationAuthorizationReceiptV1persistence and mandatory backendDeadlineConditionalTopologyCasV1with an authoritative commit-time predicate or hard no-late-commit fence; atomic time-ratchet/receipt/claim/ topology/member-fence/tombstone/outbox persistence and typed reconciliation where client timeouts never permit a later commit; boundedTopologyAuthorizationReplayLifecycleV1with independently provisioned, non-borrowableNormal/Recovery/BreakGlassaccept queues, sockets/file descriptors, TLS workers, decode CPU/memory, executor queues and pools under one aggregate fail-safe ceiling; server-controlled listener/TLS routing selects an ingress lane but grants no authority; per-lane pre-authentication ingress byte/concurrency/cryptographic/canonical-decode work limits; VIT-INV-061 as sole owner of the versioned presentation-lane mapping, with separated requestor/approver/activator roles for emergency promotion under current policy and recorded change or incident authority; a two-stage presentation protocol whereChargeTopologyAuthorizationPresentationdurably charges after authentication/canonicalization but before protected idempotency lookup and issues bounded internal, non-exportable, single-useTopologyAuthorizationPresentationChargeV1evidence bound to request/caller, ingress/presentation lane, mapping identity/generation/fence/profile digest, budget epoch/sequence and owner/boot continuity;ConsumeTopologyAuthorizationPresentationChargeconsumes that evidence, rechecks the current mapping generation, and only then performs the first-seen request/outcome/issuance transaction; mapping change returnsTopologyAuthorizationPresentationLaneChanged, while crash or fenced continuity leaves the charge spent, allocates no logical request, and requires a fresh retry charge; evidence/dispositions are bounded and checkpointed before deletion; atomic stage-one debit/evidence/sequence/ChargedAwaitingStageTwopersistence or pre-lookup failure on charge-ledger saturation; a closed disposition table whoseConsumed,MappingChanged,ControlledAbortAbandoned, andContinuityFencedOrphanedoutcomes are irreversible; andCheckpointedCompactedpreservation of the original terminal kind and result/evidence commitment; non-borrowable Normal/Recovery/BreakGlass charge-ledger rows, bytes, awaiting state, backlog, checkpoint/archive I/O, and compaction workers below aggregate ceilings; immutable VIT-INV-061 capacity-profile successors with expected-version activation, governed emergency/aggregate changes, drain-before-shrink, physical provisioning proof, downgrade fencing, and restore from the greatest authenticated committed activation record rather than raw generation or numeric maximum; atomic lane-scoped PendingDrain fence installation; one nonterminal successor; stage-one fit against active and successor profiles; typed pre-debit draining denial; exact action-authorized expected-version activation/rejection with atomic fence consumption; authenticated failover/restore; stale-worker and competing-successor rejection; and Recovery isolation; mandatory PendingDrain for every canonical reduction; overflow-safe typed complete-profile comparison with unknown/incomparable schemas treated as reductions; canonically derived aggregate-to-lane fence coverage; fixed lane/aggregate capacity-row locking; activation-record-selected recovery with lineage/activation high-watermarks; and atomic, uncallable fence lifecycle events; action-bound drain authorization for Normal/Recovery/BreakGlass/aggregate actions with exact scope/diff/coverage/policy/approval/SoD/expiry/nonce/ idempotency binding and separately authorized rejection/abandonment; closed Issued/Consumed/ExpiredUnused/RevokedUnused authorization consumption, atomic tombstone/result/mutation/event/audit/outbox persistence, exact retry recovery, typed conflicting retry, and permanent non-reuse; conservative trusted-time authorization validation with not-before/issued/ expiry, uncertainty, profile/epoch, issuer continuity, signer/key epoch/ authentication profile, long-drain historical validity, fresh activation authority, and rollback/suspend/restore/failover ratchets; canonical non-wrapping predecessor-linked activation records atomically committed with head/supersession/fence/audit/result/outbox, authenticated checkpoint-before-delete covering authorization/result/time/key high-watermarks, validation evidence and replay tombstones, and chain/head/ high-watermark rollback refusal; bounded authenticated sparse drain-replay checkpoints/archives preserving exact canonical results or authenticated references, request/lifecycle/ scope/predecessor/key commitments, exact-set membership/non-membership, resource-bounded verification and durable cursors; no permanent unbounded retention or arbitrary-ID dense-watermark inference; unavailable archive, key, chunk or proof fails closed without execution under reserved Recovery maintenance capacity; one cumulative non-wrapping predecessor-linked replay head per tenant/ deployment, with non-membership checked against its greatest committed root plus current hot rows; staged immutable upload and verification followed by one local head-CAS/exact-hot-delete transaction; readers ignore staged/ verified/orphan data, unknown external outcomes retain hot state, local unknowns reconcile the bundle, and orphan GC requires no committed reference or authenticated successor equivalence without a distributed transaction; - proof-to-execution admission binds the proof for writer-authoritative head
Hto an unchanged head, exact-key lock, current-hot absence and unique replay insert in one local write transaction; head change returns a typed no-write restart, compaction uses the same head-first lock order, and async replicas, followers, caches or weak snapshots never authorize; - canonical drain replay keys bind tenant/deployment/action kind/action ID/ idempotency ID while independent scoped unique constraints prevent one-sided ID reuse; durable logical-attempt budgets accumulate head restarts, proof bytes, decode/work, elapsed time and observed advances across crash/failover/ retry, returning typed no-write contention at exhaustion; finite authenticated admission/compaction quanta cannot be held by unauthenticated callers and retain protected Recovery progress;
- one closed drain replay-admission attempt owns each nonterminal canonical key/budget; identical requests join and changed material conflicts; workload/ boot/lease/fence/CAS takeover preserves counters/deadline and rejects stale owners; success co-commits with replay/action state, no-write terminals are irreversible, bounded attempt/terminalization/cleanup capacity is reserved, and checkpoint/link-gated cleanup removes no replay-critical evidence;
- the attempt-capacity ledger locks replay head→optional settlement journal head→key/attempt→capacity→domain, atomically reserves original active/terminal/checkpoint/cleanup buckets with creation, gives joins no reservation, rechecks fence/deadline/budget/head at success, and transfers active-to-terminal with the action/no-write bundle; stable per-leg settlement identities separate checkpoint from physical-deletion release, reconcile unknown outcomes and prevent double decrement or current-profile recomputation;
- checkpoint and physical-deletion capacity-settlement evidence uses one domain-separated authenticated sparse checkpoint/archive with two heads and one namespace for every checkpoint/deletion leg: checkpoint decrements/per-leg rows/journal append/ attempt checkpoint/audit/result commit atomically, and physical deletion uses the same protocol for separate legs; the local journal head implies no archive availability; the verified archive replay head advances only after upload/verification and its CAS commits with exact captured-version row deletion, including mixed-trigger archives; authoritative lookup revalidates archive head H and combines it with current hot-row version and journal continuity; absent-envelope non-membership never decrements, archived duplicates return one result, changed bindings conflict, unavailable checkpoint/deletion history retains the affected charge, exact tombstones survive coalescing, and bounded settlement storage/proof/compaction plus Recovery capacity forbid permanent rows or dense settlement inference;
- fail-closed capacity recovery decodes one complete tuple containing both settlement heads, both non-wrapping chains and authenticated coverage, root/key/publication/cursor, exact covered/current rows, settlement/trigger/ bundle/result identity, attempt-checkpoint linkage, settled and remaining leg sets, and conservative original-bucket balances; omission or defaulting denies; singular-head state was never an admitted Vitheim schema and is quarantined before authority mutation, without split migration, invented predecessor/coverage history, genesis inference or capacity release;
- migration/import work uses one durable fenced job budget with monotonic operation and principal/tenant/deployment counters for cumulative encoded/ decoded bytes, objects/chunks, allocation and cryptographic/proof work, temporary/staged storage, files/streams, resumes/retries/time, cleanup and concurrency; creation reserves terminal and Recovery-protected cleanup capacity, work precharges bounded quanta, exhaustion fences promotion and preserves the source, and quarantine stores only bounded metadata/digests;
VIT-INV-062 MigrationImportJobAuthorityStateowns migration/import operation uniqueness, budget/reservations, closed lifecycle, lease/fence, candidate/tombstone, authorization consumption, barrier/result and cleanup security-control state, but owns no imported domain state;VIT-LAW-009 AtomicMigrationImportActivationderives the complete orderedMigrationImportOwnerManifestV1in trusted code from both schema manifests, migration-plan digest, the currently admitted VIT-LAW-009 tuple/manifest and its authenticated dependency set; this law closure is the only owner universe, no separate runtime invariant catalog exists, importer-supplied selection is never authority, VIT-INV-062 is typed only as the live destination coordinator, and every remaining selected contributor retains domain ownership;- owner-held authentication produces dormant-preparation receipts while
VIT-INV-062 has verify-only access; activation uses an independently issued,
candidate-bound
MigrationImportActivationAuthorizationV1;AdmitMigrationImportActivationAuthorizationalone creates Issued, while the closed lifecycle also contains RevokedBeforeAdmission, Consumed, ExpiredUnused and RevokedUnused with trusted-time/key/continuity ratchets and permanent tombstones; admission after target expiry creates ExpiredUnused, never Issued; - revocation becomes effective only when an authenticated candidate-bound
MigrationImportActivationRevocationIntentV1advances the monotonic issuer authorization-scoped sequence and either creates a permanent RevokedBeforeAdmission tombstone on an absent row or CAS-transitions Issued to RevokedUnused with inbox receipt/result/audit/outbox; admission, activation, expiry and revocation use the same row, the intent cannot expire before its target authorization, remote emission is not revocation, and a late intent after Consumed returns the activation result without reversal; - through
1.0.0every affected owner guard is co-located with the job/barrier, and one local transaction uses deployment-retirement-fence→active-coordinator-generation→job→candidate/barrier→authorization→ordered-domain-owner→control-settlement-archive-head→control-settlement-journal-head→recovery-capacity-parent-ledger→backend-storage-cost-active-recost-campaign-slot→backend-storage-cost-recost-campaign-fence→corruption-control-reserve→history-obligation→corruption-fence→corruption-control-lineage→corruption-control-lineage-checkpoint→lineage-disposition→recovery-authorization→clearance-anchor-source-manifest-head→clearance-anchor-source-manifest-authorization→corruption-clearance-anchor-registry→corruption-clearance-scope→corruption-clearance-authorization→corruption-clearance-attempt→corruption-rebuild→corruption-rebuild-rejection-authorization→archive-head→history/idempotency→recovery-lineage-budget→attempt/successor-budget→retention/legal-hold→audit/result/outbox, then rechecks current budget/fence/authorization/ manifest/receipts/owner versions, consumes authorization, then activates all owner generations plus Pending/zero-counter-lineage or NoHistory/zero-eligibility-proof or NotRequested/custody-record and result/audit/outbox or none; every pre-activation failure permanently fences the candidate, response-loss retry is idempotent, cleanup cannot promote or delete authority, and non-co-located selector fallback is unsupported; - VIT-INV-062 is never imported by the candidate it coordinates: destination
operation/job/budget/fence/candidate/authorization/barrier/result/cleanup
state remains live authority; nonterminal source jobs deny, terminal history
is inert and post-activation archival only under authenticated provenance,
sequence/idempotency, retention, bounded work and protected cleanup state;
archive collision/failure has a separate durable disposition and never
changes activation; cleanup waits for the terminal obligation checkpoint and
absence is never treated as NoHistory/NotRequested; exhausted work remains
nonterminal ManualRecoveryPending with descriptors/reservations retained
until exact recovery authority acts; RetryAppend can reach only Appended or
ManualRecoveryPending; activation creates immutable zero-counter lineage
beside Pending, initial work atomically charges attempt and lineage budgets,
NoHistory/NotRequested prove no executable lineage, and missing nonterminal
lineage commits an obligation-scoped corruption fence/result. Activation
creates a Healthy generation-zero fence for every obligation; absence denies.
Before activation, one independently authorized source-manifest genesis and
Prepared→ProposalPublishedVerified→LocalActivationCommitted→Active lifecycle
rejects fork, gap, reorder, raw-generation selection and lazy initialization.
A governed publication-profile lineage binds exact witnesses/sources, quorum,
crypto/time rules and identity/generation/digest into every artifact; callers
cannot select the mode. A non-recursive trust anchor, explicit bootstrap/
rotation/checkpoint/high-watermark lifecycle, compatibility decision and
monotonic distrust ratchet govern succession. Profile transition, distrust
and activation serialize on one governance-root external CAS activation
fence port with domain-separated key, sequence/predecessor, stable request,
operation digest, authenticated receipt/status, consensus assumptions and
anti-fork/rollback finality; independent signatures cannot satisfy it. CAS
and status reads are linearizable, request identity binds one digest, final
results are immutable and compaction retains authenticated request-result
membership. Profiles are tenant/deployment scoped with one exact
nonterminal attempt slot. Root loss/full compromise uses an independently
rooted Pending→Retired/EvidenceUnavailable retirement protocol that never
needs the lost root; unavailable evidence permits empty replacement bootstrap
but permanently quarantines old custody. Replacement inherits no authority/
sequencing state, and
1.0.0has no in-place recovery root. Retirement consumes an independently admitted six-state single-use grant in the same transaction that advances a genesis-created Operational/RetirementPending/ Retired fence; every authority and execution boundary rechecks that fence, creates Pending and reserves complete terminalization capacity or none. That fence is the first universal lock rank. Activate, Abort and PermanentlyUnresolved share the governance sequence and one immutable per-transition terminal CAS; journal/high-watermarks are receipt projections. Proposal and active high-watermarks are separate, stable request identities reconcile unknown publication, and local CAS is followed by an external activation receipt or authenticated abort/unresolved disposition. Restore/import trusts only externally Activated lifecycle under the bound profile; an older self-consistent local snapshot, unavailable lifecycle/witness/key proof or operational-active head below the active watermark is typedManifestHistoryUnavailableOrRolledBackand unready. Activation binds that witnessed head; a greater unresolved proposal cannot poison the last proved Active predecessor and blocks only itself, descendants and cleanup. Separate operational-active and transition-candidate heads enforce that rule. Finalization rechecks current compatibility/distrust and terminalizes rather than activates an old profile when required. Every publication attempt reserves complete non-borrowable completion capacity before its first send. PermanentlyUnresolved requires an authenticated external terminal seal; timeout, retry exhaustion or witness absence retains fenced reconciliation. Activation creates registry generation zero and a non-borrowable Recovery control reservation for fence/scope/terminal/result/audit/outbox state under a trusted capacity profile and immutable platform maximum. It also creates an obligation-wide control lineage holding the original reservation. Each lifetime-work budget conserves available/reserved/nondecreasing spent proof, retry, hash, signature, bytes-processed and time. Its separate physical- capacity ledger conserves reserved-unoccupied/occupied/reclaim-pending/ released rows, bytes-stored, audit and outbox; only verified archive plus exact deletion releases it. Signed backend cost profiles charge canonical destination artifacts by backend/schema/index generation with checked rational ceiling arithmetic and canonical boundary/golden vectors. An independently rooted cost-profile lineage/head/high-watermark and analytical complete-domain classifier require destructive authorization for any possible lower charge. The rounded-affine symbolic classifier has explicit input/proof/work maxima; only ValidWeakening is authorizable, while invalid, unknown, malformed, overflowed or over-budget input is terminal no-write. Backend/schema activation uses one parent/selector active campaign slot, a total state/recovery-intent table, parent epoch/fence, fixed pre-cut snapshot and bounded post-cut fold with a hard final tail. Parent conservation covers active, campaign RecostPending, pending-successor and workspace aggregates; each forward transfer moves equal amounts between the middle two, while workspace reservation/settlement uses exact parent transfer/inverse rows. Workspace OriginalTotal is immutable, Released is monotonic and the remaining parent member is derived; a complete leg moves to Released atomically with its inverse credit and settlement evidence. Before reservation, pre-cut release settles active charge only and tombstones the child into the folded reservation cut; later releases settle RecostPending or pending successor. The campaign fence follows its parent-ledger rank. Prior-state Fenced recovery stays bounded and preserves Open/Finalizing. Abort/quarantine close; Closed never reopens; activation/abort/quarantine share one terminal CAS/checkpoint. Permanent quarantine consumes a distinct six-state one-shot grant under SoD; remote revocation is only a signed issuer intent until the destination sequence/inbox/apply transaction commits it. Quarantined capacity remains the whole parent member until broader custody-safe release. Revocation/expiry/consumption use one first-terminal-wins result table, so CAS losers return the stored terminal outcome rather than loop/conflict. Final activation consumes current authority and binds a Verified campaign- owned workspace at the exact same closed logical/physical cut, with physical high-watermark, source ledger/ceiling, bounded old-fence cleanup and a deletion-proved settlement checkpoint plus inverse parent credit. A protected cleanup lane, durable contention budget and hard terminal-backlog maxima force bounded cleanup progress without a backend fairness assumption. Unknown deletion outcomes enter bounded reconciliation. Independently authorized permanent retention consumes a precharged pool slot, preserves the complete parent charge and removes the exhausted workspace from the active lane without changing activation or abort; an authenticated cleanup origin returns only to its matching pending state. Retention and lineage BeginRelease/ReplanCustodyRelease/AbandonCustodyRelease/ CommitCustodyRelease use closed destination-applied authorization state/sequence/inbox/tombstone/outcome families, so custody evidence alone has no command authority. Broader custody release can credit only after every remaining leg proves AuthenticatedDeleted for its exact storage generation/root or TransferredToCustodyLedger against a Begin-created TransferPending maximum. A governed versioned profile maps unlike source/ destination generations, units and overhead with checked rational ceilings. Each reservation pins its exact generation/evaluator in the existing governed lineage; live dependencies retain old evaluators and fence incompatible/weakening activation, with destructive authority required for weakening. A streaming charge cap and atomic bounded extension commit capacity before extra bytes or finalization. External transfer follows Open→SealPending→Sealed; only Open mutates, unknown seal is never guessed and reopening requires provider proof the old completion can never occur; provider-fenced Sealed binds immutable object/root/size/ETag/version before eligibility. Evaluator binary/corpus digests and authenticated node readiness are mandatory; emergency distrust denies chunks, extension, eligibility and Commit until independent migration preserves at least the existing maximum. Reassessment never clamps corrected charge: positive deficit debits protected emergency capacity or fences tenant/backend readiness until separately authorized remediation. EffectiveCharge combines base plus covered deficit, and Commit atomically settles both into one conservative custody member before exact source credit. Unknown preserves predecessor and pending charge; only definitely-never-transferred or exact destination-deleted reconciliation releases it. After bounded permanent uncertainty, independent quarantine converts the full EffectiveCharge into a permanent member, fences namespace/ transfer, retains legal-hold evidence and never treats late evidence as refund authority. Platform/tenant ceilings and a separately authorized confirm/delete/permanently-unresolvable workflow preserve quarantine and legal-hold denial. Both destructive workflows have full destination-applied six-state authorization/revocation families. Remediation actions have a total continuation matrix; Begin consumes authority and creates the exact effect before dispatch, Complete never redispatches, and destructive completion uses fresh finalization authority. Broker-only Dispatch is the current legal/ hold/policy cut and rechecks credential/distrust/fence/routing epochs while atomically redeeming one-use capability into EffectDispatched. A governed provider profile/result freezes effect-ID, dedup/query horizon and authenticated no-effect guarantees. One persisted application-level transmission claim realizes VIT-INV-006: only the winning executor receives one unreconstructable process-local permit, while the durable row/digest is non-bearer status evidence and retry returns no permit. It permits only in-invocation transport retransmission; return, crash, lease loss or uncertainty is query-only. BeginRelease Admit charges a bounded pre-Begin pool; winning Begin transfers it into the lineage budget, and cleanup is exact-candidate scoped under a winner mapping. Final Commit selects completed with/without residual custody and transfers every surviving terminal unknown member to its own budgeted residual obligation under a sorted immutable descriptor/transfer root; versioned child/budget/aggregate state settles atomically with one externally checkpointed cumulative anti- rollback head. Winning Begin creates explicit LineageOwned routing generation 1 plus NoneCanonicalEmpty aggregate state, and the generationed CAS selects lineage or residual ownership for all destination operations; absence never implies ownership. MarkEligible and final Commit bind a complete attempt-set root and refuse all nonterminal provider work. A closed writer matrix makes every authorization/effect/capability/evidence/reconciliation/archive mutation advance it under one order. Mutation after CommitEligible proceeds while atomically selecting typed PreparingRevalidationRequired with mandatory invalidation/root bindings; PreparingOpen alone admits new effect/artifact work and the separate fence is integrity evidence, not authority. Every further covered mutation while Required appends an immutable non-wrapping advance, CASes previous/current root and cumulative commitment, and remains denied. Full eligibility validation must verify the continuous chain or authenticated checkpoint plus suffix and bind its final current root. Begin/Replan requires an overflow-checked lifetime-capacity proof over fixedu128attempt-set/revalidation/canonical capacity-checkpoint/capacity- replay-head counters plus capacity-archive guard generation and reserves eachu128::MAXexclusively for an absorbing exhaustion fence. The archive sequences form one pair with one atomic pair sentinel and advance together only on successful capacity- archive Commit (ArchiveFinalize), never FinalizeGc. Insufficient headroom denies before external work; a valid sentinel permanently unreadies every effect and Commit path and never represents the triggering mutation. A lineage-wide capacity state owns class-specific admitted/consumed/reserved/remaining counts satisfyingadmitted = consumed + reserved + remainingand head/counter equations. Permit admission moves remaining→reserved; the terminal result/event/audit/outbox transaction moves selected legs reserved→consumed and unused exclusive legs reserved→remaining. Retry, CAS loss, timeout and failover move nothing. Reservation IDs/amounts and settlement history remain integrity-committed through Replan, compaction, restore and migration. Every writer locks it before the attempt-set head and atomically consumes one immutable exact-retry charge with mutation/head/ result. Every ordinary writer then locks/reads the high-watermark guard and denies PreparePending/AbortDrainPending/Witnessed and may omit only unrelated later rows; archive writers lock publication before replay head. Acquired subsets always preserve relative rank. Replan, compaction, restore and migration cannot reset it. Dedicated capacity checkpoints and a predecessor-linked archive-replay head commit exact charge/result membership, capacity/sentinel equations and archive epochs. Only the greatest verified head plus hot suffix is authoritative; archive loss returns typed historical-state-unavailable without a charge or head advance. Publication uses a bounded manifest/cursor/budget and closed Staged→Verified→Consumed or Orphan→Collected receipt machine funded by non-borrowable Recovery capacity. The guard is generationed. Prepare moves Unprepared(g)→PreparePending(g) and returns the sole process-local unreconstructable submission permit; only after that Prepare commit may the permit submit, while every other state, stale generation and retry is query-only. Witnessed(g) can end only when Commit atomically installs replay head, deletes captured rows, records Committed(g) and opens Unprepared(g + 1). Ordinary negative status never rolls a guard. Abort moves through AbortDrainPending, denies new queries and callsSealCapacityArchiveWitnessProposalDefinitelyUnwitnessedwith one non-bearer seal claim. Expected-predecessor/proposal CAS serializes seal against submission; the authority permanently tombstones rejection, rejects every late submission and exposes an independently discoverable receipt. Abort opensg + 1only after that receipt, every query is terminal, every terminalization reservation and settlement is consumed and no positive receipt exists. Positive-after-seal evidence fences the lineage as authority equivocation. That fence is permanently absorbing for the lineage and old authority identity/key epoch. Both receipts are retained; no ClearFence, receipt preference or old namespace reuse exists. Only independent quorum and SoD may retire that authority and bootstrap a new identity/lineage with fresh sequencing/permit namespaces and conservative consumed/reserved carry-forward that cannot increase remaining capacity. A unique fence-keyed NoReplacement→Staged→ActivatedPendingPointerWitness→Operational head and current pointer prevent split-brain replacements; different material is permanently rejected. SignedP_nreconciliation alone makes the pending lineage operational. Retirement is one local AuthorityRetirement writer/class/charge, atomically terminal with one recovery-head advance. A parent Recovery escrow funds the separate recovery writer head and non-releasable Fenced EvidenceMaintenance partition. Generation-zero bootstrap instead verifies a pre-signed receipt under a separate deployment-bootstrap reserve, with no signer call in its local transaction. Frozen-source outbox/destination-inbox transfer, one-to-one-or-quarantined reservation disposition and an independent predecessor-linked high-watermark make one-sided rollback detectable; the destination remains non-operational until exact import/conformance and pointer activation. Dedicated exact-set recovery checkpoint/publication/ replay/restore state and independent pointer/fence high-watermarks in one total recovery-anchor chain begin from signed tenant-boundP_0plus explicit CanonicalNoPredecessor and Healthy recovery guard, requireC_1→P_0, and use only the acyclic staggerC_n→P_(n-1), H_n→C_n, P_n→H_n; generated schema/hash-DAG tests reject same-generation back-edges and future signature/ result inclusion. Dedicated typed checkpoint-create, pointer publish/ Reconcile/query and restore advance/complete writers are bounded and return no reusable permit. Orphan/GC proves current non-reference across all replay, transfer/pointer, activation, restore, evidence, retention and legal-hold authorities; externally bound publication cannot orphan. These controls prevent compaction loss or older-authority revival across sequential equivocations; historical unavailability stays unready and never falls back to the old archive. Contradictory pointer evidence atomically consumes a pre-reserved terminalization leg, preserves both requests/receipts/discovery evidence and CASes Healthy→Fenced. Every post-bootstrap writer locks the guard first. AuthorityChanging requires Healthy; Fenced EvidenceMaintenance permits only exact checkpoint/archive Commit, independent fence-anchor publication/query, restore verification/export and monotone custody strengthening. A shared non-wrapping anchor sequence makes the fence high-watermark dominate all earlier pointers, and restore compares both greatest anchors. No generic clear or recursive automatic replacement exists. Every pointer query is first registered in an independent rollback-resistant observation registry. A signed no-fence assertion covers only its sealed exact-set zero-unresolved frontier. There is no cross-system CAS: registry claim drain, non-authoritative local preparation, signed registry confirmation/rejection, exact local CAS, signed local- finalization receipt and registry settlement order restore and every authority mutation. Effects additionally redeem a current claim at the executor/provider fence immediately before send. The external registry denies claims in ObservationBlocked, FenceAnchorPending and RestoreUnready; exactF_menters absorbing AuthorityFenced, which a stale local Healthy restore cannot reopen. Operational admission proves live plus outcome- unknown claims never exceed signed per-kind/tenant/deployment/globalc_max, and every claim owns protected drain/terminal work. Confirmation, timeout or row absence cannot release a claim without authenticated local commit or permanent no-commit evidence. Initial claim creation itself uses durable Admission, one-shot Publish, signed Reconcile and bounded status-query settlement; a lost Issued receipt cannot reconstruct a permit, and Unknown/Unavailable stays potentially live. PreparedNonAuthoritative is stored only in a proposal namespace and allocates no stream version, journal offset, event ID, outbox/projection position or successful idempotency result. Finalization appends a new immutable batch whose canonical event bodies match the confirmed proposal and atomically writes an unsigned commit record. The selected signer signs only that post-commit record through its own response-loss protocol; no HSM/KMS call or implicit in-process signature occurs inside the database transaction. Claims bind exactly one DomainAggregateTarget, ControlOwnerTarget or CanonicalNoAggregateTarget. A domain proposal/finalization touches one stream only; cross-aggregate work is rejected to the Phase B process-manager/outbox path. Registry confirmation signs a ProposedEventDescriptor root covering event/schema identity, target, tenant, command/causation/correlation, time, sensitivity/custody and payload lifecycle. Inline payload is permitted only for non-sensitive schemas; classified data remains an opaque encrypted/ externally erasable reference or erased tombstone and never enters registry, signer, status, audit, log/trace/error or archive records as plaintext. Residency, retention, hold, ciphertext digest, keyed/domain-separated plaintext commitment and key custody remain bound through finalization/ export; raw dictionary-testable hashes are forbidden. PayloadReferenceUseClaim binds every proposal/event/shared member, transfer-unknown disposition and authoritative release proof. Neither proposal terminality nor a local count authorizes erasure.P_claimfunds pre-settlement work and admission reserves a tenant PayloadLifecycleMaintenanceCapacity landing slot. Post-signing enters PayloadMaintenanceHandoffPending; an exact local handoff, or CanonicalNoPayloadMaintenanceHandoffProof for an empty governed-reference set, is required before settlement publication andP_claimrelease, while registry settlement later releasesc_max. Conservation admits neither dual nor absent ownership. Stable reservation/settlement IDs, a predecessor-linked journal, verified archive replay and authenticated physical-deletion receipt carry each leg to absorbing PhysicallyReleased. Unavailable archive retains occupancy and exact retry cannot double-release. Lifecycle saturation rejects new classified payloads without blocking unrelated commands or existing cleanup. The target binds its expected predecessor; only journal identity, a commit-cut-containing interval under the non-regressing recorded- time ratchet and the canonically derived predecessor chain are finalizer- owned, and the signed commit record covers them. A version-bound CommitCutRecordedTimePort must prove native authenticated commit evidence, a backend commit-before hard fence or formally equivalent attestation for SQLite/PostgreSQL/MySQL/MongoDB/SurrealDB; start/insert/client time is invalid. Clock rollback or missing failover/restore continuity unreadies. Zero-event domain batches reject; control/no-aggregate targets bind CanonicalNoDomainEventChain instead. Every local writer follows its declared subset of GlobalTransactionLockRankCatalogV1: recovery/authority guards, fences, quota/uniqueness, command/claim/proposal, canonically sorted payload lifecycle, time ratchet, aggregate/journal and commit/result/audit/outbox. Catalog activation fences legacy writers; static phase/adapter-trace checks reject reordering, reference-only/process-local keys and undeclared locks. Before claim acquisition, independent scoped unique constraints resolve command ID and idempotency ID to the same terminal or active execution; one-sided or cross-pair reuse conflicts even after compaction, unavailable history unreadies, and cancellation ends at ProposalPrepared before disposition publication. Remote signing requires either trusted-adapter authoritative reread or authenticated backend commit attestation. The explicit hosted-runtime profile names its trust boundary; caller-provided bytes, cache/replica reads and transaction-return success are not proof. Claim admission also preselects and cardinality-funds a bounded threshold/redundant signer set or root-authorized successor lineage.S_claimcovers every member attempt, response-loss query, partial, concurrency/terminalization route and quorum import. Recovery signs only the identical commit, never rewrites events/results or resets capacity; without a valid successor, CommitReceiptSignerRecoveryRequired remains live and authority stays closed. Unknown/Unavailable and local exhaustion remain distinct fail-closed unresolved states; authenticated external seal alone assigns permanent unresolved meaning, and late contradiction always strengthens toward Fenced. Registration, cancellation, terminalization and fence anchoring have separate bounded response-loss lanes. The named observation-registry authority port must pass linearizability, failover, non-equivocation, key/retention, partitioning and budget conformance or the adapter refuses. Exact-set claim checkpoints and Stage/Verify/Commit archives preserve live, redeemed, outcome-unknown, confirmed-unsettled and frontier-referenced history; missing replay/history enters RestoreUnready. Active/terminal row and byte ceilings backpressure tenants before unsafe compaction. Staged/Verified claim-history publications reconcile Commit status before current multi-authority non-reference, retention and legal-hold checks may mark them orphan eligible. A separate non-borrowable cleanup reserve prevents normal claim load from starving GC. Committed or frontier-referenced history is permanently ineligible for orphaning. Contradiction beforeE/J/Fpublication therefore remains externally visible across restoration of an older local backup. HealthyC_n/H_nand fencedE_m/J_marchives have disjoint command/result/discriminant vocabularies; FenceEvidence Commit has no orphan/GC surface. The signed non-borrowableB_EMledger escrows the fullR_firstanchor route before any pointer-query permit and has no pre-1.0.0replenishment. - Provision recovery genesis trust from a pinned canonical root/provenance
lineage, never caller keys or first-seen material. Deterministically build
P_0, obtain an independent offline/remote quorum signature, and import its receipt once. Rotation preserves historical verification; irreversible distrust invalidates pending material, unreadies recovery and preserves any existing Fenced state without re-signing genesis. - Identities never
cross generations. A charged local fence
precedes external traffic. BeginAbortDrain returns no seal permit unless its
typed transaction reserves the complete non-releasable sealed-abort/
WitnessWon-Commit/seal-query/output/drain/exhaustion/equivocation envelope.
Lost response, failover and restore enter Unready and use only a separately
typed AbortDrainPending Recovery-funded seal-status admission→one-shot
process-local permit→Reconcile lane. SealWon/WitnessWon/Unknown/
TransportFailure/DeadlineExceeded/ContradictoryEvidence close under trusted-
time backoff, immutable terminalization reservation and exact-once
settlement; seal retry is status-only, and unmetered restore I/O/reseal is
forbidden. WitnessWon CASes AbortDrainPending→Witnessed and preserves
ArchiveFinalize; SealWon waits for full drain; contradiction fences without
rollover.
All external outcomes enter only through Reconcile with one disposition
ID/charge/result. The authority signs an acyclic canonical proposal that
excludes its future receipt and Reconcile/Commit result digests; receipt,
Reconcile and Commit add only forward references. Generated dependency-graph
verification rejects cycles, signature inclusion and encoding/epoch
substitution. Prepare, terminal Reconcile and ArchiveFinalize Commit remain
three distinct hot charges/head advances. Begin/Replan reserves bounded non-
borrowable Recovery query capacity. Stable IDs derive from guard generation
plus admission writer sequence, adding no counter. Each admission and
terminalization is separately charged. Admission atomically reserves the
future terminalization charge/head advance, result/audit/outbox bytes/work
and concurrency settlement or writes nothing and returns no permit.
Reconcile consumes that immutable reservation with one closed outcome and
settlement exactly once; timeout, cancellation, worker loss, Replan and
restore cannot release, move or borrow it. Positive/permanently sealed
negative evidence may
co-commit the disposition; other outcomes remain read-only only for that
disposition. Direct Commit is
3 + 2q - e. Withsseal queries, sealed abort and contradiction are3 + 2q + 2s - e, WitnessWon then Commit is4 + 2q + 2s - e, and typed exhaustion while fenced is3 + 2q + 2s. Exactlyqandsreservations are consumed; completion escrow and every route charge/result remain hot. Trusted-time profile, uncertainty, continuity and epoch bind deadline/backoff; rollback cannot replenish elapsed capacity. Exhausted calls/bytes/work/time/concurrency permit no traffic and never imply unwitnessed. A governed tenant/lineage witness profile freezes predecessor CAS, non-equivocation, signatures/rotation/distrust, permanent seal/tombstone discovery, bounded typed seal-status reconciliation and positive-after-seal equivocation semantics, durability and failover. An independent precommit high-watermark witnesses the exact successor; restore establishes it through the applicable pre-reserved bounded ordinary/seal query lane first, and final witnessed head installation, exact captured deletion, terminal tombstone and next guard are atomic and leave the compaction charge hot. Begin creates plan generation 1 and PreparingOpen. Only independently authorized Replan can recover a terminally reconciled plan by fencing/ superseding old attempts/grants/receipts and atomically creating a new generation/bundle/reservations; Abandon fences only and never refunds Begin. Every Replan repeats trusted backend-limit preflight and atomically reserves replacement/future-Commit plus retained-history capacity. An immutable cumulative lineage budget cannot reset; only authenticated checkpoint/ archive proof compacts exact replay/anti-reuse state, and exhaustion does not refund. Every post-Begin destination admission atomically creates/joins one pessimistic, original-bucket budget charge; exact retry never recharges, settlement waits for checkpoint/archive and Recovery capacity is non-borrowable. Commit consumes those receipts while settling every leg, advancing Released to OriginalTotal and committing CustodyReleased with the matching parent inverse. The combined rank acquires residual routing head/residual state head/counter-capacity state/remediation attempt-set head/counter-capacity archive-high-watermark/counter-capacity archive-publication/counter-capacity archive-replay head/archive head/plan head/commit-attempt disposition/sorted remediation attempt/capability/evidence/authorization/reconciliation/checkpoint rows/ publication state, settlement head, sorted custody profile heads/ ledgers/reservations, parent, current slot, sorted old campaign fences, control/lineage/checkpoint, authorization/custody and outputs; an aggregate bundle maximum proves every ordinary/workspace leg, disposition receipt, reservation/reconciliation/GC obligation and custody-ledger write fits the backend transaction before ReleasePending. Explicit Begin and Commit lineage commands alone mutate ReleasePending/Released and persist action-specific results; commit rebinds the begin result, verified receipt, predecessor/proposed heads, dispositions/profiles/reservations/bundle/grant and expected version. Stage, Verify, MarkOrphan and FinalizeGc alone own precharged receipt transitions. Stage/Verify admit only the current PreparingOpen attempt and otherwise return no-write AttemptClosed before upload, verification or budget. Stage, Verify, MarkEligible, Commit, Replan, Abandon and orphan admission serialize on archive-head→plan-head→attempt→ receipt-state. MarkOrphan accepts only Superseded/Abandoned; authorization absence/expiry/revocation is not permanent ineligibility. Only Commit moves CommitEligible→Consumed and Verified→ConsumedByCommit while installing the head with exact hot-row deletion and every capacity effect. Orphan/Collected receipts cannot commit, and readers ignore non-head evidence. Each retention/release issuer Revoke command allocates one monotonic signed intent/result without destination capability; destination Apply alone executes the full six-state table, including absent no-write and first-terminal observation rules. A co-located Recovery parent ledger atomically pairs child allocation/release with parent debit/credit under one deterministic transfer ID/equation, including completion reserves; restore verifies both sides from one snapshot and never guesses compensation. Atomic parent aggregates, exact membership commitments and predecessor checkpoints make admission bounded. Restore gates each affected partition while protected monotonic cursor/work-budget verification streams to Ready or Fenced; checkpoint creation reserves the complete derived snapshot cost, crash cannot reset work and no startup-wide scan is permitted. Kind-specific exact-once transfers update scope/lineage atomically. Every re-fence uses both ledgers; clearance cannot reset them, and exhaustion or loss of minimum future capacity permanently quarantines. Rebuild and custody-safe, no-future-operation Release are explicit terminals; release checkpoints before settling each original reserve leg exactly once through authenticated local settlement-journal and verified archive-replay heads. Every history path follows the shared typed fence-before-lineage lock order; adapter traces prove it and Release includes the Recovery parent ledger, obligation, fence, lineage, checkpoint and custody authority; Released requires the exact parent credit. Append, recovery and cleanup stop until a separately issued/admitted/revocable/ expiring single-use clearance authorization and a destination-ratcheted mandatory-class/quorum anchor registry with authenticated collection receipt prove the exact activation and complete post-activation lineage. One fence- wide scope admits one live grant/attempt generation and preserves lifetime charges/tombstones. Registry advance atomically rebinds an Open scope, terminalizes a live stale grant with charges preserved and leaves terminal scopes unchanged. Source-policy weakening and permanent rebuild rejection each require complete destination-local admission, pre-admission/Issued revocation, expiry and same-transaction consumption. Their revocation intents bind issuer/continuity, signer/key/epoch/profile, issued-at/not-before, target-covering expiry, time uncertainty/profile/epoch, closed reason, nonce and distinct revocation idempotency; omission/substitution denies and remote messages confer no effect. Typed restoration algebra separates monotonic counters, exact ceilings, derived capacity, causal heads and consistent snapshots. Unprovable state stays fenced; one rebuild parent owns bounded proposals, independently authorized permanent rejection and one successor without hiding old evidence. Candidate, barrier and activation authority bind the exact disposition/evidence/policy epochs. NoHistory proves zero eligibility; NotRequested commits current retention/classification/hold/ evidence-floor/compliance/legal/SoD authority and cannot weaken an active hold. Cumulative lineage limits never reset, recovery ceilings fit a platform hard maximum and cannot be increased through1.0.0. Recovery authorization/result payload tags are the sole action discriminators and any index is derived/read-verified. The shared six-state lifecycle returns one closed outcome including Fenced; explicit expiry is Issued-only and absent expiry/consumption is typed no-write NotAdmitted. One closed top-level conflict wrapper carries only changed-material authorization/revocation/ recovery conflicts; CAS losers reread the state table, and different valid operation kinds on one exact target are not changed material. Recovery revocation is destination-local with explicit signer/key/time binding, and Waive/Abandon require distinct current policy/legal-hold/compliance authority plus canonical custody records; identity collisions fail closed; and coordinator-schema migration requires a separate stable-ID, independently authorized, budgeted closed lifecycle with pre-admission-revocable begin, fresh handoff and explicit cancellation grants, typed checkpoint/successor receipt, and atomic coordinator-generation/fence handoff with canonical per-action result/conflict; - begin, handoff and cancellation revocation share one action-discriminated authenticated intent, exact-authorization/action sequence key and target- covering lifetime; only its destination-local same-row apply transaction commits inbox, tombstone, required bootstrap terminalization, result/audit/ outbox, while remote emission has no effect;
- every VIT-INV-062 mutation locks and rechecks the active coordinator
generation/fence first; a stale transaction or binary that omits the guard
cannot commit or become ready after handoff;
a once-per-first-seen-request rate and successful-admission/outstanding quotas,
monotonic request sequence for every first-seen canonical request,
separate successful issuance sequence, exact replay horizon,
authenticated checkpoint/archive commitments, checkpoint-before-delete
compaction, fail-closed unavailable history, key/restore ratchets, and
storage/backlog accounting and alerts;
issuer-authenticated complete sequence/deadline range manifests, sparse-by-
default consumer commitments, trusted-time/deadline-gated dense consumer
eligibility, late-presentation denial, and separate non-borrowable normal/
recovery/break-glass identities, presentation/request rate, outstanding
counters and reserve, exact authenticated-lane/authorized-class matching,
with no emergency
exemption from authorization, deadline, or replay controls;
atomic stage-two topology-authorization success where the exact presentation
charge evidence, request charge, layered deployment/issuer/canonical-caller
admission/outstanding quotas, original quota claim, reservation, request and
issuance sequences, immutable outcome, canonical receipt, idempotent result,
and outbox commit together; denied first-seen canonical requests consume the
already committed presentation charge and request rate but create no
authority, while exact retries require a new presentation charge; lineage
revoke/supersede never releases a live
receipt; settlement decrements the original counters all-or-none and exactly
once only after consumer-authenticated consumption/definite absence/
permanent-unresolved state, conservative expiry, or receipt-specific
VIT-INV-060 fencing proven by an authenticated consumer terminal receipt;
bounded denial-request replay with exact retry identity/outcome, authenticated
predecessor-linked request checkpoint before deletion, historical late
requests, fail-closed missing proof, and explicit row/byte/backlog/archive/
decode/verification-work limits;
canonical
TopologyAuthorizationConsumerTerminalReceiptV1binding consumer owner/fence, authorization/receipt/intent, closed outcome, result/tombstone/ time, sender/key/profile, message and outbox sequences; only VIT-INV-060 has sender credentials and VIT-INV-061 is verify-only; a separate consumer disposition/evidence/receipt family represents reconciliation, and only the terminal receipt type is accepted for settlement; resource-bounded issuer range roots/chunks with encoded-byte, entry, decode- allocation, verification-work, proof-depth and per-job chunk ceilings, resumable verification cursor, and fail-closed partial-chain handling; profile-discriminated authorization locally consumed with the successor, applicable workload proof, tombstones, and fence outbox without cross-owner atomicity; challenge/sequence/expiry topology receipts and monotonic local observation ratchets; current-topology normal-path admission/readiness/dispatch/start checks independent of rollout and fence delivery; closed single-use-claim, bounded readiness-freshness, and owner-protocol scope; co-transactional local consumption/outcome with tombstone-first historical replay, typed uncertainty/no reissue, restore high-watermarks, and zero offline authority; transactional prepare/activation/convergence/ revocation delivery, authenticated authorization/global-result receipts, and closed signed/sender-generate receiver-verify MAC/attested-channel variants with replay and durable-integrity anchors rather than digest authority; expected-version explicit succession; gap-free milestone selection; shared runtime/CLI canonical cryptographic verification; complete scope/validity/uncertainty/signer/root/ revocation/successor binding; catalog-bound checkpoint/backup/restore evidence; and rollback/suspend/expiry/emergency-distrust handling. - Closed law-semantic dispatch: prose is evidence only; supported IDs exhaustively resolve to compiled transitions, typed outcomes, recovery, and positive/negative/model/fault tests, with stage-aware file/symbol/test realization and unknown IDs or incomplete predecessor closures rejected before readiness.
- Strong tenant partitions in storage, search, queues, caches, blobs, logs, exports, metrics labels, and backups.
- Authentication independent from authorization; sender-constrained privileged workloads; explicitly lower-assurance, non-privileged bearer policy; deny-by-default authorization.
- Field-level redaction preserved through API, search, reports, notifications, AI context, audit, and exports.
- Single-aggregate transactional local effects for command, consumer, timer,
activity, and poison transitions; distinct dispatch/results; inbox/outbox,
fencing, quotas, bounded retries, backpressure, and explicitly at-least-once
remote calls. Stable external-effect identities and request digests bind
provider idempotency/replay horizons, separate execution/provider-outcome/
resolution-evidence/operational-workflow/compensation types, reconciliation
deadlines, escalation, and authorized manual resolution. Assessment is not
provider truth; unknown privileged or non-compensable work is never retried
blindly. Effect intent always requires commit-time authorization and binds
tenant, initiator, delegation, capability, target, purpose, request, policy,
authentication assurance, and typed live-subject, approved-grant, or service-
principal execution authority. Approved grants bind exact effect/request/
target/version, purpose, approvers/quorum/separation, assurance at approval,
window, attempts, policy, and revocation. Workers authenticate as themselves
and never impersonate offline humans. Reviewed low-risk immutable effects may
be
CommitBound; privileged, destructive, secret-bearing, containment, and compensation effects areCommitAndDispatchand require fenced single-use authority redemption. Session expiry alone does not invalidate a grant; revocation, target drift, tenant suspension, grant exhaustion, and required approver/policy revalidation fail closed. Workers and leases confer no business authority, and binding substitution is forbidden. Every grant lineage has one authoritative stream: inline ownership stays in the approval aggregate; dedicated ownership uses immutable approval receipt plus outbox/ process-manager continuation. Pre-issuance revocation wins, generation identities are unique, and a successor atomically leaves the superseded grant permanently non-redeemable in that owner stream. Redemption is linearized by a co-located fenced localGrantRedemptionGuard: lineage-owner transitions create/revoke/replace it, while dispatch advances only the effect stream and atomically compare-and-claims one bound attempt plus receipt/outbox. The guard serializes revocation/final-attempt races; retries and restore cannot create or resurrect consumption, and non-co-located or two-stream adapters fail. Every dispatch locks a complete boundedDispatchAuthorityFenceSetof applicable monotonic tenant, subject/principal, session/credential/mapping, delegation, group/role/relationship, and policy epochs. Authority-changing commands update their local epoch atomically with the owner event. Missing, stale, substituted, reused, or non-co-located fences deny; external-only bounded-stale facts never authorize privileged effects. Current-target dispatch also requires a typedDispatchTargetFence. Same- aggregate expected version/digest or a target-owner-maintained co-located row binds target identity, lifecycle, and deletion/supersession epoch. Remote, cross-shard, projection-only, stale, restored, or substituted target state denies before provider I/O. Provider-owned targets use a distinctRemoteTargetConcurrencyProfile, never a local fence. Strong conditional mutation binds exact provider/account/ resource, validator bytes/kind/provenance, admitted provider capability, request digest, and idempotency key. Precondition failure is typed non- acceptance and cannot silently refresh; response loss remains unknown. Privileged/destructive/containment unconditional mutation requires a narrow expiring reviewedRemoteMutationException. It has one owner stream and exact tenant/provider/account/resource/action/request, approvals/quorum/separation, policy/provider epochs, assurance, time, and attempt bindings. Its co-located guard serializes revocation, expiry, supersession, provider-capability change, and final-attempt claims while dispatch advances only the effect stream. The resulting receipt is bounded by immutableredeemed_atandtransmit_beforeplus effect/attempt, permitted service audience, provider/ account/request, and admitted epochs. Immediately before I/O,ClaimTransmissionStartrechecks current fences and binds one globally unique claim to the exact authenticated worker instance, lease generation/fence, receipt/effect attempt, and permit digest. Non-persisted permit material is returned once only inside the trustedTransmissionExecutorthat owns the provider socket. Split workers submit immutable authenticated instructions and receive status; permits never cross RPC/IPC/queues. The sealed non-Clone, non-serializable value is consumed by the write and best-effort zeroized; its digest is never authority. Duplicate instruction, executor failover, replacement worker, or possible start without proven absence is typed: pre-claim validation/CAS failure isDefinitelyNotStarted; ambiguous claim/ permit delivery isOutcomeUnknown; committed claim isStartClaimedReconciling. The last two reconcile without ordinary retransmission.VIT-LAW-006registers the exact generation-specific start dependency set; the claim coordinates proof without owning any authority root. Restore cannot reconstruct the permit; failover, pause, or clock rollback cannot extend it.1.0.0supports no transferable permit profile. A boundProviderExecutionProfiledenies master-key/general database access, uses exact-claim-bound tenant/provider/account/action/request/destination opaque credential operations, provider-native least privilege, short lifetime where available, and destination/TLS/DNS/redirect controls with no general proxy. Executor pools isolate tenant/account trust domains; unrestricted shared cross-tenant privileged credentials are unsupported and unavoidable residual provider blast radius is documented. One authoritative profile lineage owns active/suspended/superseded/revoked generations plus monotonic profile, provider-account, credential-version, and broker-policy epochs; claim and redemption recheck them. Profile mutation is control-plane-only and uses typed proposal, approval, activation, suspension, revocation, and supersession commands; signed digest-bound admission; semantic expansion review; quorum/ separation; current activation fences; and revocation tombstones. Remote rotation is asynchronous and evidence-driven; local successor activation atomically disables predecessor redemption, while unknown provider creation/revocation reconciles with bounded overlap and escalation. A lineage-owned guard serializes rotations; unknown states block successors, takeover inventories the provider, orphan credentials are quarantined and quota-counted, and late callbacks are fenced. Fresh credential-capability snapshots and local epochs bind raw/normalized policy, reviewed evaluator and policy-language versions, canonical comparison/ explanation, and provider provenance. Only equal or explicitly admitted safe subset authority may operate; superset, incomparable, or unknown quarantines the entire credential, invalidates all handles/work, and emits an incident. Neither automatic profile widening nor break-glass may bypass it. The system cannot roll back the evaluator's signed binary/corpus-admitted lineage or monotonic epoch; evaluator change/revocation immediately requires re-evaluation and incompatible nodes reject startup. Re-evaluation uses an invalidation campaign root created atomically with the evaluator epoch, a canonical capability-owner source manifest, monotonic outbox sequences and campaign high-watermarks, exact destination receipts, fenced source topology, authoritative membership shard journals, sealed generations/high-watermarks, one scan receipt per membership-manifest shard, delivery and membership barriers, generation-bound idempotent jobs, explicit create/move/delete/quarantine/rotation dispositions, and authoritative capability-owner mismatch reconciliation. Search/projection indexes cannot prove completeness. Missing delivery isMembershipDeliveryBlocked; mismatch reconciliation remains an independent backstop. A successor campaign tombstones older enumeration and cannot inherit its counts. Re-evaluation then uses durable tenant/provider/account-partitioned jobs with stable generations, bounded concurrency/retry/provider-rate claims, global and tenant fairness, starvation bounds, privileged/near-term priority, and a non-borrowable security-cleanup lane. Old output remains unusable while queued, stale evidence is fetched again, and repeated replacement, crash, failover, or a hostile tenant cannot lose, duplicate, or monopolize work. Quarantine clears only through separated, current-evidence remediation/revalidation that creates a fresh capability generation and tombstones old work. Credential recovery uses an independently admitted cleanup-only remediation credential/channel through rotation/takeover, or enters manual intervention when no independent provider recovery path exists. Its first admission, rotation, loss, and compromise recovery use a signed separated-quorum ceremony, two independently administered recovery channels for automatic profiles, offline/manual recovery independent of the lost authority, independent KMS/identity failure domains where practical, expiry/availability monitoring, and tested recovery exercises. It cannot self-approve or recover its own compromise. Restore cannot resurrect any of this authority. Signing/mTLS/HSM key material remains non- exportable. Bearer/API-key profiles put HTTP authorization serialization, TLS, claim, and socket inside the hardened broker/executor TCB; bearer bytes may briefly exist only there and are prohibited from upstream, plugin, general connector, durable, log, diagnostic, and crash surfaces. - Stable invariant IDs in
docs/INVARIANT_OWNERSHIP.mdbind every authority declaration to exactly one ownership and lifecycle row. Stable enforcement, capability, test, recovery-manifest, and owner-fence IDs bind the owner-updated guard, transaction placement, concrete enforcement, supported storage, P/N/M/F evidence, restore/migration fields, supersession, mixed-version behavior, and rollback floor. CI derives coverage from phase declarations and rejects unregistered, multiply owned, untested, unsupported, asymmetrically superseded, or recovery-incomplete invariants; adapters cannot claim support without every applicable semantic capability. - Canonical composite-law generations bind the actual effective milestone, predecessor, proof coordinator, dependency delta, linearization/failure/ recovery semantics, mixed-version intersection, activation fence, migration, rollback, semantic/dependency/recovery contract versions, canonical manifest, and content digest. CI rejects future-effective dependencies, broken/no-op chains, semantic or digest drift, and future-generation conformance while permitting a genuine removal-only or semantics-only successor. A separate complete milestone review registry rejects undeclared authority work, proposals after planned status, bare law claims, or missing option/production decisions.
- Durable quota accounting uses a bounded atomic claim set with typed
concurrency, consumable-operation, provider-rate, estimated-liability, and
retained-byte settlement. Only provider-dependent claims hold for unknown
outcomes; concurrency releases with its lease, rate tokens become
non-refundable at transmission, liabilities reconcile to actual cost or a
distinct audited write-off, and byte claims follow local allocation/deletion.
Refunds are evidence-bound and exactly once; manual assessment cannot mint
provider evidence; compensation has separate claims. Claim sets are local
transactional authority, not aggregate streams: canonical deadlock-free
ordering reserves all members or none, an opaque token/digest freezes ordered
membership, bundles never reacquire individual members, transitions are
idempotent by set/claim identity, and partial restore/reconciliation is
quarantined. Each set shares one local quota partition with its work bundle;
wider limits allocate fenced hierarchical capacity leases into local
partitions and conserve parent/child capacity without distributed work
transactions. Active/active authoritative multi-region writes are unsupported
at
1.0.0; incompatible placement fails closed. Capacity leases bind kind, unit, period, and settlement policy. Expiry stops admission but retains spent/ encumbered capacity; parents reclaim only proven free remainder, and claims settle against their original encumbrance through aQuotaCapacityTransferStateoutbox/inbox process manager. Local transitions are receipt-idempotent, delivery is at least once, reclaim requires authenticated acknowledgement and old-epoch fence proof, uncertainty stays charged, and double-entry recovery never frees capacity at both ends. Transfer also freezes accounting owner, hierarchy root/parent lease, period, work/recovery lane, capacity class, residency/region, and source/destination authorization. A transfer cannot change tenant, parent, period, region, lane, or turn emergency/security-cleanup/reconciliation capacity into business capacity. Existing capacity class is immutable regardless of privilege. Only future unallocated parent capacity can change allocation through a fenced, simulated, separation-of-dutiesQuotaCapacityPolicycommand. Each policy lineage owns one parent and atomically updates its co-located parent ledger under an independently governed floor-set version. Floor reductions use a separate capability and approval lineage, current tenant/hierarchy/incident/ emergency/policy fences, obligation simulation, append-only epochs, a versioned/digested durable platform-floor ratchet, and cross-command separation from spending released capacity. Nodes below the admitted floor reject startup; mixed versions use the stricter profile, and downgrade/restore cannot release capacity. Multi-parent finalization proves one prepared receipt for every member of a root-owned canonical manifest under an unchanged membership epoch and per-class conservation constraints. It only permits activation: every parent freshly CAS-revalidates its ledger/unallocated capacity, floor ratchet/set, obligations, root generation/manifest, and current operational fences or remains conservatively blocked/reconciling. Each ratchet entry has a canonical accounting owner/root, quota kind, unit/scale, period, class/lane, region/residency, and settlement-policy key; profile migration is total, conservation-preserving, and overflow checked. The root admits exactly one active rollout generation; successors permanently supersede predecessors, rollback is a complete successor over actual limits, and late or restored cancelled/superseded work fails closed. Cancellation after any preparation creates a complete root-owned recovery successor; prepared parents stay conservative, never restore independently, recheck current state/authority, use idempotent restore-safe receipts, and escalate missed recovery deadlines. Tenant work cannot invoke it, and every delayed transfer transition rechecks current local tenant/principal/policy epochs. Composite transactions use the canonical stream/authority-fence/target-fence/ remote-exception-guard/grant-guard/quota/uniqueness/receipt order with bounded identity-preserving deadlock retry. Per-tenant/work-class ceilings, fair share, starvation bounds, and a scoped emergency reserve keep recovery available without tenant borrowing or monopolization. - Capability-limited plugins and integrations; opaque secret handles and host-brokered authenticated operations; plaintext credentials never enter Wasm guest memory.
- Tamper-evident event and evidence history with independently stored signed checkpoints.
- Tested backup/restore, projection/search rebuild, workflow continuation, migration rollback, and disaster recovery.
- Typed tenant-surface disposition evidence that distinguishes local deletion/ controlled-key erasure from provider attestations, unconfirmed requests, and unverifiable previously disclosed plaintext. A controlling mandatory erasure, maximum-retention, or closure deletion obligation outranks rollup preservation. Every raw/rollup/manifest/result/cache/export/checkpoint- metadata surface is disposed independently; lost historical authority is recorded without retaining prohibited sensitive/linkable content and exposed as unknown.
- Complete audit provenance without recording plaintext secrets.
Critical and high findings block release. Medium and lower findings require remediation or an explicit, scoped, time-bounded acceptance with owner, compensating controls, review date, and expiry. No acceptance may waive tenant isolation, audit immutability, or legal obligations.