Status: baseline
skrifheim assumes hostile networks, compromised clients, stolen admin credentials, copied disks, poisoned AI workers, malicious plugins, replayed messages, stale replicas, and partial node capture.
- canonical facts,
- world history,
- policy epochs,
- crypto epochs,
- classification labels,
- signatures,
- evidence references,
- manifests,
- optional publishing-extension public/private separation,
- AI artifact provenance.
- unauthorized reads across clearance boundaries,
- forged device or workload context supplied to policy evaluation,
- write-down from high classification to lower outputs,
- query inference through aggregation or repeated small queries,
- access-pattern leakage through touched segments, indexes, response size, timing, cache hits, or repeated query shape,
- projection mixing incompatible compartments,
- stale vector/search results leaking deleted or unauthorized facts,
- AI artifact poisoning,
- manifest rollback,
- rollback to a self-consistent old database directory containing old manifests, WAL, policies, credentials, key states, deleted facts, missing audit events, or reusable emergency approvals,
- concurrent database processes advancing the same storage directory,
- storage-format downgrade or partial migration attacks,
- WAL frame deletion, duplication, reordering, torn-tail append, or appending after an unvalidated corrupt tail,
- malformed physical records, block indexes, filters, compression metadata, or offset tables that trigger misreads, over-allocation, or integrity bypass,
- policy-domain high cardinality causing pathological small-file amplification or compaction debt,
- WAL or segment corruption,
- weak entropy, nonce reuse, or test-only randomness entering production crypto paths,
- unauthorized export,
- replayed, stale, or overbroad API credentials and sessions,
- nondeterministic or overpowered policy/law-pack evaluators,
- plugin capability escape.
- classify facts, projections, blobs, query results, and AI artifacts,
- reject unsafe query plans before execution,
- expose aggregate query proof state only across public API boundaries, not per-label planner decisions,
- bind subject, device, and workload context at the authenticated API boundary before policy evaluation,
- keep projections rebuildable,
- sign commits and manifests,
- require a non-rollbackable freshness anchor for production profiles; signed manifests and AEAD authenticate a stored state but do not prove it is the newest valid state by themselves,
- fail closed on active startup when local storage is older than the freshness anchor, and open historical roots only through explicit recovery workflows,
- admit a production entropy/CSPRNG provider before nonce, key, salt, replay nonce, or random identifier generation is security-relevant,
- scope keys by compartment and epoch,
- release keys through scoped key-provider boundaries rather than giving the main database process unrestricted root or tenant key authority,
- quarantine stale or forked replicas,
- chain audit records and include audit roots in manifests and freshness anchors so valid individual audit records cannot be silently deleted or reordered,
- bind query plans to authenticated identity, attestation evidence, snapshot, policy epoch, query digest, purpose, expiry, and replay nonce; public query requests must not provide the labels or result security metadata of stored facts,
- model and gate access-pattern and query-shape leakage instead of assuming encryption hides which data was touched,
- reject concurrent writers, stale storage leases, storage-format downgrade attempts, and partial migrations before durable roots are trusted,
- use a block-structured physical layout with authenticated record/block metadata, durable indexes, protected-root accounting, and domain-local compaction instead of whole-segment reads,
- repair only recoverable torn WAL tails at authenticated frame boundaries and reject interior corruption or append-after-corruption attempts,
- test storage ordering with failure injection, subprocess crash cases, and reference-model recovery comparisons,
- make API credential/session revocation part of authenticated access, not an application-side afterthought,
- evaluate law and policy packs through deterministic bounded mechanisms with no network, filesystem, random, wall-clock, or process side effects,
- keep public web projections separate from private worlds,
- treat AI output as untrusted until reviewed.
Break-glass access is not a current bypass capability. Existing break-glass audit metadata records intent and attested context only. The future access model must be scoped, time-bounded, approval-gated, and auditable before use; it must not silently become global clearance escalation. AI-assisted identity proofing can provide evidence, but must not be the sole authorization authority for emergency access.