v0.18.3 adds purpose-specific non-clone key/plaintext owners in the optional
software provider, with no public generic secret-retention closures. Their
contract, temporary upstream private-state cleanup exception and residue
non-claims are in Crypto Provider Contract.
The earlier SecretBytes callback API remains scaffold-only and is not used
by production-provider paths.
Status: scaffolded in v0.12.0
skrifheim treats secret memory as an explicit boundary. Key material, bearer
tokens, seed material, recovery secrets, and future hardware-provider handles
must not be stored in ordinary Vec<u8> or String fields once they enter the
crypto control plane.
skrifheim-crypto exposes SecretBytes as the first secret-owning wrapper.
It is intentionally narrow:
- non-empty and bounded by
SECRET_VALUE_MAX_BYTES, - no
Clone,PartialEq, orEq, - redacted
Debug, - closure-only read access through
with_secret, - explicit
clear_secretandinto_cleared, - clear-on-drop storage through the admitted
sanitizationcrate.
SecretBytes::from_slice copies from a borrowed source slice and cannot clear
that source memory. Callers that own secret bytes in a Vec<u8> should prefer
SecretBytes::from_vec, which transfers the allocation into clear-on-drop
storage instead of creating a duplicate plaintext allocation.
The wrapper is not a key manager, KMS client, HSM handle, memory-locking system, or cryptographic verifier. It is the in-process ownership rule that future key and secret APIs must use before durable encryption paths exist.
sanitization 2.2.0 is admitted for this boundary with:
sanitization = { version = "2.2.0", default-features = false, features = ["alloc"] }The selected feature set keeps skrifheim on no-std library crates, avoids
derive macros, avoids serde, avoids zeroize/subtle interop, and avoids
platform memory-locking features. It gives skrifheim a safe wrapper around a
documented volatile wipe boundary without adding unsafe Rust to the core
crates.
- Do not derive or implement
Clone,PartialEq, orEqfor secret-owning wrappers. - Do not expose
as_slice,to_vec,into_vec, or raw byte accessors from secret-owning wrappers. - Debug output for secret-owning wrappers must redact contents and exact byte length.
- Error messages must be static and must never include secret bytes, key IDs that are themselves secret, or caller-provided secret labels.
- Rejected owned secret buffers must still be cleared before drop.
This scaffold does not protect against process dumps, privileged memory reads, swap, hibernation, CPU caches, crash aborts, optimizer-visible historical stack copies, or host runtime snapshots. Platform memory locking, guard pages, hardware-backed handles, and statistical/codegen evidence belong to later hardening milestones.