Notable changes to Network Scanner are documented in this file. The format follows Keep a Changelog; versions before the hardening batches are summarized under their original scope.
- hostile
Authorizationheader values (non-ASCII bearer tokens) and non-string WebSocket auth payloads no longer crash the token comparison with a server error that never consumed rate-limit quota - report downloads only serve generated
security_report_*files; operator notes kept in the reports directory are no longer downloadable - URL-shaped targets (
https://example.com) are handed to Nmap as the bare hostname, so vulnerability and port scans no longer abort before the web checks can run (schemes are matched case-insensitively per RFC 3986); URL targets whose hostname would start with an option prefix are refused, keeping option injection out of Nmap's argv once the scheme is stripped, and malformed IPv6 URL targets are rejected as invalid input - every Nmap run is bounded (
--host-timeoutplus a process timeout), so a wedged scan can no longer pin a request thread or a scan slot forever - timed-out WHOIS lookups no longer leak a joinable worker thread per call; the bounded wait now runs on a daemon thread
- AI analysis prompts cap the scan data they carry: oversized payloads were rejected by the model on context length and silently degraded to the fallback analysis
- fallback analyses are labeled per component in the comprehensive aggregate, in the CLI output and in the web UI instead of masquerading as model analysis
- the CLI prints the DNS record map instead of the API wrapper's keys (the previous output listed letters of the domain and the wrapper's field names as if they were records)
python app.pyserves directly outside debug mode again; flask-socketio 5.5.1 refused the Werkzeug dev server without an explicit operator acknowledgment
- upgraded pinned dependencies past published advisories: flask 3.1.3, flask-cors 6.0.0, requests 2.33.0, dnspython 2.6.1, python-dotenv 1.2.2 and gunicorn 23.0.0 (request smuggling, CVE-2024-6827)
- flask-socketio moves to 5.6.1 alongside the flask 3.1 stack: 5.5.1 cannot serve the request session its event dispatcher needs
- the CLI's requests pin moves with the backend's so the combined CI install still resolves
- hardened API request handling: hashed rate-limit keys, opt-in proxy header trust, request size caps mapped to 413, generic 500 responses, bounded automated-scan concurrency and a bounded OpenAI client
- wrapped scan data in untrusted-data delimiters with a system instruction so scanned banners cannot steer the analysis prompts
- closed known dependency advisories of that date (gunicorn, jinja2, flask-cors, python-socketio, requests) and dropped unused runtime packages
- overrode vulnerable transitive frontend dependencies without leaving the Create React App toolchain
- automated CI (backend, CLI and frontend suites on Python 3.10/3.12 and Node 20) and a weekly Dependabot schedule
- regression suites covering validation, limiter, OpenAI and reliability contracts
FLASK_ENV=productionrefuses placeholderSECRET_KEYvalues and anySECRET_KEYshorter than 32 characters, and placeholderAPI_ACCESS_TOKENvalues: generation fails fast at startup instead of silently running with insecure defaults. Set both to unique random values before upgrading.- rate-limit storage moves from
REDIS_URLtoRATELIMIT_STORAGE_URI(memory://by default; point it at Redis to share limits across workers).REDIS_URLwas never read by the application. - empty-string environment values are treated as unset for optional
settings (
SCAN_CONCURRENCY,OPENAI_MODEL, rate-limit overrides), matching how Docker Compose passes them. - the sqlite database moved to the persistent Docker volume, so container recreation no longer loses it.
- the frontend build requires Node 20 or newer and the backend requires Python 3.10 or newer, matching the pinned dependencies, the Docker images and CI.