diff --git a/.github/workflows/code-scanning.yaml b/.github/workflows/code-scanning.yaml
index d00a7707b3f..63d7745bf04 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/code-scanning.yaml
+++ b/.github/workflows/code-scanning.yaml
@@ -66,25 +66,12 @@ jobs:
             scripts/shellcheck-json1-to-sarif.mts
           sparse-checkout-cone-mode: false
 
-      - name: Detect trusted ShellCheck converter
-        id: converter
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          if [ -f trusted-shellcheck-converter/scripts/shellcheck-json1-to-sarif.mts ]; then
-            echo "present=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          else
-            echo "present=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-            echo "Trusted base revision does not yet contain the ShellCheck converter; conversion and upload begin after this helper lands on the base branch."
-          fi
-
       - name: Setup Node.js
-        if: steps.converter.outputs.present == 'true'
         uses: actions/setup-node@820762786026740c76f36085b0efc47a31fe5020 # v7.0.0
         with:
           node-version: 22.19.0
 
       - name: Install ShellCheck
-        if: steps.converter.outputs.present == 'true'
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
           probe="$RUNNER_TEMP/shellcheck-json1-probe.sh"
@@ -117,7 +104,6 @@ jobs:
 
       - name: Collect shell files
         id: shell-files
-        if: steps.converter.outputs.present == 'true'
         working-directory: source
         run: |
           git ls-files -z -- '*.sh' 'install.sh' 'uninstall.sh' | sort -zu > "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE/shell-files.txt"
@@ -128,7 +114,7 @@ jobs:
           fi
 
       - name: Generate ShellCheck SARIF
-        if: steps.converter.outputs.present == 'true' && steps.shell-files.outputs.has_files == 'true'
+        if: steps.shell-files.outputs.has_files == 'true'
         working-directory: source
         run: |
           # Ubuntu's packaged ShellCheck may not support --format=sarif.
@@ -170,7 +156,7 @@ jobs:
 
       - name: Check SARIF has runs
         id: sarif-runs
-        if: steps.converter.outputs.present == 'true' && steps.shell-files.outputs.has_files == 'true'
+        if: steps.shell-files.outputs.has_files == 'true'
         run: |
           run_count="$(jq '.runs | length' shellcheck.sarif)"
           if [ "$run_count" -gt 0 ]; then
@@ -181,7 +167,7 @@ jobs:
           fi
 
       - name: Upload ShellCheck SARIF
-        if: steps.converter.outputs.present == 'true' && steps.shell-files.outputs.has_files == 'true' && steps.sarif-runs.outputs.has_runs == 'true'
+        if: steps.shell-files.outputs.has_files == 'true' && steps.sarif-runs.outputs.has_runs == 'true'
         uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@f205ea1c3313d32999d8d6a48b4f6530d4437b38 # v4
         with:
           sarif_file: shellcheck.sarif
diff --git a/.github/workflows/codebase-growth-guardrails.yaml b/.github/workflows/codebase-growth-guardrails.yaml
index 21fc0ea7df1..761e749e39d 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/codebase-growth-guardrails.yaml
+++ b/.github/workflows/codebase-growth-guardrails.yaml
@@ -113,26 +113,10 @@ jobs:
           ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }}
           persist-credentials: false
 
-      - name: Detect guardrail tools on the base revision
-        id: tools
-        # The tools live in the base tree. On the PR that first adds them, the
-        # base revision predates them, so skip until the change lands on base.
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          if [ -f tools/growth-guardrails/test-size-budget.mts ] \
-            && [ -f tools/growth-guardrails/test-conditionals.mts ]; then
-            echo "present=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          else
-            echo "present=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-            echo "Trusted base revision does not yet contain the growth-guardrail tools; the policy applies once this change lands on the base branch."
-          fi
-
       - name: Install trusted dependencies
-        if: steps.tools.outputs.present == 'true'
         run: npm ci --ignore-scripts --no-audit --no-fund
 
       - name: Require changed test files to stay within size budget
-        if: steps.tools.outputs.present == 'true'
         env:
           GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
           PR_NUMBER: ${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}
@@ -145,7 +129,6 @@ jobs:
           node --experimental-strip-types tools/growth-guardrails/test-size-budget.mts
 
       - name: Require changed test files not to add if statements
-        if: steps.tools.outputs.present == 'true'
         env:
           GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
           PR_NUMBER: ${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}
diff --git a/.github/workflows/installer-hash-check.yaml b/.github/workflows/installer-hash-check.yaml
index 4265f551413..4dbeb427aac 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/installer-hash-check.yaml
+++ b/.github/workflows/installer-hash-check.yaml
@@ -4,10 +4,9 @@
 # Verifies pinned installer SHA-256 hashes still match upstream scripts.
 # Checked: allowlisted OpenShell installer and Brev release assets.
 # Reports the required network-backed drift check on every PR, every push to
-# main, and weekly. Pull requests execute checker code from their base commit;
-# the immutable bootstrap is used only for the PR that first adds that action.
-# A new release-manifest allowlist entry must therefore land on main in a
-# prerequisite PR before a later PR changes runtime selectors to that release.
+# main, and weekly. Pull requests execute checker code from their base commit.
+# A new release-manifest allowlist entry must land on main in a prerequisite PR
+# before a later PR changes runtime selectors to that release.
 
 name: Security / Installer Hash Check
 
@@ -42,9 +41,8 @@ jobs:
         with:
           node-version: 22.19.0
 
-      # The full PR-head checkout below supplies data only. Its checker and pin
-      # parser are never executed: later steps run exclusively from either
-      # .trusted-installer-hash or .bootstrap-installer-hash.
+      # The checkout of the latest PR commit supplies data only. The checker and
+      # pin parser execute from the checkout of the PR base SHA below.
       - name: Checkout pull request head
         if: github.event_name == 'pull_request'
         uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
@@ -72,127 +70,12 @@ jobs:
             scripts/checks/extract-installer-pins.mts
           sparse-checkout-cone-mode: false
 
-      - name: Detect base-trusted installer hash action
-        id: trusted-installer-hash
-        if: github.event_name == 'pull_request'
-        shell: bash
-        run: |
-          if [[ -f .trusted-installer-hash/.github/actions/ci-installer-hash-check/action.yaml ]]; then
-            echo "available=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          else
-            echo "available=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          fi
-
-      # invalidState: the first PR that introduces this action has no copy in
-      # its base commit. Running the mutable PR-side checker would let that PR
-      # authorize its own installer pins.
-      # sourceBoundary: this exact commit and reviewed Git tree contain the
-      # trusted action and checker; the PR head supplies only inspected files.
-      # whyNotSourceFix: a base commit cannot contain a new action before the
-      # introducing PR merges, so the bootstrap must name immutable code once.
-      # regressionTest: test/pr-workflow-contract.test.ts rejects mutable
-      # checker execution, non-immutable refs, and a mismatched reviewed tree.
-      # manualReviewEvidence: on 2026-07-02, independent Git object inspection
-      # confirmed commit cb5e9aefab2b16fedc0995149fc3520da0d5e0c7 has
-      # tree 1fdf59efe40b78c407e222fd42043b23a61e199a. The reviewed bootstrap
-      # script SHA-256 is 179e1572932eedc1a8ed974d534e9f2a5c34db7ebe971000dc20b77ed9d9feb3;
-      # its parser SHA-256 is
-      # e1d6b63a7b0378a3d28ee71d347ade2da75b3fcf2ff55aa55a9b54d2bc2fc13a;
-      # and its composite-action SHA-256 is
-      # 9c48c64cc934032c99a0aa9aa08b1164757988dc2842e1df88d1b7252ce1183f.
-      # removalCondition: remove the bootstrap checkout after this workflow has
-      # landed on every supported PR base. The fallback is refused after the
-      # explicit 180-day review window ending 2026-12-29T19:35:41Z.
-      - name: Enforce immutable installer hash bootstrap expiry
-        if: >-
-          github.event_name == 'pull_request' &&
-          steps.trusted-installer-hash.outputs.available != 'true'
-        shell: bash
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          node <<'NODE'
-          const commit = "cb5e9aefab2b16fedc0995149fc3520da0d5e0c7";
-          const expiresAt = "2026-12-29T19:35:41Z";
-          const expiresAtMs = Date.parse(expiresAt);
-          const canonicalExpiresAt =
-            Number.isFinite(expiresAtMs) && /^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}T\d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2}Z$/u.test(expiresAt)
-              ? new Date(expiresAtMs).toISOString().replace(".000Z", "Z")
-              : "";
-
-          if (!/^[a-f0-9]{40}$/u.test(commit) || canonicalExpiresAt !== expiresAt) {
-            console.error(
-              "::error::Immutable installer hash bootstrap expiry configuration is invalid; " +
-                "refusing the fallback. Expected a 40-character commit SHA and canonical UTC expiry.",
-            );
-            process.exit(1);
-          }
-
-          if (Date.now() >= expiresAtMs) {
-            console.error(
-              `::error::Immutable installer hash bootstrap ${commit} expired at ${expiresAt}. ` +
-                "Remove the bootstrap fallback or replace it with newly reviewed immutable checker code.",
-            );
-            process.exit(1);
-          }
-
-          const daysRemaining = Math.ceil((expiresAtMs - Date.now()) / 86_400_000);
-          console.log(
-            `Immutable installer hash bootstrap ${commit} remains valid for ${daysRemaining} day(s), ` +
-              `until ${expiresAt}.`,
-          );
-          NODE
-
-      - name: Checkout immutable installer hash bootstrap
-        if: >-
-          github.event_name == 'pull_request' &&
-          steps.trusted-installer-hash.outputs.available != 'true'
-        uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
-        with:
-          ref: cb5e9aefab2b16fedc0995149fc3520da0d5e0c7
-          path: .bootstrap-installer-hash
-          persist-credentials: false
-          sparse-checkout: |
-            .github/actions/ci-installer-hash-check
-            scripts/check-installer-hash.sh
-            scripts/checks/extract-installer-pins.mts
-          sparse-checkout-cone-mode: false
-
-      - name: Verify immutable installer hash bootstrap tree
-        if: >-
-          github.event_name == 'pull_request' &&
-          steps.trusted-installer-hash.outputs.available != 'true'
-        shell: bash
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          readonly expected_commit="cb5e9aefab2b16fedc0995149fc3520da0d5e0c7"
-          readonly expected_tree="1fdf59efe40b78c407e222fd42043b23a61e199a"
-          actual_commit="$(git -C .bootstrap-installer-hash rev-parse HEAD)"
-          actual_tree="$(git -C .bootstrap-installer-hash rev-parse 'HEAD^{tree}')"
-          if [[ "${actual_commit}" != "${expected_commit}" ]]; then
-            echo "::error::Immutable installer hash bootstrap checkout does not match the reviewed commit." >&2
-            exit 1
-          fi
-          if [[ "${actual_tree}" != "${expected_tree}" ]]; then
-            echo "::error::Immutable installer hash bootstrap checkout does not match the reviewed tree." >&2
-            exit 1
-          fi
-
       - name: Verify pull request installer hashes from base-trusted code
-        if: >-
-          github.event_name == 'pull_request' &&
-          steps.trusted-installer-hash.outputs.available == 'true'
+        if: github.event_name == 'pull_request'
         uses: ./.trusted-installer-hash/.github/actions/ci-installer-hash-check
         with:
           repo-root: ${{ github.workspace }}
 
-      - name: Verify pull request installer hashes from immutable bootstrap
-        if: >-
-          github.event_name == 'pull_request' &&
-          steps.trusted-installer-hash.outputs.available != 'true'
-        uses: ./.bootstrap-installer-hash/.github/actions/ci-installer-hash-check
-        with:
-          repo-root: ${{ github.workspace }}
-
       - name: Verify trusted event installer hashes
         if: github.event_name != 'pull_request'
         uses: ./.github/actions/ci-installer-hash-check
diff --git a/.github/workflows/pr.yaml b/.github/workflows/pr.yaml
index 740fddd49d2..f2fc16a6d67 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/pr.yaml
+++ b/.github/workflows/pr.yaml
@@ -173,46 +173,9 @@ jobs:
             .github/actions/ci-install-dependencies.sh
           sparse-checkout-cone-mode: false
 
-      - name: Detect trusted installer integration action
-        id: trusted-installer-integration
-        shell: bash
-        run: |
-          if [ -f .trusted-ci-actions/.github/actions/ci-installer-integration/action.yaml ]; then
-            echo "available=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          else
-            echo "available=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          fi
-
       - name: Run installer integration tests
-        if: ${{ steps.trusted-installer-integration.outputs.available == 'true' }}
         uses: ./.trusted-ci-actions/.github/actions/ci-installer-integration
 
-      - name: Setup Node.js for installer integration
-        if: ${{ steps.trusted-installer-integration.outputs.available != 'true' }}
-        uses: actions/setup-node@820762786026740c76f36085b0efc47a31fe5020 # v7.0.0
-        with:
-          node-version: "22"
-          cache: npm
-
-      - name: Install installer integration dependencies
-        if: ${{ steps.trusted-installer-integration.outputs.available != 'true' }}
-        shell: bash
-        run: |
-          npm install --ignore-scripts
-          cd nemoclaw && npm install --ignore-scripts
-
-      - name: Build installer integration artifacts
-        if: ${{ steps.trusted-installer-integration.outputs.available != 'true' }}
-        shell: bash
-        run: |
-          npm run build:cli
-          cd nemoclaw && npm run build
-
-      - name: Run installer integration tests (bootstrap)
-        if: ${{ steps.trusted-installer-integration.outputs.available != 'true' }}
-        shell: bash
-        run: CI=true npx vitest run --project installer-integration
-
   wechat-runtime-audit:
     needs: changes
     if: needs.changes.outputs.code == 'true'
@@ -235,54 +198,12 @@ jobs:
             .github/actions/ci-reviewed-npm-audit/verify-and-install-npm.sh
           sparse-checkout-cone-mode: false
 
-      - name: Detect trusted WeChat runtime audit
-        id: trusted-wechat-audit
-        shell: bash
-        run: |
-          if [ -f .trusted-wechat-audit/.github/actions/ci-wechat-runtime-audit/action.yaml ]; then
-            echo "available=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          else
-            echo "available=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          fi
-
-      # One-time bootstrap for this PR only. The action is pinned to a signed,
-      # immutable commit that contains only the reviewed audit implementation.
-      # Every later PR must resolve the action from its base SHA above.
-      # Removal condition: delete this checkout and its paired audit step in the
-      # first follow-up after PR #6739 merges, before the next release tag.
-      - name: Checkout pinned bootstrap WeChat runtime audit
-        if: ${{ steps.trusted-wechat-audit.outputs.available != 'true' && github.event.pull_request.number == 6739 && github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name == 'HOYALIM/NemoClaw' }}
-        uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
-        with:
-          repository: HOYALIM/NemoClaw
-          ref: 0d2256d71d5bbba3bcaaaa4d01714fa56f22d1e2
-          path: .trusted-wechat-audit-bootstrap
-          persist-credentials: false
-          sparse-checkout: |
-            .github/actions/ci-wechat-runtime-audit
-          sparse-checkout-cone-mode: false
-
-      - name: Reject unavailable trusted WeChat runtime audit
-        if: ${{ steps.trusted-wechat-audit.outputs.available != 'true' && (github.event.pull_request.number != 6739 || github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name != 'HOYALIM/NemoClaw') }}
-        shell: bash
-        run: |
-          echo "::error::Trusted base SHA does not contain ci-wechat-runtime-audit"
-          exit 1
-
       - name: Audit locked WeChat runtime graph
-        if: ${{ steps.trusted-wechat-audit.outputs.available == 'true' }}
         uses: ./.trusted-wechat-audit/.github/actions/ci-wechat-runtime-audit
         with:
           target-root: ${{ github.workspace }}
           report-dir: artifacts/wechat-runtime-audit
 
-      - name: Audit locked WeChat runtime graph (pinned bootstrap)
-        if: ${{ steps.trusted-wechat-audit.outputs.available != 'true' && github.event.pull_request.number == 6739 && github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name == 'HOYALIM/NemoClaw' }}
-        uses: ./.trusted-wechat-audit-bootstrap/.github/actions/ci-wechat-runtime-audit
-        with:
-          target-root: ${{ github.workspace }}
-          report-dir: artifacts/wechat-runtime-audit
-
       - name: Upload WeChat runtime audit evidence
         if: ${{ always() }}
         uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7.0.1
@@ -319,64 +240,12 @@ jobs:
             scripts/lib/reviewed-npm-audit.mts
           sparse-checkout-cone-mode: false
 
-      - name: Detect trusted reviewed npm audit schema
-        id: trusted-reviewed-npm-audit
-        shell: bash
-        run: |
-          if grep -Fq 'NEMOCLAW_REVIEWED_NPM_AUDIT_TARGET_ROOT' \
-              .trusted-reviewed-npm-audit/.github/actions/ci-reviewed-npm-audit/action.yaml \
-            && grep -Fq 'resolveTrustedAuditConfigPath(TRUSTED_REPO_ROOT)' \
-              .trusted-reviewed-npm-audit/scripts/audit-reviewed-npm-graph.mts \
-            && [ -f .trusted-reviewed-npm-audit/ci/npm-audit-exceptions.json ] \
-            && [ -f .trusted-reviewed-npm-audit/ci/reviewed-npm-audit.json ] \
-            && [ -f .trusted-reviewed-npm-audit/scripts/lib/openclaw-npm-remediation.mts ] \
-            && [ -f .trusted-reviewed-npm-audit/scripts/lib/reviewed-npm-audit.mts ]; then
-            echo "available=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          else
-            echo "available=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          fi
-
-      # One-time bootstrap for this PR only. The action, driver, and helper are
-      # pinned to its signed first commit; every later PR must use its base SHA.
-      - name: Checkout pinned bootstrap reviewed npm audit
-        if: ${{ steps.trusted-reviewed-npm-audit.outputs.available != 'true' && github.event.pull_request.number == 6830 && github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name == 'HOYALIM/NemoClaw' }}
-        uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
-        with:
-          repository: HOYALIM/NemoClaw
-          ref: 0c7dd29394d2c4db660c4d09f3654c0789e200d0
-          path: .trusted-reviewed-npm-audit-bootstrap
-          persist-credentials: false
-          sparse-checkout: |
-            .github/actions/ci-reviewed-npm-audit
-            ci/npm-audit-exceptions.json
-            ci/reviewed-npm-audit.json
-            scripts/audit-reviewed-npm-graph.mts
-            scripts/lib/openclaw-npm-remediation.mts
-            scripts/lib/reviewed-npm-archive.mts
-            scripts/lib/reviewed-npm-audit.mts
-          sparse-checkout-cone-mode: false
-
-      - name: Reject unavailable trusted reviewed npm audit
-        if: ${{ steps.trusted-reviewed-npm-audit.outputs.available != 'true' && (github.event.pull_request.number != 6830 || github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name != 'HOYALIM/NemoClaw') }}
-        shell: bash
-        run: |
-          echo "::error::Trusted base SHA does not contain the schema-2 reviewed npm audit"
-          exit 1
-
       - name: Audit reviewed production npm graphs
-        if: ${{ steps.trusted-reviewed-npm-audit.outputs.available == 'true' }}
         uses: ./.trusted-reviewed-npm-audit/.github/actions/ci-reviewed-npm-audit
         with:
           target-root: ${{ github.workspace }}
           report-dir: artifacts/reviewed-npm-audit
 
-      - name: Audit reviewed production npm graphs (pinned bootstrap)
-        if: ${{ steps.trusted-reviewed-npm-audit.outputs.available != 'true' && github.event.pull_request.number == 6830 && github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name == 'HOYALIM/NemoClaw' }}
-        uses: ./.trusted-reviewed-npm-audit-bootstrap/.github/actions/ci-reviewed-npm-audit
-        with:
-          target-root: ${{ github.workspace }}
-          report-dir: artifacts/reviewed-npm-audit
-
   cli-test-shards:
     needs: changes
     if: needs.changes.outputs.code == 'true'
@@ -409,87 +278,12 @@ jobs:
             .github/actions/ci-install-dependencies.sh
           sparse-checkout-cone-mode: false
 
-      - name: Detect trusted E2E support sharding
-        id: trusted-shard-capabilities
-        shell: bash
-        run: |
-          if grep -Fq -- '--project e2e-support' \
-            .trusted-ci-actions/.github/actions/ci-cli-coverage-shard/action.yaml; then
-            echo "e2e-support=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          else
-            echo "e2e-support=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          fi
-          if grep -Fq -- 'name: Install pinned Pi search tools' \
-            .trusted-ci-actions/.github/actions/ci-cli-coverage-shard/action.yaml; then
-            echo "pi-search-tools=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          else
-            echo "pi-search-tools=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          fi
-
-      # The PR action comes from the base commit. Provision Pi's search tools here until
-      # the trusted action contains the same pinned, version-verified contract.
-      - name: Install pinned Pi search tools (bootstrap)
-        if: ${{ steps.trusted-shard-capabilities.outputs.pi-search-tools != 'true' }}
-        shell: bash
-        env:
-          FD_FIND_VERSION: "9.0.0-1"
-          RIPGREP_VERSION: "14.1.0-1"
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          sudo apt-get update -qq
-          sudo apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
-            "fd-find=${FD_FIND_VERSION}" \
-            "ripgrep=${RIPGREP_VERSION}"
-
-          INSTALLED_FD_FIND_VERSION="$(dpkg-query -W -f='${Version}' fd-find)"
-          INSTALLED_RIPGREP_VERSION="$(dpkg-query -W -f='${Version}' ripgrep)"
-          if [ "$INSTALLED_FD_FIND_VERSION" != "$FD_FIND_VERSION" ]; then
-            echo "::error::fd-find package version $INSTALLED_FD_FIND_VERSION does not match $FD_FIND_VERSION"
-            exit 1
-          fi
-          if [ "$INSTALLED_RIPGREP_VERSION" != "$RIPGREP_VERSION" ]; then
-            echo "::error::ripgrep package version $INSTALLED_RIPGREP_VERSION does not match $RIPGREP_VERSION"
-            exit 1
-          fi
-
-          command -v fdfind >/dev/null
-          command -v rg >/dev/null
-          EXPECTED_FD_BINARY_VERSION="${FD_FIND_VERSION%%-*}"
-          EXPECTED_RG_BINARY_VERSION="${RIPGREP_VERSION%%-*}"
-          FD_BINARY_VERSION="$(fdfind --version)"
-          RG_BINARY_VERSION="$(rg --version)"
-          RG_BINARY_VERSION="${RG_BINARY_VERSION%%$'\n'*}"
-          if [ "$FD_BINARY_VERSION" != "fdfind $EXPECTED_FD_BINARY_VERSION" ]; then
-            echo "::error::fdfind binary version $FD_BINARY_VERSION does not match fdfind $EXPECTED_FD_BINARY_VERSION"
-            exit 1
-          fi
-          if [ "$RG_BINARY_VERSION" != "ripgrep $EXPECTED_RG_BINARY_VERSION" ]; then
-            echo "::error::rg binary version $RG_BINARY_VERSION does not match ripgrep $EXPECTED_RG_BINARY_VERSION"
-            exit 1
-          fi
-
       - name: Run CLI coverage shard
         uses: ./.trusted-ci-actions/.github/actions/ci-cli-coverage-shard
         with:
           shard: ${{ matrix.shard }}
           shard-count: "8"
 
-      # The PR action comes from the base commit. Until that trusted action
-      # contains the E2E-support project, keep this PR and older-base PRs
-      # covered without executing a mutable replacement action.
-      - name: Validate changed live E2E mock parity (bootstrap)
-        if: ${{ steps.trusted-shard-capabilities.outputs.e2e-support != 'true' && matrix.shard == 1 }}
-        run: npx tsx scripts/checks/e2e-mock-parity.mts --base HEAD^1 --head HEAD^2
-
-      - name: Run E2E support shard (bootstrap)
-        if: ${{ steps.trusted-shard-capabilities.outputs.e2e-support != 'true' }}
-        env:
-          E2E_SUPPORT_SHARD: ${{ matrix.shard }}
-          E2E_SUPPORT_SHARD_COUNT: "8"
-        run: >-
-          npx vitest run --project e2e-support
-          --shard="${E2E_SUPPORT_SHARD}/${E2E_SUPPORT_SHARD_COUNT}"
-
   cli-tests:
     needs:
       - changes
diff --git a/agents/openclaw/dependency-review.md b/agents/openclaw/dependency-review.md
index 1b73ddd4021..392b8d0b6db 100644
--- a/agents/openclaw/dependency-review.md
+++ b/agents/openclaw/dependency-review.md
@@ -33,8 +33,7 @@ The reviewed audit wrapper reports lower-severity production findings and blocks
 - Installation boundary: the image materializes the reviewed lock into a root-owned dedicated npm cache and adds the exact package metadata needed by npm's offline resolver. Before that cache becomes immutable, the shared `scripts/lib/reviewed-npm-archive.mts` implementation re-packs every locked archive offline from the final cache and rejects registry-origin drift, metadata or packed-byte SRI drift, unsafe filenames, missing archives, and symlinks. The sandbox user copies that verified immutable source into a writable cache used for registry metadata lookup, archive packing, and the OpenClaw plugin install; no retrieval step falls back to `HOME/.npm`. The copy is deleted in the same image layer, and the trusted cache is never writable. The installer runs in offline, legacy-peer mode, then `verify-wechat-runtime-lock.mts` rejects integrity, version, dependency-set, or peer-range drift and refuses an image OpenClaw version below the plugin's locked peer minimum.
 - Default CI gate: `wechat-runtime-audit` in `.github/workflows/pr.yaml` and `.github/workflows/main.yaml` invokes the reviewed `.github/actions/ci-wechat-runtime-audit` implementation.
   The pull request workflow resolves the action from the PR base SHA.
-  Because PR #6739's base SHA predates the action, only that PR can use the pinned bootstrap action from signed immutable commit `HOYALIM/NemoClaw@0d2256d71d5bbba3bcaaaa4d01714fa56f22d1e2`.
-  Other PRs fail closed if their base lacks the action.
+  If the PR base SHA does not contain the action, the pull request workflow fails.
   The `main.yaml` workflow uses the merged action.
   The action uses Node.js `22.19.0`.
   It downloads `npm@10.9.4` and verifies the archive against the committed Subresource Integrity (SRI) value.
@@ -49,7 +48,6 @@ The reviewed audit wrapper reports lower-severity production findings and blocks
   Any final nonzero status fails the action.
   The report directory stores each attempt in `npm-audit-signatures-attempt-<n>.txt`.
   After a failed attempt, the action copies available npm debug logs to `npm-audit-signature-debug/`.
-  Removal condition: delete the PR #6739 bootstrap checkout, its paired conditional audit step, and the bootstrap-specific test assertions in the first follow-up after this PR merges, before the next release tag; all later PRs must use the normal base-SHA action path.
 - Advisory command: `npm ci --ignore-scripts --omit=dev --legacy-peer-deps --prefix agents/openclaw/wechat-runtime && npm audit --omit=dev --audit-level=low --json --prefix agents/openclaw/wechat-runtime && npm audit signatures --prefix agents/openclaw/wechat-runtime`.
 - Advisory review: `2026-07-12`; result: `0` known vulnerabilities across the resolved production graph.
 - Regression tests: `test/wechat-locked-install.test.ts` keeps the manifest runtime-lock paths and installer verification dispatch synchronized; `test/verify-wechat-runtime-lock.test.ts` proves the installed graph and OpenClaw peer-range compatibility fail closed; `test/wechat-runtime-audit-workflow.test.ts` keeps the Docker cache lifecycle, audit threshold, bounded download-only signature retry, invalid-signature denial, and real npm-pack boundary synchronized.
diff --git a/ci/source-shape-test-budget.json b/ci/source-shape-test-budget.json
index 29b62dceb32..c64ef36d64a 100644
--- a/ci/source-shape-test-budget.json
+++ b/ci/source-shape-test-budget.json
@@ -446,6 +446,12 @@
       "test": "requires one advisor lane to publish the PR comment",
       "category": "security"
     },
+    {
+      "file": "test/pr-workflow-contract.test.ts",
+      "test": "executes pull request installer hash checks only from the PR base SHA",
+      "category": "security"
+    },
+
     {
       "file": "test/runtime-provider-source-shape.test.ts",
       "test": "keeps migrated provider identities and implementations behind the one bundle composition",
diff --git a/docs/security/openclaw-2026.6.10-dependency-review.md b/docs/security/openclaw-2026.6.10-dependency-review.md
index b5df1686569..b16931e09fc 100644
--- a/docs/security/openclaw-2026.6.10-dependency-review.md
+++ b/docs/security/openclaw-2026.6.10-dependency-review.md
@@ -395,7 +395,12 @@ No real Microsoft Teams tenant proof is included in this PR. The work remains tr
   The low `body-parser` and moderate Hono and `protobufjs` findings remain documented at the configured `high` threshold.
   Current NemoClaw closes the WeChat residual with `agents/openclaw/wechat-runtime/package-lock.json` and post-install graph verification.
 - `src/lib/messaging/channels/manifests.test.ts` remains below the shared `test-size:check` threshold and does not need extraction in this dependency bump.
-- The npm audit result in this note remains a point-in-time snapshot. Default PR and main CI rematerialize the production-compatible graph from the reviewed local archives, audit it and the committed mcporter lock with `npm audit --omit=dev --json` through the reviewed evaluator, upload the raw reports and normalized policy results, and fail on unaccepted findings at the configured `high` threshold. The separate `wechat-runtime-audit` gate uses Node `22.19.0` and npm `10.9.4`, installs the committed WeChat production lock with scripts disabled, fails on any low-or-higher production advisory, verifies registry signatures, exercises the reviewed archive through a copied writable cache, and uploads its evidence. Pull requests execute that WeChat audit action from the base SHA; because PR #6739's base predates the action, that PR alone may bootstrap it from signed immutable commit `HOYALIM/NemoClaw@0d2256d71d5bbba3bcaaaa4d01714fa56f22d1e2`, while every other PR fails closed if its base lacks the action. The production installer routes registry metadata lookup, archive packing, and installation through the disposable writable-cache boundary so retrieval cannot fall back to `HOME/.npm`; the trusted source cache remains read-only and the disposable copy is removed in the same image layer.
+- The npm audit result in this note remains a point-in-time snapshot.
+  Default PR and main CI rematerialize the production-compatible graph from the reviewed local archives, audit it and the committed mcporter lock with `npm audit --omit=dev --json` through the reviewed evaluator, upload the raw reports and normalized policy results, and fail on unaccepted findings at the configured `high` threshold.
+  The separate `wechat-runtime-audit` gate uses Node `22.19.0` and npm `10.9.4`, installs the committed WeChat production lock with scripts disabled, fails on any low-or-higher production advisory, verifies registry signatures, exercises the reviewed archive through a copied writable cache, and uploads its evidence.
+  Pull requests execute that WeChat audit action from the PR base SHA.
+  If the PR base SHA does not contain the action, the pull request workflow fails.
+  The production installer routes registry metadata lookup, archive packing, and installation through the disposable writable-cache boundary so retrieval cannot fall back to `HOME/.npm`; the trusted source cache remains read-only and the disposable copy is removed in the same image layer.
 - The stale nonterminal rebuild-resume repair in `src/lib/actions/sandbox/rebuild-resume-session.ts` remains a migration compatibility shim tracked against #4533's onboard FSM/resume compatibility boundary. Its removal condition is to delete it after a session-version migration proves recreate sessions are always persisted at a resumable pre-sandbox boundary; `src/lib/actions/sandbox/rebuild-resume-session.test.ts` covers the helper directly, `test/onboard-resume-provider-recovery.test.ts` carries the onboard-suite producer-level regression for `machine.state='openclaw'`, and `src/lib/actions/sandbox/rebuild-resume-snapshot.test.ts` owns the rebuild handoff regression.
 - Production OpenClaw image build paths call `scripts/check-production-build-args.sh` before production `docker build` or `docker/build-push-action` use. `test/openclaw-dependency-review.test.ts` keeps that workflow contract documented.
 - The rebuild-reasoning cases added by this PR live in the focused `rebuild-resume-reasoning.test.ts` file; the smaller route-provenance additions remain with their `rebuild-resume-config.ts` boundary tests.
diff --git a/scripts/check-installer-hash.sh b/scripts/check-installer-hash.sh
index 75c58426e3e..90d94f869fe 100755
--- a/scripts/check-installer-hash.sh
+++ b/scripts/check-installer-hash.sh
@@ -80,8 +80,8 @@ sha256_file() {
 # sourceBoundary: NVIDIA/OpenShell owns the release assets and their published
 # digests; NemoClaw owns this independent verification of its local pin table.
 # In pull-request CI, this checker and its pin parser execute only from the
-# base-trusted checkout or the immutable bootstrap checkout, never from the PR
-# head; installer files from the PR head are treated strictly as input data.
+# base-trusted checkout. Installer files from the latest PR commit are input data
+# and are never sourced or executed.
 # whyNotSourceFix: an upstream release cannot validate which artifacts a
 # downstream installer consumes, so this comparison must remain in NemoClaw.
 # regressionTest: test/installer-hash-check.test.ts proves download failures and
@@ -105,10 +105,10 @@ check_openshell_release_assets() {
   # invalidState: target-controlled shell formatting hides, duplicates, or
   # mixes a release version while the trusted release-asset check still reports
   # success.
-  # sourceBoundary: this parser executes beside the checker only from the
-  # base-trusted checkout or immutable bootstrap, never from the PR head. It
-  # defines the accepted static shell subset; PR-head installers are input data
-  # only and are never sourced or executed.
+  # sourceBoundary: In pull-request CI, this parser and checker execute only
+  # from the base-trusted checkout. The parser defines the accepted static shell
+  # subset. Installer files from the latest PR commit are input data and are
+  # never sourced or executed.
   # whyNotSourceFix: installers need shell-native lookup before dependencies are
   # available, and sourcing target-controlled shell here would execute PR code.
   # regressionTest: test/installer-hash-check.test.ts covers resilient formatting
diff --git a/test/growth-guardrails-workflow-boundary.test.ts b/test/growth-guardrails-workflow-boundary.test.ts
index 8553e9248c0..72c9c6cf510 100644
--- a/test/growth-guardrails-workflow-boundary.test.ts
+++ b/test/growth-guardrails-workflow-boundary.test.ts
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ describe("growth-guardrails workflow trust boundary", () => {
           "      - name: Check out the trusted base revision",
           "      - name: Execute an untrusted action\n        uses: attacker/payload@main\n\n      - name: Check out the trusted base revision",
         ),
-      /must contain exactly 7 approved steps, not 8/,
+      /must contain exactly 6 approved steps, not 7/,
     ],
     [
       "a non-approved shell field",
diff --git a/test/pr-workflow-contract.test.ts b/test/pr-workflow-contract.test.ts
index f9957c76638..759cc027c42 100644
--- a/test/pr-workflow-contract.test.ts
+++ b/test/pr-workflow-contract.test.ts
@@ -71,11 +71,6 @@ const trustedPrActionPaths = {
 
 const trustedCheckoutAction = "actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1";
 const trustedSetupNodeAction = "actions/setup-node@820762786026740c76f36085b0efc47a31fe5020";
-const installerHashBootstrapCommit = "cb5e9aefab2b16fedc0995149fc3520da0d5e0c7";
-const installerHashBootstrapTree = "1fdf59efe40b78c407e222fd42043b23a61e199a";
-const installerHashBootstrapCreatedAt = "2026-07-02T19:35:41Z";
-const installerHashBootstrapExpiresAt = "2026-12-29T19:35:41Z";
-
 const trustedActionDirs = [
   ".github/actions/ci-static-checks",
   ".github/actions/ci-build-typecheck",
@@ -285,11 +280,52 @@ function codeFilterMatchesChangedPaths(workflow: CiWorkflow, paths: string[]): b
   });
 }
 
+function installerHashTrustViolations(workflow: CiWorkflow): string[] {
+  const steps = workflow.jobs["check-hash"]?.steps ?? [];
+  const baseCheckout = steps.find(
+    (step) => step.name === "Checkout base-trusted installer hash action",
+  );
+  const prCheck = steps.find(
+    (step) => step.name === "Verify pull request installer hashes from base-trusted code",
+  );
+  const allowedExecutors = new Set([
+    "./.trusted-installer-hash/.github/actions/ci-installer-hash-check",
+    "./.github/actions/ci-installer-hash-check",
+  ]);
+
+  return [
+    ...(baseCheckout ? [] : ["missing base-trusted installer hash checkout"]),
+    ...(baseCheckout?.uses === trustedCheckoutAction
+      ? []
+      : ["base-trusted installer hash checkout must use the pinned checkout action"]),
+    ...(baseCheckout?.with?.ref === "${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }}"
+      ? []
+      : ["base-trusted installer hash checkout must use the PR base SHA"]),
+    ...(baseCheckout?.with?.path === ".trusted-installer-hash"
+      ? []
+      : ["base-trusted installer hash checkout must use the trusted action path"]),
+    ...(prCheck?.if === "github.event_name == 'pull_request'" &&
+    prCheck.uses === "./.trusted-installer-hash/.github/actions/ci-installer-hash-check"
+      ? []
+      : ["pull request installer hashes must use only the base-trusted action"]),
+    ...steps.flatMap((step) => [
+      ...(step.uses === "./.github/actions/ci-installer-hash-check" &&
+      step.if !== "github.event_name != 'pull_request'"
+        ? ["installer hash action from the latest PR commit must not execute for pull requests"]
+        : []),
+      ...(step.uses?.includes("ci-installer-hash-check") && !allowedExecutors.has(step.uses)
+        ? [`unapproved installer hash executor: ${step.uses}`]
+        : []),
+    ]),
+  ];
+}
+
 describe("pull request and main workflow contracts", () => {
   const prWorkflow = readYaml<CiWorkflow>(".github/workflows/pr.yaml");
   const mainWorkflow = readYaml<CiWorkflow>(".github/workflows/main.yaml");
   const dcoWorkflow = readYaml<CiWorkflow>(".github/workflows/dco-check.yaml");
   const installerHashWorkflow = readYaml<CiWorkflow>(".github/workflows/installer-hash-check.yaml");
+
   const installerHashAction = readYaml<InstallerHashAction>(
     ".github/actions/ci-installer-hash-check/action.yaml",
   );
@@ -313,84 +349,59 @@ describe("pull request and main workflow contracts", () => {
     ),
   };
 
-  it("fails closed when the immutable installer hash bootstrap expiry is mutated", () => {
-    const expiryStep = requiredWorkflowStep(
-      installerHashWorkflow.jobs["check-hash"],
-      "Enforce immutable installer hash bootstrap expiry",
+  // source-shape-contract: security -- PR base SHA action execution prevents pull-request code from authorizing installer hashes
+  it("executes pull request installer hash checks only from the PR base SHA", () => {
+    expect(installerHashTrustViolations(installerHashWorkflow)).toEqual([]);
+
+    const headCheckout = structuredClone(installerHashWorkflow);
+    requiredWorkflowStep(
+      headCheckout.jobs["check-hash"],
+      "Checkout base-trusted installer hash action",
+    ).with = {
+      ref: "${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}",
+      path: ".trusted-installer-hash",
+    };
+
+    const missingBaseCheckout = structuredClone(installerHashWorkflow);
+    missingBaseCheckout.jobs["check-hash"].steps = missingBaseCheckout.jobs[
+      "check-hash"
+    ].steps?.filter((step) => step.name !== "Checkout base-trusted installer hash action");
+
+    const mutableExecutor = structuredClone(installerHashWorkflow);
+    requiredWorkflowStep(
+      mutableExecutor.jobs["check-hash"],
+      "Verify pull request installer hashes from base-trusted code",
+    ).uses = "./.github/actions/ci-installer-hash-check";
+
+    const bootstrapExecutor = structuredClone(installerHashWorkflow);
+    bootstrapExecutor.jobs["check-hash"].steps?.push({
+      name: "Run installer hash bootstrap",
+      uses: "./.bootstrap-installer-hash/.github/actions/ci-installer-hash-check",
+    });
+
+    const prOnlyLocalExecutor = structuredClone(installerHashWorkflow);
+    prOnlyLocalExecutor.jobs["check-hash"].steps?.push({
+      name: "Run local installer hash action for pull requests",
+      if: "github.event_name == 'pull_request'",
+      uses: "./.github/actions/ci-installer-hash-check",
+    });
+
+    expect(installerHashTrustViolations(headCheckout)).toContain(
+      "base-trusted installer hash checkout must use the PR base SHA",
     );
-    const expired = runWorkflowShellStep(
-      {
-        ...expiryStep,
-        run: expiryStep.run?.replace(installerHashBootstrapExpiresAt, "2000-12-27T23:26:13Z"),
-      },
-      {},
+    expect(installerHashTrustViolations(missingBaseCheckout)).toContain(
+      "missing base-trusted installer hash checkout",
     );
-    const malformedExpiry = runWorkflowShellStep(
-      {
-        ...expiryStep,
-        run: expiryStep.run?.replace(installerHashBootstrapExpiresAt, "not-a-canonical-utc-date"),
-      },
-      {},
+    expect(installerHashTrustViolations(mutableExecutor)).toContain(
+      "pull request installer hashes must use only the base-trusted action",
     );
-    const mutableRef = runWorkflowShellStep(
-      {
-        ...expiryStep,
-        run: expiryStep.run?.replace(installerHashBootstrapCommit, "main"),
-      },
-      {},
+    expect(installerHashTrustViolations(bootstrapExecutor)).toContain(
+      "unapproved installer hash executor: ./.bootstrap-installer-hash/.github/actions/ci-installer-hash-check",
     );
-    const valid = runWorkflowShellStep(expiryStep, {});
-
-    expect(valid.status).toBe(0);
-    expect(valid.stdout).toContain("remains valid");
-    expect(expired.status).not.toBe(0);
-    expect(expired.stderr).toContain("expired at 2000-12-27T23:26:13Z");
-    expect(expired.stderr).toContain("Remove the bootstrap fallback");
-    expect(malformedExpiry.status).not.toBe(0);
-    expect(malformedExpiry.stderr).toContain("expiry configuration is invalid");
-    expect(mutableRef.status).not.toBe(0);
-    expect(mutableRef.stderr).toContain("refusing the fallback");
-  });
 
-  it("fails closed when the immutable installer hash bootstrap tree differs", () => {
-    const treeStep = requiredWorkflowStep(
-      installerHashWorkflow.jobs["check-hash"],
-      "Verify immutable installer hash bootstrap tree",
-    );
-    const fakeBin = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "nemoclaw-bootstrap-git-"));
-    const fakeGit = join(fakeBin, "git");
-    writeFileSync(
-      fakeGit,
-      [
-        "#!/bin/sh",
-        'case "$*" in',
-        '  *"HEAD^{tree}"*) printf \'%s\\n\' "${FAKE_TREE}" ;;',
-        `  *) printf '%s\\n' ${installerHashBootstrapCommit} ;;`,
-        "esac",
-      ].join("\n"),
-      { mode: 0o755 },
+    expect(installerHashTrustViolations(prOnlyLocalExecutor)).toContain(
+      "installer hash action from the latest PR commit must not execute for pull requests",
     );
-
-    try {
-      const env = {
-        GITHUB_WORKSPACE: tmpdir(),
-        PATH: `${fakeBin}:${process.env.PATH ?? ""}`,
-      };
-      const valid = runWorkflowShellStep(treeStep, {
-        ...env,
-        FAKE_TREE: installerHashBootstrapTree,
-      });
-      const mismatch = runWorkflowShellStep(treeStep, {
-        ...env,
-        FAKE_TREE: "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
-      });
-
-      expect(valid.status).toBe(0);
-      expect(mismatch.status).not.toBe(0);
-      expect(mismatch.stderr).toContain("does not match the reviewed tree");
-    } finally {
-      rmSync(fakeBin, { recursive: true, force: true });
-    }
   });
 
   it("validates CLI shard inputs before using them in shell commands", () => {
diff --git a/test/reviewed-npm-audit-workflow.test.ts b/test/reviewed-npm-audit-workflow.test.ts
index b2352442b1a..8ed51c8fbd2 100644
--- a/test/reviewed-npm-audit-workflow.test.ts
+++ b/test/reviewed-npm-audit-workflow.test.ts
@@ -41,13 +41,6 @@ type Workflow = {
 };
 
 const REPO_ROOT = path.join(import.meta.dirname, "..");
-const BOOTSTRAP_SHA = "0c7dd29394d2c4db660c4d09f3654c0789e200d0";
-// Removal condition: delete the PR-6830 fork bootstrap after this PR merges and
-// the base branch contains the schema-v2 reviewed npm audit action.
-const BOOTSTRAP_IF =
-  "${{ steps.trusted-reviewed-npm-audit.outputs.available != 'true' && github.event.pull_request.number == 6830 && github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name == 'HOYALIM/NemoClaw' }}";
-const REJECT_UNAVAILABLE_IF =
-  "${{ steps.trusted-reviewed-npm-audit.outputs.available != 'true' && (github.event.pull_request.number != 6830 || github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name != 'HOYALIM/NemoClaw') }}";
 const DOMEXCEPTION_INTEGRITY =
   "sha512-tlc/FcYIv5i8RYsl2iDil4A0gOihaas1R5jPcIC4Zw3GhjKsVilw90aHcVlhZPTBLGBzd379S+VcnsDjd9ChiA==";
 
diff --git a/tools/growth-guardrails/workflow-boundary.mts b/tools/growth-guardrails/workflow-boundary.mts
index fbd82888e9f..588b0242b17 100644
--- a/tools/growth-guardrails/workflow-boundary.mts
+++ b/tools/growth-guardrails/workflow-boundary.mts
@@ -53,21 +53,17 @@ const APPROVED_STEP_SHAPES = [
     name: "Check out the trusted base revision",
     sha256: "4ec2659f39a08af0cb6abf60ab63a6732ab2375f538fc5b80601d566fdbcbc5a",
   },
-  {
-    name: "Detect guardrail tools on the base revision",
-    sha256: "f10b24b97320e991cc060be9f5e98bda2705abd8d0814da123cfd5ca8672a442",
-  },
   {
     name: "Install trusted dependencies",
-    sha256: "bf5757db70862f1e068748855d97ab5ae6a4a43ebd7ed812baa9f45269bdf6c3",
+    sha256: "2388fa3f5694ed0db8df96bf5f2bbcc3f377d5fe66e433b32d0ef71e88d0f362",
   },
   {
     name: "Require changed test files to stay within size budget",
-    sha256: "eec9020e81cf9d972592cc3129f6656ec0d46618623fb368674e8e823d8c1457",
+    sha256: "5d631c12f457e947bd7bd83447ab2a294cbe4d8430dbed4e92d09d7f7594dd3b",
   },
   {
     name: "Require changed test files not to add if statements",
-    sha256: "9aa363162eb2dc6740d9a27c52e6171b2a5587017eb039773a0f4ee0b32f8cde",
+    sha256: "991a7036d27aeb45fde2f3178936fba6ac87b90200b79c933015f9d63525d3cf",
   },
 ] as const;