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feat(spec): add Siacoin chain spec - #197
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🤖 Spec pipeline started on PR open — running Phase 8 → 11. Results post here as comments. View run |
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Phase 8 — smart-router boot + method probe (resumable pipeline run, Phases 8–11)
Method Probe Report — sc (Siacoin)Generated: 2026-10-20T15:44:57Z
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| variant | spec graph loaded | imports resolved | verification definitions well-formed | boot outcome | evidence (log excerpt) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SC | YES | n/a (imports: []) |
YES (no Bad verification definition) |
Router booted, listened on 0.0.0.0:3360, entered "ready for requests"; placeholder upstream then failed the chain-id verification (404 from siascan's unprefixed routes) and was excluded → provider pool empty / No pairings available on a live request. This is the expected degraded outcome, not a spec defect. |
{"level":"info","endpoints":"SC:rest Network Address:0.0.0.0:3360","message":"RPCSmartRouter Listening"} / {"level":"info","message":"RPCSmartRouter done setting up all endpoints, ready for requests"} / {"level":"warn","error":"...404 page not found...","verification":"chain-id","message":"failed verification on provider startup"} |
| SCT | YES | YES — imports: ["SC"] resolved cleanly, no spec not found for chainId |
YES (overridden chain-id verification for SCT ran, referencing chainID:SCT, not Bad verification definition) |
Identical shape to SC: router booted and listened on 0.0.0.0:3360 (mapped 3460), placeholder upstream failed the SCT chain-id check and was excluded → no live request attempted (not needed to prove spec-load). |
{"level":"info","endpoints":"SCT:rest Network Address:0.0.0.0:3360","message":"RPCSmartRouter Listening"} / {"level":"warn","error":"...404 page not found...","chainID":"SCT",...,"verification":"chain-id","message":"failed verification on provider startup"} |
No occurrence in either container's full log of: failed to load any specs, spec not found for chainId, Bad verification definition, panic, fatal, duplicate. The only invalid/error lines present are the expected per-provider invalid Verification on provider startup / provider validation failed — excluding from provider list, both caused by the placeholder's 404s, not by a malformed spec.
Parse-directive & verification runtime check (Step 3.5)
| Check | Verdict | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| GET_BLOCKNUM (router latest_block) | NOT_EXERCISED | No metric emitted for smartrouter_latest_block / lava_rpcsmartrouter_latest_block; log shows "no direct RPC endpoints to initialize ChainTrackers" — the chain tracker never starts because the sole static provider never passed verification. Expected with a dead placeholder upstream, not a spec defect. |
| GET_BLOCK_BY_NUM (log hash-reads ∥ fetch_block counters) | NOT_EXERCISED | Same cause — no healthy provider, so the tracker never ran. |
| Parse-signature log lines | none | PARSE_SIG grep (failed to parse response / formatResponseForParsing / ParseBlockHashFromReplyAndDecode / CraftChainMessage / Failed parsing default value / blockParsing / expected parsed hashes length / tried decoding a hex response / failed to parse generic parser path / failed to unmarshal result) returned zero matches on either container. |
| Verification | Verdict | Providers OK/failed | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| chain-id | FAIL (against placeholder only) | 0/1 | sc-upstream-1 / sc-testnet-upstream-1 (https://api.siascan.com) returned 404 ("404 page not found") for /api/consensus/index/0 — siascan's explorer API has no /api prefix, so this is an upstream-shape mismatch with a known-dead placeholder, not a spec expected_value defect. No real walletd upstream was available to validate the chain-id verification's function_template/expected_value against. |
| index-mode | NOT_EXERCISED | 0/0 | Never attempted — the sole provider was already excluded by the failing chain-id check before index-mode could run. |
Addon & extension coverage (Step 1c)
ADDONS: none declared. Both inventories are empty:
jq -r '[.. | objects | .add_on? // empty] | map(select(. != "")) | unique[]' sc.json→[]jq -r '[.. | objects | .extension? // empty] | map(select(. != null and . != "")) | unique[]' sc.json→[]
No addon/extension coverage table is applicable.
Method probe (Step 4) — NOT_TESTABLE, no upstream
All 29 apis declared under SC (and inherited by SCT) are reported NOT_TESTABLE except the one stateful api, which is SKIP (stateful) regardless of upstream availability. (Note: the dispatch brief estimated 8 stateful apis; a direct jq check of .category.stateful over every api in sc.json found exactly 1 — /api/txpool/broadcast — the rest are a mix of deterministic and non-deterministic but all stateful:0. The table below reflects the verified count.)
| Method | Classification | Upstream notes | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| /api/txpool/broadcast | SKIP (stateful) | — | would broadcast a transaction |
| /api/state, /api/consensus/network, /api/consensus/tip, /api/consensus/tipstate, /api/consensus/index/{height}, /api/consensus/blocks/{id}, /api/consensus/checkpoint/{id}, /api/consensus/updates/{index}, /api/txpool/transactions, /api/txpool/fee, /api/txpool/events, /api/addresses/{addr}/balance, /api/addresses/{addr}/events, /api/addresses/{addr}/events/unconfirmed, /api/addresses/{addr}/outputs/siacoin, /api/addresses/{addr}/outputs/siafund, /api/outputs/siacoin/{id}, /api/outputs/siacoin/{id}/spent, /api/outputs/siafund/{id}, /api/outputs/siafund/{id}/spent, /api/events/{id}, /api/txpool/parents, /api/txpool/transactions/v2/basis, /api/batch/addresses/balance, /api/batch/addresses/events, /api/batch/addresses/outputs/siacoin, /api/batch/addresses/outputs/siafund, /api/check/addresses (28 apis) | NOT_TESTABLE | No usable walletd upstream exists (see top section); no provider ever passed verification, so these were never probed through the router. Not a FAIL, not a SKIP, not an UNPROBED-under-rate-limit — there was nothing to probe against. |
Log-scan findings (probe window)
Not run — Step 4 (the probe loop) never executed, so there is no probe window to scan. The only non-benign warn/error lines observed anywhere in either container's lifetime are the expected per-provider verification failures against the placeholder ("[-] verify failed sending chainMessage", "invalid Verification on provider startup", "provider validation failed — excluding from provider list"), all attributable to https://api.siascan.com not being walletd — not router/spec-level findings.
Testnet verification pass (Step 7)
TESTNET_VERIFY: NOT_TESTABLE (no testnet upstream)
The spec-load boot for SCT (above) proves imports: ["SC"] resolves and the SCT-overridden chain-id verification definition is well-formed and loadable. The live verification outcome cannot be assessed because no testnet walletd upstream exists — the same placeholder-driven 404/exclusion seen on mainnet occurred here too.
| Verification | Verdict | Providers OK/failed | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| chain-id (SCT expected_value) | NOT_TESTABLE (live) / well-formed (load-time) | 0/1 | Ran against placeholder, got 404 (shape mismatch, not a value mismatch) — no real upstream to confirm the expected_value itself. |
| index-mode | NOT_EXERCISED | 0/0 | Never reached — same reason as mainnet. |
Empirical block time (Step 8)
Not measured in this phase — no upstream to query. The PR body already records an explorer-derived measurement from a prior run, cited here as prior-run evidence only, NOT a Phase-8 measurement:
| Network | RPC | Empirical (ms) | Spec effective (ms) | Drift | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| mainnet | (explorer-derived, prior run) | 595818 | 600000 | ~0.7% | OK (prior-run evidence, not re-measured here) |
| testnet (Zen) | (explorer-derived, prior run) | 606392 | 600000 | ~1.1% | OK (prior-run evidence, not re-measured here) |
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Phase 9 — parallel reviewers (3 independent
Three distinct reports confirmed on disk (distinct md5s, shared All three ran with the Phase-8 constraint in hand (no public walletd endpoint ⇒ every api Merged gapsMEDIUM (unanimous — all 3 reviewers, independently) —
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| api | deterministic |
|---|---|
/api/addresses/{addr}/events |
true ← the outlier |
/api/addresses/{addr}/events/unconfirmed |
false |
/api/addresses/{addr}/balance |
false |
/api/addresses/{addr}/outputs/siacoin |
false |
/api/addresses/{addr}/outputs/siafund |
false |
/api/batch/addresses/events (sc.json:493, its own batch form) |
false |
Verified against walletd v2.15.2 source by reviewer 1: addressesAddrEventsHandlerGET (api/server.go:1350) → wm.AddressEvents(addr, offset, limit) and batchAddressesEventsHandlerPOST (api/server.go:1509) → wm.BatchAddressEvents(...) return the same class of data with the same pagination semantics, so no technical property distinguishes them.
Impact: QoS/data-reliability only — not correctness, not boot, not block tracking. A tip-dependent query marked deterministic: true can produce spurious reliability mismatches between two honest providers synced to slightly different tip heights.
Reviewers disagreed on direction: reviewer 1 suggested raising the batch form to true; reviewers 2 and 3 framed the singular as the outlier to lower. Resolved in Phase 10 — see that comment.
MINOR (dropped from the fix list per Phase-10 consolidation rules, recorded here for the reviewer)
/api/check/addressesparsing may not match its semantics (reviewer 2,sc.json:528) — currentlyblock_parsing: DEFAULT/latest,deterministic: false. If the route is pure address-format validation with no chain-state dependency, the guide's rule would call forblock_parsing: EMPTY+deterministic: true(the bucket/api/consensus/networkalready uses). Could not be confirmed either way with no live walletd and no API docs — flagged for confirmation, not asserted as a defect.- No
timeout_mson the four/api/batch/addresses/*POST routes (reviewer 3,sc.json:467-526) — each accepts up to 1000 addresses with a per-address sqlite lookup. Not a convention violation at their 60-CU tier (kaspa.json's same-tier/transactions/searchcarries none either), so a soft suggestion only. - Cross-chain determinism convention note (reviewer 3) —
kaspa.jsonmarks its balance-equivalenttruewheresc.jsonusesfalse; the catalog is not uniform on this axis. Informational, no action.
Confirmed correct by all three (no findings)
API coverage complete and HTTP-method-accurate against the walletd v2.15.2 binary source (21 GET + 8 POST); both parse directives (GET_BLOCKNUM → /api/consensus/tip, GET_BLOCK_BY_NUM → /api/consensus/index/{height} with PARSE_DICTIONARY_OR_ORDERED) verified correct at source level; network params; the genesis-block-id chain-id verification (a sound substitute for a node with no native chain-id RPC) plus the index-mode check; SC → SCT inheritance correctly minimal; CU tiering consistent; removed-field guard clean; no routing collisions; archive/pruning/GET_EARLIEST_BLOCK triplet consistently all-absent.
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Phase 10 — gap synthesis + fix pass, and Phase 10b — smoke re-probe Consolidation
Nothing was stripped by the disable-suggestion filter because no reviewer proposed a disable — all three correctly read the Phase-8
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| Gate | Result |
|---|---|
jq validity |
exit 0 |
check_method_schema.sh |
PASS — 29/29 apis schema ok, FAIL section empty |
check_unused_fields.sh |
PASS (no removed fields) — none of the 15 fields removed in smart-router #218 are present; envelope is still { "proposal": { "specs": [ … ] } } |
check_hanging_api.sh |
PASS — no FAIL rows (new chain, so no --base) |
check_stateful.sh |
PASS — no FAIL rows |
check_disabled_count.sh |
PASS (report only) — 0 distinct disabled methods, matching the body marker |
compute_units remains the only compute-unit input, and no category.subscription exists anywhere (this spec has no subscription methods at all — zero FUNCTION_TAG_SUBSCRIBE directives).
Phase 10b — smoke re-probe: SMOKE: OK
Still no usable upstream, so this was the same degraded shape as Phase 8: re-boot both variants against the fixed spec and check the one thing a one-field edit could plausibly break — the router's spec-graph load.
| Variant | SPEC_LOAD |
Evidence |
|---|---|---|
SC |
OK | "chain_id":"SC","total_specs_loaded":"304","message":"Successfully loaded and expanded spec from aggregated sources" |
SCT |
OK | "chain_id":"SCT","total_specs_loaded":"304" with both SC and SCT in the loaded spec_ids — imports: ["SC"] resolves, and the overridden chainID:"SCT" verification is still well-formed and loadable |
No panic / fatal / failed to load any specs / spec not found for chainId / Bad verification definition / duplicate in either log. No new log signature versus Phase 8 — both boots reproduced the identical expected placeholder-upstream 404 on chain-id verification and nothing else.
PARSE: NOT_TESTABLE · VERIFY: NOT_TESTABLE · ADDONS: none declared · all 7 smoke items NOT_TESTABLE (no upstream). A NOT_TESTABLE item cannot regress, so none of these counts against the fix.
jq re-confirms only the intended field moved: /api/addresses/{addr}/events det=false, every other address-indexed row false, no other deterministic value touched. Both containers torn down.
The fixed
sc.jsonis left uncommitted in the working tree, as this run's contract requires — a later workflow step commits and pushes it to the PR branch.
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Phase 11 — final reviewer verdict: ✅ APPROVED
A fresh-context reviewer re-ran What the final pass verified
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Phase 12 — closing summary checklist (tail of Phase 11; this pipeline run covered Phases 8–11) Auto-decisions taken on this unattended run
Run stats — this pipeline run only (Phases 8–11)These figures cover only Phases 8–11, run as a separate workflow run. The Phases 1–7 time and tokens live in the State left behind
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Auto-committed by spec_pipeline.yml after the Phase-10 fix pass. Run: https://github.com/Magma-Devs/lava-specs/actions/runs/39449391722
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📦 Committed pipeline fixes to |
Remove the index-mode verification (GET /api/state, indexMode == "full"). omer asked to support both index modes (MAG-2968 comment 30546), and the decision to accept personal-mode nodes was made on 2026-10-29. SCT inherited the check from SC, so it goes away on both networks. Index mode "none" is now accepted as well. The chain-id verification (genesis block at height 0) stays. It still refuses nodes started from a checkpoint. Personal-mode risk: a personal node answers 200 with a zero balance for any address it does not track, so Kraken must add every address on every node. Tested with smart-router v1.6.2 against walletd v2.15.2 on zen: - before: personal-mode node refused (index-mode got "personal", want "full") - after: personal-mode node accepted; an untracked funded address reads 0 - after: full-mode node still accepted; the same address reads 1,356,000,020 SC Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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/rerun-from 8 |
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🤖 Command acknowledged — running Phase 8 → 11. Progress and results post here as comments. View run |
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Phase 8 — smart-router boot + method probe (resumable run, Phases 8–11 · re-validating head
Method Probe Report — scGenerated: 2026-10-29T10:46:50Z Why Branch BPer the orchestrator brief and this run's own endpoint research (below), no publicly reachable Endpoint research (this run, 2026-10-29)Bounded search (~15 min) for a reachable public walletd instance, mainnet and/or Zen testnet.
Conclusion: re-confirms the prior 2026-10-20 pipeline run's known-negative finding. No ws/wss upstream was sought or required: the spec's only Spec-graph load + boot sequence (both variants)Config shape: one
Explicit answer to the orchestrator's question: the one remaining verification ( Parse-directive & verification runtime check (Step 3.5)
Addon & extension coverage (Step 1c)
Method probe (Step 4)Not run as a true probe loop (no upstream to probe against). For evidence, 2 representative All 28 non-stateful apis are marked NOT_TESTABLE (no upstream; see evidence above), and
Log-scan findings (probe window)No Testnet verification pass (Step 7)TESTNET_VERIFY: NOT_TESTABLE — same no-upstream reason as mainnet. Positive evidence obtained:
Empirical block time (Step 8)Not measured — no upstream. walletd's
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Phase 9 — parallel reviewers (3 independent
Merged gaps: none. All three fresh-context reviewers returned zero CRITICAL, zero MEDIUM Anti-collision check passed: the three reports have distinct What each pass independently confirmed
Context carried into the reviewsEach reviewer read |
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Phase 10 — gap synthesis + fix pass, and Phase 10b — smoke re-probe · head Consolidation
All three Phase 9 reviewers returned Fix pass — no edit applied
Phase 10a — post-fix static gates (run regardless)
Governance-field guard: an explicit scan for all 15 fields removed in smart-router #218 — Phase 10b — smoke re-probe:
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| Boot check | SC (3360/7779) | SCT (3460/7879) |
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RPCSmartRouter Listening + ready for requests |
present | present |
Fatal signatures (failed to load any specs, spec not found for chainId, Bad verification definition, duplicate, panic, fatal) |
none | none |
| Spec load | total_specs_loaded: 304 |
total_specs_loaded: 304, spec_ids includes SCT |
imports: ["SC"] resolution |
— | OK — SCT's chain-id override carries only expected_value (172fb3d5…) and correctly inherits SC's parse_directive (/api/consensus/index/0) |
chain-id definition well-formed/loadable |
OK | OK |
Post-fix verdicts: PARSE: NOT_TESTABLE · VERIFY: NOT_TESTABLE · TESTNET_VERIFY: NOT_TESTABLE
· ADDONS: none declared. All seven probe items came back NOT_TESTABLE (no provider), matching
Phase 8 row-for-row.
Why no regression was structurally possible at the probe level, stated plainly: nothing was
PASS or TESTED_OK in Phase 8, because no public walletd upstream exists. So the comparison
rules had no classification that could regress. What this pass did establish is the part that
is still meaningful without an upstream — the spec continues to load and boot cleanly in the
router on both variants, with no fatal or Bad verification definition signature in either
container's full log, and SCT's inheritance intact. The placeholder upstream's chain-id failure
(404 page not found from the siascan explorer's un-prefixed routes) is an upstream URL-shape
mismatch, identical to Phase 8, and is not a defect in the spec's expected_value.
Log scan of the probe window: no panic/fatal and no non-benign errors. Five lines matched the
literal string 429 but all were false positives (GUIDs/timestamps containing that digit run);
no actual HTTP 429 occurred on either container. Both containers torn down; no sr_sc*
containers remain.
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Phase 11 — final reviewer verdict: ✅ APPROVED · head
A fresh-context reviewer re-ran Stale-state sanity check passed: the highest line number the report cites is 561, inside What the final pass covered
Scope of the verdict — read this alongside the approvalThis APPROVED verdict is a static and boot-level judgement. Live method coverage was never The two genesis block ids pinned by the Re-validation outcome for the
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Phase 12 — closing summary checklist (tail of Phase 11; this pipeline run covered Phases 8–11 at head Honest status of this run
Auto-decisions taken (no human on this unattended run)
Run stats — this pipeline run only (Phases 8–11)These figures cover only this resumable run (Phases 8–11). They are not a Phases 1–11 grand |
Kraken calls it in production (MAG-2968 comment 30943). walletd serves it as a public route (wrapPublicAuthHandler in api/server.go, v2.15.2), so it needs no walletd password, like every other route in this spec. It returns the peer list of whichever node the router picks: deterministic false, stateful 0, DEFAULT latest, and CU 10 like /api/txpool/fee. SCT inherits it from SC. Tested with smart-router v1.6.2 against our walletd v2.15.2 nodes: on mainnet and zen it answers 200 through the router, the same as calling walletd directly. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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/rerun-from 8 |
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🤖 Command acknowledged — running Phase 8 → 11. Progress and results post here as comments. View run |
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Phase 8 — smart-router boot + method probe (resumable run, Phases 8–11 · re-validating head
Method Probe Report — scGenerated: 2026-11-01T14:44:08Z Endpoint research (crux of this run)Two prior pipeline runs on this PR (2026-10-20, 2026-10-29) concluded no public walletd instance exists for Siacoin mainnet or Zen testnet. This run independently re-confirmed that conclusion with a fresh, time-boxed search (~10 minutes):
Conclusion: re-confirmed — no reachable walletd upstream exists. Proceeding with the conservative fallback: router spec-graph load boots only, no method probing, no verification-pass (beyond observing it execute and fail solely on connection-refused), no block-time measurement. Spec-graph load boot (SC)Docker: image was genuinely missing locally and was pulled fresh ( Config Boot log evidence (
SPEC_LOAD (SC): OK Spec-graph load boot (SCT)Config Boot log evidence (
SPEC_LOAD (SCT): OK Both containers ( Parse-directive & verification runtime check (Step 3.5)No chain tracker cycles ran (no healthy provider →
Addon & extension coverage (Step 1c + probes)ADDONS: none declared. Per-method table (all 30 methods — NOT_TESTABLE, no reachable upstream)
Deliberately absent from the spec (not findings, not missing coverage — confirmed on-purpose per the triggering comment): Log-scan findings (probe window)No method probe loop ran (no reachable upstream to probe through), so there is no probe-window log scan. The only warn/error lines in either boot's log are the expected per-retry
Testnet verification pass (Step 7)TESTNET_VERIFY: NOT_TESTABLE (no reachable walletd upstream for either network; see Endpoint research above). The SCT load boot (above) did execute the
Empirical block time (Step 8)BLOCK_TIME: mainnet=skipped testnet=skipped No recipe applies regardless of upstream availability: walletd's
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Phase 9 — parallel reviewers (3 independent
Integrity checks: all three reports landed at their own numbered paths (no shared-path write), all three md5 digests differ (no reviewer wrote another's path), and every evidence line reference falls inside No CRITICAL findings from any reviewer. Reviewers 1 and 3 found the spec clean. Reviewer 2's merged gaps: MEDIUM 1 —
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Phase 10 — gap synthesis + fix pass, and Phase 10b — smoke re-probe · head Consolidation
Reviewers 1 and 3 returned no findings, so the merged CRITICAL+MEDIUM set is reviewer 2's, deduplicated. Both applied items target the same api entry. Fixes applied (uncommitted in the working tree — a later workflow step commits them)
Auto-decisions at this phase (no human on this run)
Phase 10a — post-fix static gates (all PASS, empty FAIL sections)
The envelope remains the canonical Phase 10b — smoke re-probe: ✅
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Phase 11 — final reviewer verdict: ✅ APPROVED · head
A fresh-context reviewer re-ran What the final pass verified
MINOR carried forward (non-blocking, no change made)
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Phase 12 — closing summary checklist (tail of Phase 11; this pipeline run covered Phases 8–11 at head Auto-decisions made in this run (no human available — all recorded)
Working tree
Run stats — this pipeline run only (Phases 8–11)These figures cover only Phases 8–11 of this resumable run. The Phases 1–7 research and drafting ran in a separate |
Auto-committed by spec_pipeline.yml after the Phase-10 fix pass. Run: https://github.com/Magma-Devs/lava-specs/actions/runs/41317246815
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📦 Committed pipeline fixes to |
Live parse +
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| Check | Result |
|---|---|
Spec loads; SCT → SC import resolves |
PASS for both |
GET_BLOCKNUM (/api/consensus/tip → .height) reads a live mainnet tip |
PASS: latestBlock=600063, same as siascan |
Requests through the router: /api/consensus/tip, /api/consensus/index/0 |
200, bodies identical to siascan |
chain-id on SC (smartrouter health): /api/consensus/index/0 → .id == 25f6e3b9…26e81c |
PASS |
Negative control: chain-id on SCT against mainnet data |
FAIL, as it should: expected 172fb3d5…, got 25f6e3b9…. The check really compares values, and SCT inherits SC's directive and overrides only the expected value. |
The router never calls /api/state |
Confirmed: the index-mode check is gone, as intended in a299510 |
Not covered by this run
- walletd's own routes: the other 28 methods, including the customer's 8 GETs and
POST /api/txpool/broadcast. They're covered by the manual walletd v2.15.2 run recorded in the PR body ("Update 2026-11-01"). That run was on an earlier head, and the only change since is the compute-units bump onGET /api/consensus/updates/{index}, which doesn't change routing. SCTagainst a real Zen node.
🤖 Generated with Claude Code
Merge-readiness review at head
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| Route | sc.json |
Why its answer changes (walletd v2.15.2) |
|---|---|---|
GET /api/events/{id} |
341 | scanEvent sets Confirmations = 1 + scanHeight - ev.Index.Height (persist/sqlite/events.go:120). The body changes every block, and between nodes indexed to different heights. The customer calls this route (MAG-2968 comment 30943). |
GET /api/outputs/siacoin/{id} |
281 | Returns unspent outputs only, so the answer changes once the output is spent. |
GET /api/outputs/siafund/{id} |
311 | Same as above. |
GET /api/consensus/blocks/{id} |
101 | A numeric id is resolved as a height through cm.BestIndex(height) (api/server.go:256), so near the tip a reorg changes the answer. A block-ID id is stable. If you'd rather keep true here, say so in the body. |
Why it matters: with deterministic: true, cross-validation treats honest nodes a block apart as disagreeing.
Fix: set these to false, or say in the body why each one stays true.
2. Open question: The customer's sync mode against the genesis pin. The chain-id check on /api/consensus/index/0 (sc.json:384-404) refuses a checkpoint-synced walletd, which answers 404 there. The PR body (lines 73-81) calls that the intended failure mode. The customer was asked (MAG-2968 comment 30967), and Omer's answer on 11-01 (comment 31001) was "It might be checkpoint and might be first block". That answer came after the body's last update.
If the customer's nodes were started from a checkpoint, the router refuses all of them and every customer call fails. Unlike index mode, auth and wallet routes, the pin has no owner decision recorded.
Clears when: The customer confirms its nodes synced from the first block, or Omer signs off on the pin as it is.
Not yet tested at this head
- Real walletd at
1792a3a. The run against a real walletd (router v1.6.2) was at3b75f23, before Phase 10 changed the CU and the deterministic flag. My run on1792a3aused a siascan shim and covered onlyGET_BLOCKNUM,chain-idand two routes. To settle it: rerun the customer's call list from the body against the team's walletd node at1792a3a. - SCT against a real Zen node, including the
POSTcollection it inherits fromSC(broadcast).
Non-blocking: for the reviewer, and before the customer goes live
- Mempool and peer reads can be served 75 s stale when the router runs with a cache.
- The router doesn't use
deterministicto decide caching (see the comment atprotocol/rpcsmartrouter/node_bound_methods.go:21-26). It skips onlystatefulrequests and the names innodeBoundMethods, which coverstxpool_content,getmempoolinfo,statusand others but no walletd path. - So
/api/txpool/transactions,/api/txpool/events,/api/txpool/fee,/api/syncer/peersand/api/addresses/{addr}/events/unconfirmedare cached for 1/8 of the block time: 75 s at 600 s blocks (ecosystem/cache/core/policy.go:55). - The customer polls
/api/txpool/transactionsafter broadcasting. - The fix is on the router side, not in this spec: the walletd paths need adding to
nodeBoundMethods./api/stateand/api/consensus/networkare not affected; theirEMPTYparser makes themNOT_APPLICABLE, and those are never cached.
- The router doesn't use
- Paths the spec doesn't list are still relayed. The router's
defaultApiContainer(protocol/chainlib/base_chain_parser.go:518, reached fromrest.go:179) relays an unlisted REST path withdeterministic: true, CU 20 andlatest. So public walletd routes the omission table treats as excluded, such asGET /api/healthandPOST /api/syncer/broadcast/block, still go through. This is how the router handles every REST spec, but the deployment note only covers the password-gated routes. - Broadcast behaves differently on personal-mode nodes. walletd refreshes v2 broadcast proofs only on
fullindex nodes (api/server.go:477). The customer runsfull, so the impact is low, but the body doesn't say so. - The body is stale after Phase 10. The CU table says "7 @ 10, 19 @ 20, 4 @ 60" and lists
updatesat 20. The file now has 7 / 18 / 5.
Checked and fine
PARSE_DICTIONARY_OR_ORDERED ["height","=","0"]does read the height out of the REST path: the router loggedrequested_block=5for/api/consensus/index/5.SCTinheritsSC'schain-iddirective and overrides only the value: a mainnet node failsSCT's check, as it should.- Ticket coverage: an independent read of MAG-2968 (all 13 comments) found 12 obligations implemented, 1 deliberately deviated (wallet routes, documented) and 0 missing.
🤖 Generated with Claude Code
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Follow-up to the review above: the router-side caching gap (walletd mempool and peer reads cached for 75 s, because |
…(MAG-2968) avitenzer's review on PR #197: these answers change as the chain moves, so cross-validation would treat two honest nodes a block apart as disagreeing. - GET /api/events/{id}: the reply carries Confirmations = 1 + scanHeight - height (persist/sqlite/events.go:121, walletd v2.15.2). It grows every block and differs between nodes indexed to different heights. - GET /api/outputs/siacoin/{id}, GET /api/outputs/siafund/{id}: only unspent outputs are returned (persist/sqlite/utxo.go: spent_index_id IS NULL), so the answer changes once the output is spent. - GET /api/consensus/blocks/{id}, GET /api/consensus/checkpoint/{id}: a numeric id is read as a height through cm.BestIndex (api/server.go), so a reorg near the tip changes the answer. checkpoint/{id} was not in the review but takes the same code path. Tested with smart-router v1.6.4 against our walletd v2.15.2 nodes: Kraken's call list answers the same through the router as directly, on mainnet (SC) and on zen (SCT, including the POST broadcast route it inherits). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@avitenzer thanks. Addressed at Blocking
Not yet tested at this head: now tested (router v1.6.4, our walletd v2.15.2 nodes, at
Non-blocking
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/rerun-from 8 |
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🤖 Command acknowledged — running Phase 8 → 11. Progress and results post here as comments. View run |
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Phase 8 — smart-router boot + method probe (resumable run, Phases 8–11 · re-validating head
Method Probe Report — scGenerated: 2026-11-02T10:52:03Z This is the 4th consecutive pipeline run of Phase 8 on this chain (after heads a299510, 3b75f23, and the human reviewer's live-parse run at 1792a3a). This run replicates the prior conservative spec-graph-load methodology for both variants and adds the siascan-shim upgrade the human reviewer piloted, now re-run fresh at head f254bce (after the 5-route Endpoint re-confirmation (time-boxed, ~6 minutes)Re-confirmed, rather than relitigated, the settled conclusion that no public walletd instance exists for Siacoin mainnet or Zen:
Conclusion: re-confirmed, 4th consecutive run. Spec-graph load boot (SC) — conservative baseline, unreachable placeholder upstreamConfig Boot log evidence (
SPEC_LOAD (SC): OK Spec-graph load boot (SCT) — conservative baseline, unreachable placeholder upstreamConfig Boot log evidence (
SPEC_LOAD (SCT): OK Both boots were sequential on the same host ports, fresh container each time, torn down after capture. Shim upgrade — PARSE/VERIFY exercised live at head f254bceStatus: SUCCEEDED. Stood up a local test-only HTTP shim (
The router containers ran with SC against the mainnet shim (
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| Method | Classification | Upstream notes | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| GET /api/state | NOT_TESTABLE | — | no reachable walletd upstream |
| GET /api/consensus/network | NOT_TESTABLE | — | same |
| GET /api/consensus/tip | PASS (via test-only siascan shim — not a provider) | shim 127.0.0.1:8181/8182 | GET_BLOCKNUM directive; also NOT_TESTABLE against real walletd |
| GET /api/consensus/tipstate | NOT_TESTABLE | — | no reachable walletd upstream |
| GET /api/consensus/index/{height} | PASS (via test-only siascan shim — not a provider) | shim 127.0.0.1:8181/8182 | GET_BLOCK_BY_NUM directive + chain-id verification template; manual probe at height 500000 confirmed correct parsing; also NOT_TESTABLE against real walletd |
| GET /api/consensus/blocks/{id} | NOT_TESTABLE | — | no reachable walletd upstream |
| GET /api/consensus/checkpoint/{id} | NOT_TESTABLE | — | same |
| GET /api/consensus/updates/{index} | NOT_TESTABLE | — | same |
| GET /api/syncer/peers | NOT_TESTABLE | — | present on purpose (the customer's production usage, head 3b75f23); not probed here, not a defect |
| GET /api/txpool/transactions | NOT_TESTABLE | — | same |
| GET /api/txpool/fee | NOT_TESTABLE | — | same |
| GET /api/txpool/events | NOT_TESTABLE | — | same |
| GET /api/addresses/{addr}/balance | NOT_TESTABLE | — | same |
| GET /api/addresses/{addr}/events | NOT_TESTABLE | — | same |
| GET /api/addresses/{addr}/events/unconfirmed | NOT_TESTABLE | — | same |
| GET /api/addresses/{addr}/outputs/siacoin | NOT_TESTABLE | — | same |
| GET /api/addresses/{addr}/outputs/siafund | NOT_TESTABLE | — | same |
| GET /api/outputs/siacoin/{id} | NOT_TESTABLE | — | same |
| GET /api/outputs/siacoin/{id}/spent | NOT_TESTABLE | — | same |
| GET /api/outputs/siafund/{id} | NOT_TESTABLE | — | same |
| GET /api/outputs/siafund/{id}/spent | NOT_TESTABLE | — | same |
| GET /api/events/{id} | NOT_TESTABLE | — | same |
| POST /api/txpool/broadcast | SKIP | — | stateful: 1 — would broadcast a transaction; never probed regardless of upstream availability |
| POST /api/txpool/parents | NOT_TESTABLE | — | no reachable walletd upstream |
| POST /api/txpool/transactions/v2/basis | NOT_TESTABLE | — | same |
| POST /api/batch/addresses/balance | NOT_TESTABLE | — | same |
| POST /api/batch/addresses/events | NOT_TESTABLE | — | same |
| POST /api/batch/addresses/outputs/siacoin | NOT_TESTABLE | — | same |
| POST /api/batch/addresses/outputs/siafund | NOT_TESTABLE | — | same |
| POST /api/check/addresses | NOT_TESTABLE | — | same |
Counts: PASS=2 (directive routes, shim-only, not real coverage) FAIL=0 SKIP=1 UNPROBED=0 NOT_TESTABLE=27 WARN=0 TIMEOUT=0 LOG_WARN=0.
Deliberately absent from the spec (not findings — confirmed on-purpose settled decisions, see PR body): /api/wallets/* routes, authorization header directive / router auth config, index-mode verification.
Real walletd coverage of the other 28 methods, including the customer's 8 GETs and the broadcast POST, comes from the manual run the team posted on the PR (router v1.6.4 against walletd v2.15.2 at this commit f254bce — see PR body "Update 2026-11-02"): all answer through the router with the same status/body as calling walletd directly (syncer/peers differs only in live peer stats); a broadcast with an invalid body gets walletd's own 400; PUT gets the router's own 501; the password never appears in the router log. That run is out-of-band evidence from the team's private walletd nodes, not reproduced by this CI run.
Log-scan findings
No full probe-window log scan applies in the usual sense (no method-probe loop ran against a real upstream for the 28 non-directive methods). For the shim boots specifically: zero non-benign warn/error/fatal/panic lines beyond the expected verification-retry noise (connection-refused on the deliberately-unreachable placeholder boots; the expected mismatch message on the negative control). No fatal/panic lines in any boot.
| Level | Associated method | error excerpt |
|---|---|---|
| (none — clean) | — | — |
Testnet verification pass
TESTNET_VERIFY: OK (via test-only siascan shim — not a provider; only the 2 directive routes were served). SCT's chain-id verification passed against zen shim data with its own expected_value (172fb3d508c86ac628f93c3362ba60312251466c77d63a8c99ea87717e4112c3), and the negative control (SCT booted against mainnet shim data) correctly FAILED with expected 172fb3d5…, got 25f6e3b9… — proving the override is live, not vacuously accepted. Against a real Zen walletd node, this remains out-of-band (see PR body's "Update 2026-11-02" manual-run note, which covers SCT's full GET+POST surface against the team's real zen walletd).
| Verification | Verdict | Providers OK/failed | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| chain-id (SCT, positive, zen shim) | OK (shim) | 1/1 | expected_value matches zen genesis id exactly |
| chain-id (SCT, negative control, mainnet shim) | FAIL as expected (shim) | 0/1 | expected 172fb3d5…, got 25f6e3b9… — confirms the check compares real values |
| chain-id (SCT, unreachable placeholder) | NOT_TESTABLE (executed, connection-refused only) | 0/1 | baseline load-boot evidence, see above |
Empirical block time
BLOCK_TIME: mainnet=skipped testnet=skipped
No recipe applies regardless of upstream availability: walletd's /api/consensus/index/{height} response is {"height":…,"id":…} and carries no timestamp field, so there is no way to compute an empirical block interval from this API family even with a reachable node. The shim's upstream (api.siascan.com/consensus/tip) is likewise {height,id}-only with no timestamp exposed at that path. The PR body already documents an independent empirical corroboration of the 600000ms docs value (595818ms mainnet / 606392ms zen, measured via the siascan UI's displayed block timestamps over 1000 blocks on 2026-10-20, ≤1.1% drift) — not re-derived in this run since it requires a different siascan surface than the {height,id} shim serves.
Corroboration (not a probe) of the genesis-id chain-id values, reconfirmed this run:
| Network | Source | Returned id |
Matches sc.json expected_value |
|---|---|---|---|
| mainnet | https://api.siascan.com/consensus/tip/0 |
25f6e3b9295a61f69fcb956aca9f0076234ecf2e02d399db5448b6e22f26e81c |
yes, exact match |
| zen | https://api.siascan.com/zen/consensus/tip/0 |
172fb3d508c86ac628f93c3362ba60312251466c77d63a8c99ea87717e4112c3 |
yes, exact match |
| Network | RPC | Empirical (ms) | Spec effective (ms) | Drift | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| mainnet | — | - | 600000 | - | skipped (no timestamp field in walletd's consensus/index response) |
| testnet | — | - | 600000 | - | skipped (same reason) |
Diff vs head 3b75f23 (prior Phase 8 run's baseline)
| Change | Accepted by router? | Notes |
|---|---|---|
5 routes set deterministic: false (/api/events/{id}, /api/outputs/siacoin/{id}, /api/outputs/siafund/{id}, /api/consensus/blocks/{id}, /api/consensus/checkpoint/{id}) |
Yes, no complaint | sc.json loaded cleanly in both SC and SCT boots ("Successfully loaded and expanded spec from aggregated sources", no parse/schema error); deterministic is not itself verification-gated, so this surfaces only as clean spec-graph load, consistent with prior runs |
GET /api/consensus/updates/{index} compute_units raised to 60 |
Yes, no complaint | Same — CU values are not boot-time verified by the router; clean load is the full extent of what this phase can observe for a CU change |
Both changes are settled decisions per the PR body (avitenzer's review fix, addressed at f254bce) — not flagged as findings.
Settled decisions — not findings
Per the PR body's "Defaults — do NOT revert" section, the following are confirmed present/absent as intended and are NOT flagged: the genesis-block-id chain-id pin on /api/consensus/index/0 (refusing checkpoint-synced nodes is the intended failure mode); no index-mode verification; no /api/wallets/* routes; GET /api/syncer/peers present; no authorization header directive / router auth config; the 5 deterministic: false routes.
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Phase 9 — parallel reviewers (3 independent
Three distinct reports (distinct md5s — no shared-path collision), every evidence line number within Merged gapsMEDIUM — 1 (reviewer 3)
MINOR — 2 (reviewer 1), dropped from the fix list per the Phase 10 rule (MINOR is not fixed)
What all three agree on
The 1 MEDIUM goes to the Phase 10 fix pass. |
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Phase 10 — gap synthesis + fix pass, and Phase 10b — smoke re-probe · head Consolidation
Nothing needed stripping this run: no reviewer proposed disabling anything on probe evidence (all three read the 27 Fix applied (1 of 1)
Auto-decisions recorded (unattended run, conservative default taken at each gate):
Phase 10a — post-fix static gates
Phase 10b — smoke re-probe:
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| # | Probe | Result | Phase 8 | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | GET /api/consensus/tip (GET_BLOCKNUM, via shim) |
200 · height=600084 |
PASS · height=600083 |
PASS — chain advanced 1 block, as expected |
| 2 | GET /api/consensus/index/0 (chain-id route) |
200 · id=25f6e3b9… exact match |
PASS | PASS |
| 3 | GET /api/consensus/index/500000 (manual GET_BLOCK_BY_NUM) |
200 · id=0000…795af |
same value | PASS — byte-identical to Phase 8 |
| 4 | POST /api/txpool/transactions/v2/basis (the edited route) |
shim 501 (bare http.server implements GET only); router log shows a full relay_end with the shim upstream attempted, and zero CU-related log lines |
not probed | NOT_TESTABLE — the router accepted and routed the edited entry; no CU-related rejection |
SPEC_LOAD (SC): OK—spec_count=304,chain_id=SC, listener bound, nopanic/failed to load any specs/spec not found for chainId/Bad verification definition/ duplicate-api / invalid-parser signature.PARSE: OK(via test-only siascan shim — not a provider; only the 2 directive routes were served) —smartrouter_latest_block{spec="SC"}=600084, zero parse-signature lines.GET_BLOCK_BY_NUM's autonomous tracker cycle again did not fire inside the observation window (the poll cadence at a 600 s block time), so it is corroborated by the manual router-relayed probe in row 3 rather than by the tracker — same as Phase 8.VERIFY: OK(same shim) —chain-idon SC[+] verified successfully, 1/1 providers.ADDONS: none declared— unchanged.- SCT not re-tested: the diff touches only an SC entry, so per the skill the testnet pass was not required — this is distinct from "skipped for lack of inputs". Phase 8's SCT boot (positive and negative control) stands at this head.
- Log scan: one benign circuit-breaker
warntied to probe 4's GUID — the expected consequence of POSTing to a GET-only shim, not a regression. Nothing else non-benign in the probe window. - Teardown: both containers removed, shim killed, ports free.
Watch-list (unfixed, for the reviewer)
- No
timeout_mson the 4 batchPOST /api/batch/addresses/*routes — reviewer 1 rates it minor, since CU 60 already sets the relay-window floor. - Index mode
none's behaviour on the address routes is undocumented and untested — a customer-setup/docs gap, not a spec field. block_parsingon/api/txpool/transactions/v2/basiskeys offlatestrather than the request body's owntargetChainIndex(deferred above).
⚠️ One body-prose drift this fix introduces
The PR body's CU table — corrected to "7 / 18 / 5" at f254bce — is now 7 @ 10 / 17 @ 20 / 6 @ 60 because of this one bump. The <!-- disabled-count: 0 --> marker (the part under machine test) is unaffected; the CU line is prose, so it was left for @AnnaR-prog rather than edited by this unattended run.
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Phase 11 — final reviewer verdict: ❌ CHANGES REQUESTED · head
The verdict is reported as the reviewer returned it and is not upgraded. The one CRITICAL is aimed squarely at the fix this unattended run itself applied in Phase 10, not at anything in The finding
Its evidence, which I verified independently against the file and the body:
Auto-decision taken (unattended run, conservative default, recorded)The Phase 10 CU bump has been reverted. The working tree is now byte-identical to Reasoning: two model reviewers disagree about this one number and no human has ever ruled on it. Phase 9's reviewer 3 raised it as MEDIUM from walletd source ( What this leaves for the owners — one open question, not a defectShould
If the answer is 60, the Everything else in the final pass came back clean
Per the skill this run does not loop back into another fix pass. The one substantive question above is the only thing between this spec and a clean verdict; the second open item from @avitenzer's review — the customer's walletd sync mode against the genesis pin — remains owner-tracked on MAG-2968 and is also outside what this pipeline can resolve. |
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Phase 12 — closing summary checklist (tail of Phase 11; this pipeline run covered Phases 8–11 at head Verdict and branch state
Run stats — this pipeline run only (Phases 8–11)These figures cover Phases 8–11 of this resumable run only. Phases 1–7 ran in a separate |
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@avitenzer re blocker 2 in your merge-readiness review (the customer's sync mode vs the genesis pin). Owner decision (2026-11-02): the pin stays as it is.
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@avitenzer can you re-review? Both blockers are answered, and the head is still
The last CI run's ❌ Phase 11 verdict is not about |
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@avitenzer please pause the re-review. My blocker 2 reply above is superseded: omer's MAG-2968 comment 31063, posted before it, says the router must work with nodes synced either way, and nothing is asked of the customer. So the genesis pin goes: I'm replacing it with a network-name check and will update the description. I'll ping you when it's pushed. |
…kpoint-synced nodes (MAG-2968) omer's MAG-2968 comment 31063: the router must work with nodes synced either way, and nothing is asked of Kraken. The genesis block id pin (/api/consensus/index/0) refused every node started from a checkpoint, because such a node answers 404 there. chain-id now reads /api/consensus/network .name: "mainnet" for SC, "zen" for SCT (SCT still inherits the directive and overrides only the value). Tested with smart-router v1.6.4 and walletd v2.15.2 (zen block-0 node plus a checkpoint-synced node): both admitted; old index, block and event lookups that hit the checkpoint node get its 404 (NODE_DATA_NOT_HELD) and are retried on the other node; SC refuses a zen node. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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/rerun-from 8 |
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🤖 Command acknowledged — running Phase 8 → 11. Progress and results post here as comments. View run |
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Phase 8 — smart-router boot + method probe (resumable run, Phases 8–11 · re-validating head
The one thing this run existed to test: the new
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| # | Config | Expected | Result |
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| 1 | SC vs mainnet shim |
verify OK (mainnet) |
PASS — "verification":"chain-id","rawData":"mainnet" … "[+] verified successfully" |
| 2 | SCT vs zen shim (positive control) |
verify OK (zen) |
PASS — rawData:"zen" → verified |
| 3 | SCT vs mainnet shim (negative control) |
verify FAIL | PASS (failed as required) — rawParsedBlock:"mainnet" != verification.Value:"zen" → provider excluded |
| 4 | SC vs zen shim (negative control) |
verify FAIL | PASS (failed as required) — rawParsedBlock:"zen" != verification.Value:"mainnet" → provider excluded |
Control 4 is the live reproduction of "SC pointed at a zen node is refused", which @AnnaR-prog's manual run observed against real walletd. Controls 3+4 together prove the comparison is not vacuously accepted — which is the risk a string-valued expected_value carries that a 32-byte block-id pin did not. The parse itself was checked too: the router extracted the plain strings mainnet/zen, not the raw JSON object and not an empty string, with zero parse-failure signatures across all four boots.
What has and has not been shown
- Shown: the spec graph loads and the import closure (
SCT→SC) resolves at this head; both parse directives execute (smartrouter_latest_block{spec="SC"}=600203; a router-relayed/api/consensus/index/600000parsed the correct block id); the newchain-idverification works in both directions on both networks. - Not shown: live coverage of the other 26 walletd-only routes, which stay
NOT_TESTABLE, plusPOST /api/txpool/broadcast(SKIP, stateful).NOT_TESTABLEis not coverage.api.siascan.comis theexplored/siascan explorer daemon, not walletd — it shares only/consensus/tip,/consensus/tip/{height}and/consensus/network, which is exactly the 3 routes the shim proxies and exactly why it must never be configured as a provider. Full live coverage still needs a reachable walletd (/rerun-probe mainnet=<url>); the nearest thing on record is @AnnaR-prog's manual run against the team's private walletd v2.15.2 nodes, reported in the PR body's "Update 2026-11-03" (including the checkpoint-synced-node retry behaviour, which no CI-reachable endpoint can reproduce). - No
/api/wallets/*route exists in this spec at all, so none appears in the coverage table (settled owner decision — the customer uses none of them).
Full probe report (docs/sc/METHOD_PROBE_REPORT.md)
Method Probe Report — sc
Generated: 2026-11-03T10:42:29Z
Router image: ghcr.io/magma-devs/smart-router:main (digest sha256:41f227a8d04cd31315cb3961e58932e775bacb634b3a82ca46ee105daeb6f71c)
Spec variants: SC (mainnet, rest), SCT (Siacoin Zen testnet, rest, imports: [SC])
Head under test: d1ba22b "fix(spec): check the walletd network name in chain-id, admitting checkpoint-synced nodes (MAG-2968)"
Scope note: there is no public walletd node for this chain (team's walletd v2.15.2 nodes are on a
private machine CI cannot reach; the PR's <!-- ENDPOINTS --> block ships empty). This run
re-validates ONLY the chain-id verification change at this head, using two complementary,
clearly-labelled methodologies. It does not attempt the full 30-method Step 4 probe loop —
27 of 30 routes have no reachable walletd-compatible upstream and are NOT_TESTABLE (see below).
(A) Conservative baseline boot — unreachable placeholder upstream (SPEC_LOAD)
Booted the router against node-urls: [http://127.0.0.1:1] (deliberately unreachable) for both
spec variants, to prove static spec-graph resolution / import closure / REST pattern compilation /
verification wiring load cleanly at this head, independent of any live upstream.
| Variant | SPEC_LOAD | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| SC | OK | "message":"Successfully loaded and expanded spec from aggregated sources","chain_id":"SC"; "RPCSmartRouter Listening"; "ready for requests". Only failures: PROTOCOL_CONNECTION_REFUSED / "provider validation failed — excluding from provider list" on the placeholder URL (expected — connection refused, not a spec defect). |
| SCT | OK | Same signature with chain_id:"SCT", import closure (imports:["SC"]) resolved transparently (no spec not found for chainId / no failed to load any specs). Same connection-refused-only exclusion. |
No panic, fatal, failed to load any specs, or spec not found for chainId lines in either boot.
(B) Test-only siascan shim — real PARSE/VERIFY verdicts
All results in this section are via a local test-only shim at /tmp/sia_shim.py (ports 8181
mainnet, 8182 zen) — NOT a provider, and not evidence for the other 27 walletd-only routes. The
shim serves only /api/consensus/tip, /api/consensus/index/{height}, /api/consensus/network
and 404s everything else, proxying bodies unmodified from api.siascan.com (mainnet) /
api.siascan.com/zen (zen) — confirmed those upstreams answer HTTP 200 and that
/consensus/network truly returns {"name":"mainnet",...} / /zen/consensus/network returns
{"name":"zen",...} (no hardcoded value in the shim).
| # | Config | Expected | Result | Evidence (log excerpt) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | SC vs mainnet shim | chain-id verify OK ("mainnet"); tracker runs GET_BLOCKNUM/GET_BLOCK_BY_NUM | PASS | "verification":"chain-id","rawData":"mainnet",...,"message":"[+] verified successfully"; smartrouter_latest_block{spec="SC"} 600203; router-proxied GET /api/consensus/index/600000 → {"height":600000,"id":"00000000000000056d82a01f9fb788ddde15d0f09d0ecaabb3cb6f90ac57f654"} |
| 2 | SCT vs zen shim (positive control) | chain-id verify OK ("zen") | PASS | "verification":"chain-id","rawData":"zen",...,"message":"[+] verified successfully" |
| 3 | SCT vs mainnet shim (negative control, REQUIRED) | chain-id verify FAIL with explicit mismatch | PASS (failed as required) | "rawParsedBlock":"mainnet","verification.Value":"zen",...,"message":"[-] verify failed expected and received are different" → "provider validation failed — excluding from provider list" → "no healthy providers for endpoint" |
| 4 | SC vs zen shim (negative control, REQUIRED) | chain-id verify FAIL with explicit mismatch | PASS (failed as required) | "rawParsedBlock":"zen","verification.Value":"mainnet",...,"message":"[-] verify failed expected and received are different" → "provider validation failed — excluding from provider list" → "no healthy providers for endpoint" |
| 5 | Parse-signature sanity | PARSE_CANONICAL parser_arg ["0","name"] resolves the network name string, not the raw object/empty string |
PASS | rawData/rawParsedBlock fields above show the plain strings "mainnet"/"zen" (not a JSON blob, not empty); zero hits for the parse-failure signature grep across all 4 boots |
Conclusion: the new network-name comparison is live, not vacuous. Both negative controls
produced an explicit expected X, got Y mismatch and excluded the provider — the single most
important check this run — and both positive cases verified cleanly with the real string pulled
from the live (proxied) /consensus/network body.
What the shim does NOT buy: coverage of the other 27 walletd-only routes (/api/wallets/*,
/api/txpool/*, /api/addresses/*, etc.) — these remain NOT_TESTABLE for lack of any reachable
walletd instance, exactly as in the prior 4 pipeline runs. This is not a spec defect.
Parse-directive runtime check (unchanged directives, confirmed still correct)
| Check | Verdict | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
GET_BLOCKNUM (/api/consensus/tip, parser_arg ["0","height"]) |
OK | smartrouter_latest_block{spec="SC"} 600203 (matches shim's proxied tip height); rpc_endpoint_tracker_requests_total{kind="latest_block"} 3 |
GET_BLOCK_BY_NUM (/api/consensus/index/%d, parser_arg ["0","id"]) |
OK | Direct-through-router call GET /api/consensus/index/600000 returned the correct block id string for that height. Note: the chain tracker's own automatic fork-detection block-hash poll is disabled by default ("block-hash polling (fork detection) resolved","enabled":"false","reason":"off-operator-choice") — a router default, not a spec issue — so the directive was confirmed via an explicit router call instead of the periodic tracker cycle. |
| Parse-signature log lines | none | Grepped all 4 shim boots for `failed to parse response |
Verification runtime check — chain-id
| Verification | Verdict | Providers OK/failed | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| chain-id (SC, expected "mainnet") | OK | 1/1 (vs mainnet shim) | rawData:"mainnet" — matches |
| chain-id (SCT, expected "zen") | OK | 1/1 (vs zen shim) | rawData:"zen" — matches |
| chain-id (SCT, expected "zen", fed mainnet data) | FAIL (expected to fail — negative control) | 0/1 | rawParsedBlock:"mainnet" != verification.Value:"zen" |
| chain-id (SC, expected "mainnet", fed zen data) | FAIL (expected to fail — negative control) | 0/1 | rawParsedBlock:"zen" != verification.Value:"mainnet" |
Addon & extension coverage (Step 1c)
ADDONS: none declared — jq over sc.json (both .add_on and .extension fields across the
full object tree) returns an empty list for both. Nothing to probe, nothing NOT_TESTABLE to carry.
Per-method table (all 30 routes)
Only the 3 explorer-shared routes were exercised (via the shim, labelled above); the other 27
are either NOT_TESTABLE (26 — no reachable walletd upstream serves them, and the shim
deliberately 404s every path outside the 3 it proxies) or SKIP (1 — stateful broadcast).
| Method | Classification | Upstream notes | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| GET /api/state | NOT_TESTABLE | — | no reachable walletd upstream |
| GET /api/consensus/network | PASS (via test-only siascan shim — not a provider) | shim 127.0.0.1:8181 / 8182 | chain-id VERIFICATION directive at this head (d1ba22b); 2 positive + 2 negative controls; also NOT_TESTABLE against real walletd |
| GET /api/consensus/tip | PASS (via test-only siascan shim — not a provider) | shim 127.0.0.1:8181 / 8182 | GET_BLOCKNUM directive; also NOT_TESTABLE against real walletd |
| GET /api/consensus/tipstate | NOT_TESTABLE | — | no reachable walletd upstream |
| GET /api/consensus/index/{height} | PASS (via test-only siascan shim — not a provider) | shim 127.0.0.1:8181 / 8182 | GET_BLOCK_BY_NUM directive; router-relayed probe at height 600000 parsed correctly; also NOT_TESTABLE against real walletd |
| GET /api/consensus/blocks/{id} | NOT_TESTABLE | — | no reachable walletd upstream |
| GET /api/consensus/checkpoint/{id} | NOT_TESTABLE | — | no reachable walletd upstream |
| GET /api/consensus/updates/{index} | NOT_TESTABLE | — | no reachable walletd upstream |
| GET /api/syncer/peers | NOT_TESTABLE | — | no reachable walletd upstream; present on purpose (the customer's production usage, head 3b75f23) — not a defect |
| GET /api/txpool/transactions | NOT_TESTABLE | — | no reachable walletd upstream |
| GET /api/txpool/fee | NOT_TESTABLE | — | no reachable walletd upstream |
| GET /api/txpool/events | NOT_TESTABLE | — | no reachable walletd upstream |
| GET /api/addresses/{addr}/balance | NOT_TESTABLE | — | no reachable walletd upstream; stays enabled per owner decision 2026-11-03 (checkpoint-node zero-balance effect documented and accepted) |
| GET /api/addresses/{addr}/events | NOT_TESTABLE | — | no reachable walletd upstream; stays enabled per owner decision 2026-11-03 (checkpoint-node zero-balance effect documented and accepted) |
| GET /api/addresses/{addr}/events/unconfirmed | NOT_TESTABLE | — | no reachable walletd upstream; stays enabled per owner decision 2026-11-03 (checkpoint-node zero-balance effect documented and accepted) |
| GET /api/addresses/{addr}/outputs/siacoin | NOT_TESTABLE | — | no reachable walletd upstream; stays enabled per owner decision 2026-11-03 (checkpoint-node zero-balance effect documented and accepted) |
| GET /api/addresses/{addr}/outputs/siafund | NOT_TESTABLE | — | no reachable walletd upstream; stays enabled per owner decision 2026-11-03 (checkpoint-node zero-balance effect documented and accepted) |
| GET /api/outputs/siacoin/{id} | NOT_TESTABLE | — | no reachable walletd upstream |
| GET /api/outputs/siacoin/{id}/spent | NOT_TESTABLE | — | no reachable walletd upstream |
| GET /api/outputs/siafund/{id} | NOT_TESTABLE | — | no reachable walletd upstream |
| GET /api/outputs/siafund/{id}/spent | NOT_TESTABLE | — | no reachable walletd upstream |
| GET /api/events/{id} | NOT_TESTABLE | — | no reachable walletd upstream |
| POST /api/txpool/broadcast | SKIP | — | stateful — would broadcast a transaction |
| POST /api/txpool/parents | NOT_TESTABLE | — | no reachable walletd upstream |
| POST /api/txpool/transactions/v2/basis | NOT_TESTABLE | — | no reachable walletd upstream |
| POST /api/batch/addresses/balance | NOT_TESTABLE | — | no reachable walletd upstream; stays enabled per owner decision 2026-11-03 (checkpoint-node zero-balance effect documented and accepted) |
| POST /api/batch/addresses/events | NOT_TESTABLE | — | no reachable walletd upstream; stays enabled per owner decision 2026-11-03 (checkpoint-node zero-balance effect documented and accepted) |
| POST /api/batch/addresses/outputs/siacoin | NOT_TESTABLE | — | no reachable walletd upstream; stays enabled per owner decision 2026-11-03 (checkpoint-node zero-balance effect documented and accepted) |
| POST /api/batch/addresses/outputs/siafund | NOT_TESTABLE | — | no reachable walletd upstream; stays enabled per owner decision 2026-11-03 (checkpoint-node zero-balance effect documented and accepted) |
| POST /api/check/addresses | NOT_TESTABLE | — | no reachable walletd upstream; stays enabled per owner decision 2026-11-03 (checkpoint-node zero-balance effect documented and accepted) |
Counts: PASS=3 (directive/verification routes, shim-only — not real walletd coverage) FAIL=0 SKIP=1 UNPROBED=0 NOT_TESTABLE=26 WARN=0 TIMEOUT=0 LOG_WARN=0.
Coverage scope (27 routes not exercised live)
26 of the 30 routes in the SC/SCT spec closure require a real walletd instance
(/api/state, /api/consensus/tipstate, /api/consensus/blocks/{id}, /api/txpool/*,
/api/addresses/*, /api/outputs/*, /api/events/{id}, /api/batch/addresses/*,
/api/check/addresses, …), and 1 more (POST /api/txpool/broadcast) is SKIP because it is
stateful and probing it would broadcast a transaction. No public walletd node exists and the
team's private nodes are unreachable from CI. These are NOT_TESTABLE — carried forward
unchanged from the prior 4 pipeline runs, same reason ("no reachable walletd-compatible endpoint
found"). This is a coverage gap to flag to a human with real walletd access, not a spec defect,
and it is explicitly not addressed by the siascan shim (the shim only ever serves the 3
explorer-shared routes). Note the spec declares no /api/wallets/* routes at all (settled
owner decision — the customer uses none of them), so none appear in this table.
Log-scan findings
None. No non-benign warn/error/fatal/panic lines beyond the expected connection-refused (baseline)
and expected-mismatch (negative controls) lines documented above.
Testnet verification pass (Step 7)
Folded into (B) above: SCT booted against the zen shim passed chain-id verification with its own
expected_value: "zen" (test #2), and against the mainnet shim correctly failed (test #3). No
separate Step 7 testnet-vs-real-node pass was run — no real testnet walletd endpoint exists (same
constraint as mainnet).
TESTNET_VERIFY: OK (via shim tests #2 and #3 above — not a real walletd node)
Empirical block time (Step 8)
BLOCK_TIME: mainnet=skipped testnet=skipped
Reason: walletd's /api/consensus/index/{height} response carries no timestamp field, so there is
no measurement recipe (same as prior runs). Not invented from siascan explorer-only fields.
Teardown
All containers removed: sr_sc, sr_sc_testnet (Step A boots, reused names), sr_sc_t1,
sr_sct_t2, sr_sct_t3_negctrl, sr_sc_t4_negctrl (Step B boots). Both shim processes
(sia_shim.py on 8181/8182) killed. Verified clean via docker ps -a --filter name=sr_sc (empty)
and ps aux | grep sia_shim (no processes).
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Phase 9 — parallel reviewers (3 independent
Aggregate: 0 CRITICAL, 0 MEDIUM, 2 MINOR. Three independent reports, three distinct The two MINOR findings (both informational; neither is a defect, neither feeds the fix pass)MINOR-A (reviewer 2) — two public walletd routes the spec leaves out. MINOR-B (reviewer 3) — the network-name check defends against a narrower set of failure modes than the retired genesis pin. The old pin compared a value cryptographically derived from the chain's genesis block, so anything answering with a different genesis necessarily failed. The new check compares a plain string that walletd reports from its own loaded network identity. Any process answering The reviewer is explicit that this is not a request to revert anything: the trade was the owner's deliberate call (MAG-2968 comment 31063), What all three reviewers verified clean
All 9 settled owner decisions were handed to each reviewer up front and none was re-raised — including item 7 ( Reports on disk: |
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Phase 10 — gap synthesis + fix pass, and Phase 10b — smoke re-probe · head
Phase 10 — consolidationThe three Phase 9 reviewers returned Disable-suggestion filter: 0 stripped. No reviewer proposed The two dropped MINOR gaps go to the watch-list, not the fixer:
Phase 10a — offline static gates, re-run after the (empty) fix pass
No Phase 10b — smoke re-bootRun even though the spec is unchanged, per the skill's standing instruction not to reason a re-boot away. Since there were no edits, a regression here would have indicated environmental flakiness or a Phase 8 measurement error rather than a Phase 10 change — none appeared.
The 10b pass ran image tag Both boots re-created the test-only siascan shim (killed after Phase 8) and tore it down again; all containers and shim processes verified clean. Reminder that the shim is not a provider and buys nothing for the 26 walletd-only routes. |
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Phase 11 — final reviewer verdict: ✅ APPROVED · head
The verdict is reported exactly as the reviewer returned it. Nothing was upgraded: all three Phase 9 reviewers and the final pass independently returned zero CRITICAL and zero MEDIUM, and because Phase 10 applied no changes, this APPROVED verdict is against committed head The change this round validated
What the final pass checked
Open items — owner-tracked, not defects, and not blockers
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Phase 12 — closing summary checklist (tail of Phase 11; this pipeline run covered Phases 8–11 at head File Validation
Configuration Verification
Documentation (out of skill scope — manual reminder)
Testnet vs Mainnet
Governance Prep (out of skill scope — manual reminder)
Auto-decisions taken this run (unattended; conservative default; recorded)
Run stats — this pipeline run only (Phases 8–11)These figures cover Phases 8–11 of this run alone. Phases 1–7 ran in the original Working tree
|
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@avitenzer ready for re-review at
Details are in the description's "Update 2026-11-03". |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Approved at head d1ba22b: the spec is correct for what it encodes
@AnnaR-prog: approving on spec correctness. Everything below was checked against walletd v2.15.2 source, smart-router origin/main (acc4455a), and a live run: walletd v2.15.2 (-index.mode full -http.public) started from a checkpoint on mainnet (600171) and zen (64124), each behind the router with sc.json at this head and no verifications skipped.
Verified
| Check | Result |
|---|---|
chain-id: SC on mainnet, SCT on zen |
both verified successfully; checkpoint nodes are admitted, as 31063 asks |
chain-id: SC on zen, SCT on mainnet (negative controls) |
both refused |
| Latest block | matches siascan on both networks |
GET /api/consensus/index/{h} below the checkpoint |
404 height not found; the router treats it as NODE_DATA_NOT_HELD, retries another node, never caches it |
1792a3a..d1ba22b |
only the 5 deterministic: false flips and the chain-id swap |
| Content guards | all 13 pass; disabled-count: 0 matches the file |
| Route coverage | all 30 routes exist in walletd v2.15.2; SC/SCT collide with nothing on main |
Mempool/peer routes as DEFAULT ["latest"], stateful: 0 |
correct, same shape as ETH's txpool_content; cache exclusion is the router's job (MAG-4793) |
Caveats, none of them spec defects
- Checkpoint nodes still answer some routes without an error (31063 says "never a wrong answer silently"). Measured on the mainnet checkpoint node:
GET /api/addresses/{addr}/balancefor the Sia Foundation address returns{"siacoins":"0"}(siascan: about 1.87 billion SC), andGET /api/consensus/blocks/600172returns all 34 inputs withorigin.source: "unknown". The customer doesn't call the address routes; it does callblocks/{id}, though walletd marks any spend older than 144 blocksunknownon every node (wallet/manager.go:571), so that field is best-effort by design. The spec can't turn either into an error (a disabled api is still relayed asDefault-<path>). The body records this as an owner decision; the ticket record is your 31168, which omer hasn't answered yet. His ack closes this. - Wallet routes. The customer's 30943 lists
PUT api/wallets/1/addresses, which gets a 501 through the router. Omitting the routes is consistent with Option 1 (30985: no password through the router), but the body's "the customer makes no wallet calls" isn't what 30943 says. Please fix the wording; omer's call on whether the customer sends it straight to the nodes (your 30990) belongs on the ticket. - MAG-4793 before go-live. Mempool, fee and peer reads are cached for 75 s on any router with a cache. Router fix, not spec; the customer polls
/api/txpool/transactionsafter each broadcast. - Description nits. The archive section says there is "no full-vs-archive tier to model"; admitting checkpoint nodes creates that split. Name the minimum router version: the 404 rule shipped in v1.5.8 (tested on v1.6.2, v1.6.4,
main).
Non-blocking, for the record
- walletd answers "not found" on
GET /api/outputs/siacoin/{id},/outputs/siafund/{id}and/consensus/updates/{index}with a plain-text 500. The router returns its own 500 and marks the node unhealthy. The customer calls none of these; the clean fix is upstream (the/spenthandlers already return 404). - Not proven: broadcast of an input older than the node's checkpoint through a checkpoint node (
OverwriteElementProofskeeps the caller's proof for inputs the node never indexed). Only a pool made entirely of checkpoint nodes would show it.
…(MAG-2968) avitenzer's review on PR #197: these answers change as the chain moves, so cross-validation would treat two honest nodes a block apart as disagreeing. - GET /api/events/{id}: the reply carries Confirmations = 1 + scanHeight - height (persist/sqlite/events.go:121, walletd v2.15.2). It grows every block and differs between nodes indexed to different heights. - GET /api/outputs/siacoin/{id}, GET /api/outputs/siafund/{id}: only unspent outputs are returned (persist/sqlite/utxo.go: spent_index_id IS NULL), so the answer changes once the output is spent. - GET /api/consensus/blocks/{id}, GET /api/consensus/checkpoint/{id}: a numeric id is read as a height through cm.BestIndex (api/server.go), so a reorg near the tip changes the answer. checkpoint/{id} was not in the review but takes the same code path. Tested with smart-router v1.6.4 against our walletd v2.15.2 nodes: Kraken's call list answers the same through the router as directly, on mainnet (SC) and on zen (SCT, including the POST broadcast route it inherits). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
New chain spec: Siacoin
Update 2026-11-03: nodes started from a checkpoint are admitted (commit d1ba22b)
chain-idnow checks the network name, not the genesis block id. It readsGET /api/consensus/network→.name:"mainnet"onSC,"zen"onSCT(SCTstill inherits the directive and overrides only the value). omer's MAG-2968 comment 31063: The customer runs the router on its own premises, so the router has to handle nodes synced either way, and nothing is asked of the customer. The genesis pin (/api/consensus/index/0) refused every node started from a-checkpoint, because such a node answers 404 there. This replaces the 2026-11-02 decision to keep the pin. Do NOT re-add the genesis pin./api/addresses/{addr}/*,/api/batch/addresses/*,/api/check/addresses) answer 200 with zero or missing data for coins received before a node's checkpoint (balance tested on zen on 2026-10-20). The router can't tell that from a real zero. The customer calls none of them, so this is acceptable for the customer for now (owner decision 2026-11-03). Do NOT remove or disable these routes, and do NOT re-add the genesis pin to avoid it.SCon our mainnet node:chain-idpasses (mainnet).SCon a zen node: refused (zen, wantedmainnet).SCTon a block-0 zen node plus a zen node started from a checkpoint (height 63821): both admitted.NODE_DATA_NOT_HELD) and were retried on the other node. Old block and event lookups: 20 of 20 answered 200, 8 of them after a retry.consensus/tipstate,consensus/networkandtxpool/transactionsgive the same body;statediffers only instartTime, andsyncer/peersin the live peer list.SCTon the checkpoint node alone: an old height answers 404"height not found", a new one 200.Update 2026-11-02: review fixes (commit f254bce)
deterministic: false(avitenzer's review). Their answer changes as the chain moves, so cross-validation would treat two honest nodes a block apart as disagreeing. Do NOT set them back totrue.GET /api/events/{id}: the reply carriesConfirmations = 1 + scanHeight - height(persist/sqlite/events.go:121), which grows every block.GET /api/outputs/siacoin/{id},GET /api/outputs/siafund/{id}: only unspent outputs are returned (persist/sqlite/utxo.go:spent_index_id IS NULL), so the answer changes once the output is spent. Onfullnodes the reply also carries a Merkle proof that walletd refreshes as the chain grows.GET /api/consensus/blocks/{id},GET /api/consensus/checkpoint/{id}: a numericidis read as a height throughcm.BestIndex(api/server.go), so a reorg near the tip changes the answer.checkpoint/{id}was not in the review but takes the same code path.GET /api/consensus/index/{height}staysdeterministic: trueon purpose: the router parses its height from the path (PARSE_DICTIONARY_OR_ORDERED), so it treats it like block-by-number methods on other chains. WithDEFAULTparsing onblocks/{id}andcheckpoint/{id}, the router can't know the height.SC): The customer's call list answers through the router with the same status and body as directly (syncer/peersdiffers only in live peer stats); a broadcast with an invalid body gets walletd's own 400;PUTgets the router's own 501;chain-idpasses; the password never appears in the router logSCT): the same, including thePOSTbroadcast routeSCTinherits fromSCnodeBoundMethodslists no walletd paths. Tracked as MAG-4793.Update 2026-11-01: added GET /api/syncer/peers (commit 3b75f23)
GET /api/syncer/peersbecause the customer calls it in production (MAG-2968 comment 30943). Do NOT remove it.wrapPublicAuthHandler), so it needs no password.deterministic: false,stateful: 0,DEFAULT/["latest"], CU 10 like/api/txpool/fee./api/wallets/*(MAG-2968 comment 30943). Do NOT add any/api/wallets/*route in a fix pass.authorizationheader, so a caller's password is dropped before walletd (tested: a password-only call with the right password gets 401 through the router). Do NOT add anauthorizationheader directive or any router auth config.Authorization: Basic,User-Agent: Sia-Agent):POST /api/txpool/broadcastwith an invalid body gets walletd's own 400 through the router (nothing was broadcast)PUT /api/wallets/1/addressesgets the router's own 501: the spec has no PUT collection, on purpose (wallet setup runs directly on each node)chain-idcheck passed, the password never appears in the router log, and SCT on zen servessyncer/peerstoo (inherited)Update 2026-10-29: personal index mode accepted (commit a299510)
index-modeverification (GET /api/state→.indexMode == "full"). omer asked to support both index modes (MAG-2968 comment 30546).personalandnonenodes are now admitted on SC and SCT. Do NOT re-add the check.chain-idgenesis pin at the time. It was replaced by a network-name check on 2026-11-03 (see that update).index-modegotpersonal, wantedfull)/api/wallets/*) stay out: The customer uses none of them (see the 2026-11-01 update above).Inputs provided
Siacoin (Sia), asset SC, Jira MAG-2968. Pass
run_in_background: falseexplicitly on every Agent call.API: walletd (the customer's node runs walletd, confirmed by the customer 2026-10-19). REST only, base path /api. Source of truth for routes: github.com/SiaFoundation/walletd api/server.go at tag v2.15.2.
Include the chain-wide public routes: GET /state, /consensus/network, /consensus/tip, /consensus/tipstate, /consensus/index/{height}, /consensus/blocks/{id}, /consensus/checkpoint/{id}, /consensus/updates/{index} (index = "height::blockid"), /txpool/transactions, /txpool/fee, /txpool/events, /addresses/{addr}/balance, /addresses/{addr}/events, /addresses/{addr}/events/unconfirmed, /addresses/{addr}/outputs/siacoin, /addresses/{addr}/outputs/siafund, /outputs/siacoin/{id}, /outputs/siacoin/{id}/spent, /outputs/siafund/{id}, /outputs/siafund/{id}/spent, /events/{id}, /syncer/peers (added 2026-11-01 because the customer calls it; it returns one node's peer list); POST /txpool/broadcast (transaction submission: stateful, send to all providers), /txpool/parents, /txpool/transactions/v2/basis, /batch/addresses/balance, /batch/addresses/events, /batch/addresses/outputs/siacoin, /batch/addresses/outputs/siafund, /check/addresses.
Leave out: /wallets/* (the customer uses none of them, MAG-2968 comment 30943; wallet IDs and their address sets exist only on the node that created them); /rescan, /syncer/connect, /debug/* (node admin, password-only); /health (node-local); /syncer/broadcast/block (miners only).
Latest block: GET /consensus/tip -> {"height","id"}. Block by number: GET /consensus/index/{height} -> {"height","id"}.
Chain identity (updated 2026-11-03): check the network name, GET /consensus/network -> .name: mainnet "mainnet", testnet "zen". Do NOT pin the genesis block id (GET /consensus/index/0): omer's MAG-2968 comment 31063 requires nodes started from a checkpoint to be admitted, and such a node answers /consensus/index/0 with 404.
Checkpoint effect (tested on zen 2026-10-20 and 2026-11-03): a walletd instant-synced with -checkpoint answers 404 for heights, blocks and events before its checkpoint (the router retries those on another node), and answers the address routes with 200 and a zero balance for coins received before its checkpoint (the customer calls none of them, so this is documented and accepted for now, owner decision 2026-11-03).
Index mode (updated 2026-10-29): accept both full and personal. omer asked for both (MAG-2968 comment 30546), so the /state indexMode check was removed on purpose in commit a299510; do NOT re-add it. Index mode "none" is accepted too. Known risk, now a customer setup requirement: a walletd in "personal" mode answers /addresses/{addr}/balance with HTTP 200 and zero balances, /events with [], /outputs/siacoin with "outputs": null for any address it does not track (tested on zen 2026-10-20 and 2026-10-29), so every address must be added on every node.
Defaults (updated 2026-11-03): (1) chain-id checks the network name (/consensus/network .name), so nodes started from a checkpoint are admitted (omer, MAG-2968 comment 31063); do NOT re-add the genesis block id pin. (2) the indexMode "full" check was removed on 2026-10-29 per omer's comment 30546; do NOT re-add it. (3) no /wallets/* routes: The customer builds and signs its own transactions and uses none of them (MAG-2968 comment 30943); do NOT add them in a fix pass. (4) /syncer/peers is included on purpose since 2026-11-01 because the customer calls it; do NOT remove it. (5) /events/{id}, /outputs/siacoin/{id}, /outputs/siafund/{id}, /consensus/blocks/{id} and /consensus/checkpoint/{id} are deterministic false since 2026-11-02 because their answers change as the chain moves; do NOT set them back to true. (6) POST /txpool/transactions/v2/basis stays at CU 20 (owner decision 2026-11-02); do NOT raise it in a fix pass. (7) the address routes stay enabled although a node started from a checkpoint answers them with a zero balance for coins received before its checkpoint; the customer calls none of them, so this is documented and accepted for now (owner decision 2026-11-03); do NOT remove or disable them.
Network params: proof of work. blockInterval 600 s on both nets (/consensus/network). Measured over the last 1000 blocks on 2026-10-20: mainnet 595.4 s, zen 606.7 s -> average_block_time 600000 on both.
Finality (adjudicated): The customer waits 6 confirmations (ticket + the customer's deposit page) -> block_distance_for_finalized_data 6 (= 3600 s).
Mainnet v2 hardfork: allowHeight 526000, requireHeight 530000 (v1 transactions are invalid after it). maturityDelay 144.
Testnet: zen (walletd -network zen), same API, imports mainnet, overrides only chain-id.
Endpoints: no public walletd exists. Our walletd nodes run on a private machine CI cannot reach, so leave the ENDPOINTS block blank; a manual smart-router run on those nodes will be posted on the PR. api.siascan.com is explored, not walletd: it shares only /consensus/tip and /consensus/network, so do not use it as a provider.
PR body notes: (a) deployment: run walletd with -http.public and give the router no API password, so wallet and admin routes answer 401 even if the router relays paths that are not in the spec; the router must never store the walletd password (decided 2026-10-29); (b) index lag cannot be verified: /consensus/tip is the consensus tip, not the index tip (walletd's /health reports index lag but is node-local).
chain-idchecks the network name, not the genesis block id (commit d1ba22b, omer's MAG-2968 comment 31063). Nodes started from a-checkpointmust be admitted. They answer 404 for anything before their checkpoint, and the router retries that on another node. Do NOT re-add the/api/consensus/index/0genesis pin.indexModecheck: removed on purpose on 2026-10-29 (commit a299510). omer asked to support both index modes (MAG-2968 comment 30546). Do NOT re-add theindex-modeverification. A personal-mode node answers zero for any address it does not track, so the customer's setup requirements (MAG-2968) say every address must be added on every node./api/wallets/*routes. The customer builds and signs its own transactions and uses none of them (MAG-2968 comment 30943). Do not add them in a fix pass./api/syncer/peersstays (added 2026-11-01, commit 3b75f23). The customer calls it. Do not remove it as node-local.authorizationheader directive and no stored walletd password (omer, MAG-2968 comment 30985). The customer runs walletd with the public API option. Do not add a pass-through header or router auth config.deterministic: false(commit f254bce):/api/events/{id},/api/outputs/siacoin/{id},/api/outputs/siafund/{id},/api/consensus/blocks/{id},/api/consensus/checkpoint/{id}. Their answers change as the chain moves. Do not set them back totrue.POST /api/txpool/transactions/v2/basisstays at CU 20 (owner decision 2026-11-02). A Phase 9 reviewer suggested 60 for its worst case (a walk of up to 144 blocks that recomputes proofs). The usual call is cheap, nothing has been measured, and the customer doesn't call this route. Do not raise it in a fix pass.A checkpoint-synced node is admitted by (1). On the address routes it answers 200 with a zero balance for coins received before its checkpoint. The customer calls none of them, so this is documented and accepted for now (owner decision 2026-11-03).
Deployment note
Nodes may be synced from block 0 or started from a
-checkpoint(omer, MAG-2968 comment 31063). A checkpointnode answers 404 for heights, blocks and events before its checkpoint, and the router retries those on another
node. It answers the address routes with a zero balance for coins received before its checkpoint
(documented and accepted for now: The customer calls none of them).
Run walletd with
-http.publicand give the smart-router no API password. Then thewallet and admin routes answer
401even if the router relays a path that is not inthis spec — defence in depth behind the spec's own route allow-list. Confirmed from
api/server.go@ v2.15.2:-http.publiconly un-gates the handlers wrapped inwrapPublicAuthHandler; everything inwrapAuthHandler(/wallets/*,/rescan,/syncer/connect,/debug/*) stays password-gated regardless.Public walletd routes that this spec leaves out (
GET /api/health,POST /api/syncer/broadcast/block) are stillrelayed: the router passes any unlisted REST path to the node (
defaultApiContainer). They need no password andexpose nothing private.
walletd refreshes the proofs of v2 transactions it broadcasts only on
fullindex-mode nodes (api/server.go:477).The customer runs
full.Index lag cannot be verified by this spec.
/api/consensus/tipis the consensustip, not the index tip, so a node whose wallet index lags behind consensus still
reports a current height. walletd does expose index lag via
/health, but that routeis node-local and excluded. No spec-level mechanism closes this gap today.
Sources used
IndexModeenum (personal/full/none),Scan()mode restrictionmain.goflag defaults (-index.mode,-checkpoint,-debug,-http.public),node.gocheckpoint-sync pathsql.ErrNoRows, returns zeroCurrency)go.sia.tech/coreutils v0.23.5walletdin 'full' index mode", commandwalletd --index.mode=full --http.publicwalletd v2.15.2 nodes run on a private machine CI cannot reach.
api.siascan.comwasqueried for chain facts only (genesis ids,
blockInterval, empirical block times) — itis the explored/siascan explorer daemon, not walletd, sharing only
/consensus/tipand
/consensus/network, so it must not be configured as a provider for this spec.A manual smart-router run against the private walletd nodes will be posted as a PR
comment.
imports: []on SC — Siacoin is standalone. All 156root specs were scanned for index
SC/SCTor a name matching Sia: zero hits.BTCwas evaluated and rejected:btc.json's base collection isjsonrpcwithBitcoin Core method names (
getblockhash,getblock,getblockcount,estimatesmartfee, … 34 methods) that walletd does not serve, so importing it wouldadd dozens of guaranteed-failing inherited APIs. The five chains that do import
BTC(doge, litecoin, dash, zcash, qtum, bch) all run Bitcoin-Core-derived daemons; Sia does
not.
SCTimportsSC(intra-file) and overrides onlychain-id.Structural conventions were copied from kaspa.json (standalone, UTXO, PoW,
REST-only, no imports, split GET/POST collections,
internal_path: "") andaptos.json (height-placeholder
block_parsing) — as templates only, not imports.Calculations table
average_block_time/consensus/network.blockInterval= 600 s on BOTH nets; empirically 595818 ms mainnet / 606392 ms zen over the last 1000 blocks (2026-10-20)block_distance_for_finalized_datablocks_in_finalization_proof3row, not the fast-finality1and not themax(ceil(1000/abt), 3)fallbackallowed_block_lag_for_qos_syncmax(ceil(10000 / 600000), 1)=max(ceil(0.0167), 1)=max(1, 1)Empirical block-time measurement (via the siascan explorer, 2026-10-20):
2026-10-20T14:55:08Z; tip-1000 597144 @2026-10-13T17:24:50Z→ Δ 595818 s / 1000 = 595818 ms/block (0.70% faster than target)2026-10-20T14:56:09Z; tip-1000 61139 @2026-10-13T14:29:37Z→ Δ 606392 s / 1000 = 606392 ms/block (1.07% slower than target)Coverage (updated 2026-11-01, commit 3b75f23): 30 of 52 registered routes included (22 GET + 8 POST); 22 omitted, every one
with a source-grounded reason (see the omission ledger below). 0 extra, 0 invented, 0
disabled.
There was no human available on this run, so every STOP-and-ask gate was auto-resolved
with the conservative default. All of them:
include/omit gate). Decided from source rather than escalated: walletd v2.15.2 has
no pruning mechanism at all — an exhaustive grep for
prune/retention/history/keepacross its flags,api/server.go,wallet/manager.goand the sqlite persistlayer returns zero hits. A node is either synced from genesis (full history, always) or
instant-synced from a
-checkpoint(history starts at an operator-chosen height and isnever trimmed) — and since 2026-11-03 the latter is admitted (omer 31063): a lookup of history it
lacks answers 404, and the router retries it on another node. There is no
full-vs-archive tier to model. Per the indivisible-triplet rule the spec therefore
carries none of:
archiveextension,pruningverification,GET_EARLIEST_BLOCKparse directive.retention_blocks,rule.block,pruning.latest_distanceand the pruningexpected_valueare all n/a.The archive-researcher returned
status: OK(notNEEDS_HUMAN_DECISION) because thisis a definitive source finding, not an inconclusive probe.
595818/606392 ms is ≤1.1% drift, far below the 20% gate, so tie-breaker rule 1 applied
automatically and no gate fired.
internal_pathconvention —""with the full/apiwire path baked into every apiname. This was a genuine judgment call the scout flagged.internal_pathis used bythe router to pick which node-url to dial, not to match the request. The catalog
majority for REST chains (kaspa, aptos, stacks, vechain, arweave, hedera — 6 of 7)
leaves it empty and bakes the full path into
name; onlyton.jsonuses it, and onlybecause it hosts two coexisting API versions side by side. walletd has one base path
and no competing versions, so the majority convention applies — and it keeps provider
node-url config as the plain host root rather than requiring an
/api-suffixed URL.check_internal_paths.shpasses with 0 warnings and 0 errors.GET /state→.indexMode == "full". omer asked to support both index modes (MAG-2968 comment30546), so the check was removed;
personalandnonenodes are now admitted. Apersonal-modenode does not 404 or error on any route — it silently returns zeros for untracked addresses — so
this is a customer setup requirement (every address on every node), not something the spec can
check. Do NOT re-add it.
chain-id.references/phase3.1-inheritance.mdspecifies thatverificationsmerge viaCombineUnique()keyed onName. SCT overrides onlychain-id(the network name
zensince 2026-11-03), withparse_directiveomitted so the parent's directive is adopted — the sameshape
kaspa.json's testnet entry uses.confirms both
chain-idvalues with a live curl. No public walletd endpoint exists, sothis could not run in CI. Mitigation: both genesis ids were verified on our private
walletd v2.15.2 nodes on 2026-10-20 and independently re-confirmed during this run
against
api.siascan.com(/consensus/tip/0for mainnet,/zen/consensus/tip/0forzen) — two independent sources agreeing exactly. Since 2026-11-03
chain-idchecks thenetwork name instead, tested through router v1.6.4 on both networks.
spec_pipeline.ymlruns theboot/probe and review phases after this PR opens. Note the ENDPOINTS block is
intentionally blank, so the automated probe will have nothing to dial; the real
verification is the manual smart-router run against the private nodes, which will be
posted as a PR comment.
/api/check/addressespriced at CU 20, not in the batch band. It shares the1000-address cap with the four
/api/batch/addresses/*routes (which are at 60) butreturns a single
{known:bool}and short-circuits on the first hit, so it does notfan out the same way.
content-type: application/jsonheader added to the POST collection(
kind: pass_override). Not in the inputs; mirrorskaspa.json's POST collection. Safehere because all 8 POST routes decode JSON via jape/
encoding/json, so there is nomixed-content-type trap.
Not a decision, but worth flagging to a reviewer:
/api/consensus/blocks/{id}and/api/consensus/checkpoint/{id}each runstrconv.ParseUinton the{id}segmentfirst and resolve via
BestIndex(height)on success, falling back to hex BlockIDparsing — so they double as height lookups in v2.15.2. This is undocumented-but-real
behaviour. The spec deliberately does not rely on it:
GET_BLOCK_BY_NUMuses theexplicit, documented
/api/consensus/index/{height}route.Gate results (Phases 6–7, at creation, before
/api/syncer/peerswas added)All 9 Phase-6 static gates PASS; no fixer pass was needed.
%dplaceholder OK, echoed-slot OK; matrix skipped (familyrest/othernot in matrix)extensions: []everywhereINFO: retention unknown— not verifiable, correctly not blockingPhase 7:
jqexit 0 ·check_unused_fields.shPASS (no removed fields) ·check_internal_paths.shPASS (0 warnings, no errors) ·check_disabled_count.shreports 0 distinct disabled methods, matching thedisabled-count: 0marker above.Disabled-API Justifications ledger: EMPTY — no api, collection or addon ships
enabled: false. Every one of the 30 included routes is a live, public, documentedwalletd route (
wrapPublicAuthHandler). The 22 omitted routes were left out outrightrather than included-and-disabled, which is why the ledger is empty rather than
unjustified.
Supporting evidence (INLINE — do NOT reference file paths)
Parse directives
Both live on the SC mainnet
rest/GETcollection (add_on: "",internal_path: "").GET_EARLIEST_BLOCKis deliberately absent (no archive triplet), and there are noSUBSCRIBE/UNSUBSCRIBEdirectives — walletd exposes no websocket surface at all, andno api name on this chain contains
ubscribe.[ { "function_tag": "GET_BLOCKNUM", "function_template": "/api/consensus/tip", "result_parsing": { "parser_arg": [ "0", "height" ], "parser_func": "PARSE_CANONICAL" }, "api_name": "/api/consensus/tip" }, { "function_tag": "GET_BLOCK_BY_NUM", "function_template": "/api/consensus/index/%d", "result_parsing": { "parser_arg": [ "0", "id" ], "parser_func": "PARSE_CANONICAL" }, "api_name": "/api/consensus/index/{height}" } ]GET /api/consensus/tipreturns{"height":N,"id":"<hex>"}, soGET_BLOCKNUMplucks.height— the height is the legitimate block-number analog there.GET /api/consensus/index/{height}returns the same{"height","id"}shape, soGET_BLOCK_BY_NUMmust pluck.id, not.height: plucking the height would echothe
%dinput back, making every provider "agree" trivially and defeatingdata-reliability cross-checks. The echoed-slot gate confirms
parser_argis["0","id"].ChainIndex serialization gotcha (from
go.sia.tech/core/types): as a path parameter(
/api/consensus/updates/{index}) a ChainIndex is the text form"<height>::<64-hex-char-blockid>"— the full id, not the truncatedString()form. Asa response body field (
/consensus/tip, the.basisfield)MarshalJSONdeliberately hides
MarshalTextand emits the plain object{"height":N,"id":"<hex>"}.So response-body parsing targets
.height/.idand never a colon-string.Verifications — SC mainnet (network name, since 2026-11-03)
[ { "name": "chain-id", "parse_directive": { "function_template": "/api/consensus/network", "function_tag": "VERIFICATION", "result_parsing": { "parser_arg": [ "0", "name" ], "parser_func": "PARSE_CANONICAL" }, "api_name": "/api/consensus/network" }, "values": [ { "expected_value": "mainnet" } ] } ]Why
chain-idchecks the network name, not the genesis block id (changed 2026-11-03).The first version pinned the genesis block id (
/api/consensus/index/0→.id) to refusenodes started from a
-checkpoint. Such a node seeds its consensus DB at the checkpoint(
cmd/walletd/node.go:syncer.RetrieveCheckpoint+chain.NewDBStoreAtCheckpoint), so itanswers
/api/consensus/index/0with HTTP 404"height not found", and the pin refused it.omer's MAG-2968 comment 31063 requires the router to work with nodes synced either way, so the
check now reads the network name (
"mainnet","zen"), which every walletd on that networkreports. What a checkpoint node does differently:
NODE_DATA_NOT_HELDin therouter), and the router retries them on another node (tested 2026-11-03 on router v1.6.2 and v1.6.4);
checkpoint (an address a block-0 node shows at 16.97M SC, tested 2026-10-20 on zen). The customer
calls none of them, so this is documented and accepted for now (owner decision 2026-11-03).
Do NOT re-add the genesis pin.
Why there is no
index-modecheck (removed 2026-10-29). walletd's default index mode ispersonal, notfull(wallet.NewManagersetsindexMode: IndexModePersonal, andcmd/walletd/main.godefaultsIndex.Modeto the same). Apersonal-mode node returnsHTTP 200 with empty data for any address it does not track — never an error:
persist/sqlite/addresses.goswallowssql.ErrNoRowsand returns a zeroCurrency,while the events/outputs queries return nil slices with
err == nil. Observed on zen on2026-10-20, and again on 2026-10-29 through the router (an untracked funded address reads 0).
The first version refused such nodes. The check was removed because omer asked to support
both index modes (MAG-2968 comment 30546), so the risk moves to the customer's setup: every address
must be added on every node. Do NOT re-add the check.
Verifications — SCT (zen testnet override)
The testnet entry is the standard lean shape:
imports: ["SC"], onerest/GETcollection matching the mainnet's primary collection key with
apis: [], and averificationsarray overriding onlychain-id. Theparse_directiveis omitted sothe parent's is adopted.
[ { "name": "chain-id", "values": [ { "expected_value": "zen" } ] } ]POST collection headers
[ { "name": "content-type", "kind": "pass_override", "value": "application/json" } ]All 8 POST routes decode JSON via jape/
encoding/json, so there is no mixed-content-typetrap. Mirrors
kaspa.json's POST collection.Collection layout and CU distribution
GET and POST are two separate collections — unanimous convention across every REST spec
in the catalog (kaspa, ton, aptos, stacks, vechain, arweave, hedera, and the six
btc-family REST addenda). Both carry
add_on: "": there are no add-on collections,because the only chain-specific capability tiers (
indexMode, checkpoint sync) changethe correctness of base routes rather than unlocking new endpoint families.
CU distribution (updated 2026-11-02) — 7 apis @ 10, 18 @ 20, 5 @ 60:
/api/stateand/api/consensus/network(EMPTY/[""]: static node andnetwork constants, no chain state);
/api/consensus/tip,/api/consensus/tipstate,/api/txpool/fee(simple current-state reads);/api/syncer/peers(one node's peer list, added 2026-11-01); and/api/txpool/broadcast, the singlestateful: 1route (tx-submit band 10–40).outputs and events by id, the per-address reads, the two mempool list reads, and
/api/check/addresses./api/consensus/updates/{index}(a window of block updates up to the tip; raised from 20 in the Phase 10fix pass) and the four
/api/batch/addresses/*routes.api/api.gocaps each batch body at1000 addresses and each address costs its own sqlite index lookup, so one request can
fan out to ~1000 single-address reads that individually bill 20. 60 is the floor of the
heavy/complex-queries band and brackets kaspa.json's comparable batch routes
(
/addresses/balances=20,/transactions/search=60,/addresses/utxos=100). Thecu-semantic gate judged these
heavyand raised no advisory.block_parsingdistribution — 27DEFAULT/["latest"], 2EMPTY/[""](
/api/state,/api/consensus/network), 1PARSE_DICTIONARY_OR_ORDERED/["height","=","0"](
/api/consensus/index/{height}, the aptos/blocks/by_height/{block_height}shape).DEFAULTis retained on the by-id REST reads because a hex block/output/event id cannotbe parsed as a block number — those routes are nonetheless priced at 20 as state-by-id
queries, not 10.
stateful— exactly one route setscategory.stateful: 1:/api/txpool/broadcast,the transaction-submission route, which must be sent to all providers. The other seven
POSTs are reads that merely carry a request body (batch address lists, or a transaction
to inspect/rebase), so they are
stateful: 0— the same rule that makeseth_callandeth_estimateGasnon-stateful. No api setshanging_api, and consequently none setstimeout_ms: walletd has no long-poll or streaming route.Omission ledger — the 22 routes left out, with reasons (updated 2026-11-01)
Every row is grounded in the auth wrappers and route gating in
https://github.com/SiaFoundation/walletd/blob/v2.15.2/api/server.go. walletd wraps eachhandler in either
wrapPublicAuthHandler(password-exempt under-http.public) orwrapAuthHandler(password required always, regardless of-http.public)./api/walletswrapAuthHandleralways; wallet IDs are node-local, cannot be load-balanced/api/wallets/{id}/api/wallets/{id}/addresses/api/wallets/{id}/addresses/{addr}/api/wallets/{id}/batch/addresses/api/wallets/{id}/balance/api/wallets/{id}/events/api/wallets/{id}/events/unconfirmed/api/wallets/{id}/outputs/siacoin/api/wallets/{id}/outputs/siafund/api/wallets/{id}/construct/transaction/api/wallets/{id}/construct/v2/transaction/api/wallets/{id}/reserve/api/wallets/{id}/release/api/wallets/{id}/fund/api/wallets/{id}/fundsf/api/rescanwrapAuthHandler;Manager.Scan()errors"scans are disabled in index mode %s"unless the node runspersonalmode/api/syncer/connectwrapAuthHandler, peer management/api/debug/mine-debug, pluswrapAuthHandler/api/debug/pprof/{handler}-debug, pluswrapAuthHandler/api/health/api/syncer/broadcast/block/api/healthand/api/syncer/broadcast/blockare the two routesthat are technically public under
-http.publicbut are excluded by deliberate policyas node-local or miner-only. The methods-coverage gate sees them as omissions and accepts
the justifications; they must not be "fixed" by adding them.
/api/syncer/peerswas excludedthe same way until 2026-11-01; it is now included because the customer calls it.
Arithmetic: 30 included + 22 omitted = 52 registered unique paths. Verified mechanically
against the route list with
comm: 0 extra, 0 invented.Route-table audit (walletd api/server.go @ v2.15.2)
(
/debug/*, registered only when-debugis set) = 56 max; 52 unique paths.were verified present verbatim at that tag (converting jape's
:paramto{param})./health, excluded by deliberate policy above.wrapAuthHandler, independent of-http.public):POST /syncer/connect,GET+POST /rescan, all 16/wallets*routes,
POST /debug/mine,GET /debug/pprof/{handler}. Everything else useswrapPublicAuthHandler.WebSocket/subscription routes of any kind.
GET /api/state→.indexModeconfirmed to take exactly"personal"/"full"/"none"(wallet/manager.go, serialized viaMarshalText).GET /api/consensus/networkconfirmed fields include.name,.blockInterval,.maturityDelay, and.hardforkV2.{allowHeight,requireHeight,finalCutHeight,ephemeralOutputHeight}— note two more
hardforkV2fields than the inputs mention.{addresses:[...]}) for all four/batch/addresses/*routes and/check/addresses(→{known:bool}), each capped at1000 addresses (HTTP 400 above that).
DELETE /wallets/{id}is written in source with a tabbetween verb and path, so a naive
grep '"DELETE 'misses it. It is excluded anyway.Sibling Sia daemons — explicitly out of scope
renterd(renter/storage client),hostd(storage host),siad(deprecated legacy v1all-in-one daemon), and
explored/ its hosted instancesiascan/api.siascan.comare all separate Sia Foundation daemons with separate, non-overlapping REST APIs.
None of their routes appear in this spec.
api.siascan.comdeserves a specific warning: it coincidentally exposes/consensus/tipand/consensus/networkpaths that look like walletd's, but it is apure explorer/indexer with no wallet, no
/addresses/{addr}/balancewatch-set semantics,and a different route tree overall (it has no
/consensus/index/{height}at all — thegenesis lookup there is
/consensus/tip/0). It was used in this run only tocorroborate chain facts, and must not be configured as a provider for this spec.
Also note:
hostdhas an experimentalconsensus.pruneTargetreorg-window pruningsetting. That is a different daemon and is not evidence about walletd's retention — it
did not influence the archive decision.
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