Some Windows telemetry exists only when the host is configured to produce it. Rustinel subscribes to it but never changes host policy. Without the policy, the matching rules load and stay silent.
| Rules | Needs |
|---|---|
service: security |
Audit policy, for most event IDs |
service: security on 5156, 5157, 5152 |
Filtering platform connections |
ps_module (event 4103) |
Module Logging |
ps_script (event 4104) for ordinary scripts |
Script Block Logging |
ps_classic_start uses event 400 from the Windows PowerShell channel and needs no additional host policy.
service: windefend reads the Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational channel.
Check that this channel is enabled with wevtutil gl "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational".
Rustinel subscribes to selected Application channel provider and event ID pairs used by the SigmaHQ corpus.
The originating Windows provider is exposed as Provider_Name; event.provider identifies the Rustinel Event Log collector.
The source program must be installed and produce its events for a rule to fire.
SQL Server instance providers are accepted when their name contains MSSQL and the event ID is in the supported set.
Data joins non-empty raw EventData values with newlines.
For Application Error event 1000, the positional values also populate AppName, AppVersion, ModuleName, and ExceptionCode when present.
Level retains the numeric value from the Windows system header.
Formatted, localized Message text is unavailable, so rules requiring Message are reported as unsatisfiable by sigma doctor.
The supported provider and event ID pairs are recorded in the field availability table.
Each Security event is written only when its audit subcategory is enabled.
Windows enables some of them out of the box, as the Default column shows, but editions differ and Group Policy often changes them.
Check the real policy with auditpol /get /category:*.
| Event | Audit subcategory | GUID prefix | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| 4624 logon | Logon | {0CCE9215-…} |
Success |
| 4625 logon failed | Logon | {0CCE9215-…} |
Varies |
| 4648 explicit credentials | Logon | {0CCE9215-…} |
Success |
| 4776 credentials validated | Credential Validation | {0CCE923F-…} |
Varies |
| 4771 Kerberos pre-authentication failed | Kerberos Authentication Service (domain controllers) | {0CCE9242-…} |
Domain controllers |
| 4720, 4722, 4724, 4726, 4738, 4765, 4766, 4781, 4794 user accounts | User Account Management | {0CCE9235-…} |
Success |
| 4728, 4732, 4756 group membership | Security Group Management | {0CCE9237-…} |
Success |
| 4740 account lockout | Account Lockout | {0CCE9217-…} |
Success |
| 4741, 4743 computer accounts | Computer Account Management (domain controllers) | {0CCE9236-…} |
Domain controllers |
| 4719, 4817 audit policy changed | Audit Policy Change | {0CCE922F-…} |
Success |
| 1102 Security log cleared | None, always written | Always | |
| 4697 service installed | Security System Extension | {0CCE9211-…} |
No |
| 4698 to 4702 scheduled tasks | Other Object Access Events | {0CCE9227-…} |
No |
| 4656 handle requested | File System, Registry, Kernel Object, SAM | {0CCE921D-…}, {0CCE921E-…}, {0CCE921F-…}, {0CCE9220-…} |
No |
| 4663 object access | File System, Registry, Kernel Object | {0CCE921D-…}, {0CCE921E-…}, {0CCE921F-…} |
No |
| 4657 registry value modified | Registry | {0CCE921E-…} |
No |
| 5145 share access check | Detailed File Share | {0CCE9244-…} |
No |
| 5136 directory object changed | Directory Service Changes (domain controllers) | {0CCE923C-…} |
No |
| 5447 filtering platform filter changed | Filtering Platform Policy Change | {0CCE9233-…} |
No |
| 6416 device recognized | Plug and Play Events | {0CCE9248-…} |
No |
| 4768 Kerberos TGT requested | Kerberos Authentication Service (domain controllers) | {0CCE9242-…} |
Domain controllers |
| 4769 Kerberos service ticket requested | Kerberos Service Ticket Operations (domain controllers) | {0CCE9240-…} |
Domain controllers |
| 4662 directory object operation | Directory Service Access (domain controllers) | {0CCE923B-…} |
Domain controllers, needs a SACL |
| 4742 computer account changed | Computer Account Management (domain controllers) | {0CCE9236-…} |
Domain controllers |
| 4661 SAM or directory handle | SAM, Directory Service Access | {0CCE9220-…}, {0CCE923B-…} |
No, needs a SACL |
| 4673 privileged service called | Sensitive Privilege Use | {0CCE9228-…} |
No |
| 5137, 5141 directory object created, deleted | Directory Service Changes (domain controllers) | {0CCE923C-…} |
No |
| 5379 Credential Manager credentials read | User Account Management | {0CCE9235-…} |
Success |
| 5156, 5157 connection allowed, blocked | Filtering Platform Connection | {0CCE9226-…} |
No |
| 5152 packet dropped | Filtering Platform Packet Drop | {0CCE9225-…} |
No |
| 4672 special privileges assigned | Special Logon | {0CCE921B-…} |
Success |
| 5140 network share accessed | File Share | {0CCE9224-…} |
No |
| 4799 local group membership enumerated | Security Group Management | {0CCE9237-…} |
Success |
Every GUID ends in -69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030.
Back up the current policy, then enable what you need from an elevated prompt:
auditpol /backup /file:C:\auditpol-before.csv
auditpol /set /subcategory:"Security System Extension" /success:enable
auditpol /set /subcategory:"Other Object Access Events" /success:enable
auditpol /set /subcategory:"Logon" /success:enable /failure:enable
auditpol /set /subcategory:"Credential Validation" /success:enable /failure:enable
auditpol /set /subcategory:"Detailed File Share" /success:enable /failure:enable
auditpol /get /category:*!!! note "Non-English Windows"
auditpol takes the localized subcategory name.
Use the GUID instead: auditpol /set /subcategory:{0CCE9211-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030} /success:enable.
auditpol /list /subcategory:* /v prints names next to GUIDs.
- 4656, 4657, and 4663 also need a SACL on each file, key, or object you want to watch (Properties, Security, Advanced, Auditing). The subcategory alone logs nothing.
- Detailed File Share and Kernel Object are high volume.
Size the Security log accordingly:
wevtutil sl Security /ms:<bytes>. - Failed logons can burst. An exposed RDP or SMB service under password spraying writes one 4625 per attempt.
Group Policy has the same settings under Computer Configuration > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Advanced Audit Policy Configuration.
Events 5156 (connection allowed), 5157 (connection blocked), and 5152 (packet dropped) need two switches:
- The host audits them: enable Filtering Platform Connection and, for 5152, Filtering Platform Packet Drop.
- Rustinel reads them: set
security_filtering_platform_connections = trueunder[windows].
They are off in Rustinel by default because Windows writes one record per connection, far more often than it writes logon events. Size the Security log before enabling them, or older records will be overwritten before other rules see them.
Events 4672 (special privileges assigned), 5140 (network share accessed), and 4799 (local group membership enumerated) need two switches:
- The host audits them: enable Special Logon, File Share, and Security Group Management.
- Rustinel reads them: set
security_long_tail_events = trueunder[windows].
They are off in Rustinel by default because 4672 is written for every administrative logon and 5140 for every connection to a share. Their rate follows logon and file-server traffic, not attacker activity, so measure it on a representative host before enabling them fleet-wide. Account lockout (4740) is collected by default: it is written once when an account crosses the lockout threshold, on the domain controller or on the local machine that owns the account.
Measured on a quiet Windows 11 host with the lockout threshold at 10:
| Event | Rate | How measured |
|---|---|---|
| 4740 | One per lockout, none in 5 days of ordinary use | 12 bad network logons against a throwaway local account produced exactly 1 |
| 4672 | About one per logon: 3,522 against 3,531 4624 events, with 81 to 1,821 per day (about 76 per hour at the 1,821 peak) | Counted in the existing Security log over several days |
| 5140 | One per new share session, not per file operation: 9 for 9 distinct tree connects, but 2 for 200 reconnects of the same loopback share | Audit enabled for the test, then restored |
| 4799 | One per enumeration: 50 for 50 net localgroup, 307 in 5 days of lab work |
Counted in the log and by test |
These are a quiet workstation's rates. A file server sees 5140 per client session and a terminal server sees 4672 per logon, so expect orders of magnitude more there. 4672 and 5140 carry no attacker-specific signal on their own, which is why they stay behind the option.
The 4740 Subject* fields name the machine account (SYSTEM), not the caller.
Use CallerComputerName, which the local test did not populate, to find the source.
Events 4768 and 4769 (Kerberos ticket requests), 4662 (operation on a directory object), 4742 (computer account changed), 4661 (handle to a SAM or directory object), 4673 (privileged service called), 5137 and 5141 (directory object created, deleted) need two switches:
- The host audits them: enable the subcategories in the table above. 4662 and 4661 also need a SACL on the directory objects to watch, for example the domain root for DCSync detection.
- Rustinel reads them: set
security_domain_controller_events = trueunder[windows].
They are off in Rustinel by default because a domain controller writes 4768 and 4769 for every Kerberos request and 4662 for every audited directory read, so the rate follows the size of the domain. 4673 is not domain-controller only, but it is written for every use of a sensitive privilege and is gated with the rest. Size the Security log, and measure on the domain controller, before enabling them.
5379 (Credential Manager credentials read) is not gated. It is written when a process reads a stored credential, and it is collected by default.
Without Module Logging, PowerShell never writes event 4103. Enable it for all modules:
$key = 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ModuleLogging'
New-Item -Path "$key\ModuleNames" -Force | Out-Null
New-ItemProperty -Path $key -Name EnableModuleLogging -Value 1 -PropertyType DWord -Force
New-ItemProperty -Path "$key\ModuleNames" -Name '*' -Value '*' -PropertyType String -ForceOr in Group Policy: Windows Components > Windows PowerShell > Turn on Module Logging, with module names set to *.
ModuleNames must not be empty.
Windows logs suspicious script blocks (4104) on its own. To log every script block, enable Turn on PowerShell Script Block Logging in the same Group Policy folder. Check the current value:
Get-ItemProperty HKLM:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging -Name EnableScriptBlockLogging- Script block and module content is collected from Windows PowerShell 5.1.
Classic engine starts also include version 2 through event 400.
PowerShell 7 (
pwsh) uses a different provider and is not collected. ContextInfoandPayload(4103) are written in the host's display language. A rule that matches an English label such asHost Application =fires only on English hosts.